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Summary
In spite of the high level of automation commonly applied to today’s engineering
system, humans’ skill and knowledge still plays a central role in the systems’
daily operation, critical decision making, and accident management. The com-
plexity of the engineered system poses great challenge for human operators to
perceive and understand the operational situation. The research domain of situ-
ation awareness approaches the operational challenges from the human cognition
perspective while the presented thesis aims at supporting situation assessment
from the system perspective.
The thesis has reviewed different perspectives on situation awareness in the hu-
man factor studies and uses the knowledge reflectively for system representation
and analysis. The human cognitive activities during complex plant operation
and how they perceive a situation and what kind of knowledge has to be estab-
lished in the human mental model for the operators to be aware of the situations
has motivated the utilization of functional representation in system level of sit-
uation assessment. The thesis has summarized the MFM syntax and provides
detail instructions of how to model by using the modeling technique.
A PWR primary system is used as a comprehensive modeling case to demon-
strate the MFM modeling procedure. Then the thesis investigates the usability
of functional modeling approaches to define and model a plant operational sit-
uation. MFM modeling is proposed because it is a formalization combining the
means-end and part-whole dimensions of a system, so that the MFM models
can therefore represent a complex system at several abstraction levels. MFM
models also model cause-effect dependencies of functionalities and objectives of
the system in different abstraction levels, so the model can be used for causal
reasoning. This thesis extends the causal reasoning methods for MFM models
and exploits the ability for MFM models to represent operational knowledge
and operational modes. Both concepts are of great importance for situation
assessment. By applying the extended MFM theory, situation assessment pro-
cedure is developed to assess the plant operational situation. The assessment
procedure is demonstrated on the PWR model case.
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Resume´
Moderne industrielle systemer har en stadig stigende grad af automatisering.
Menneskets færdigheder og viden spiller dog stadig en væsentlig rolle n˚ar op-
eratørerne tager beslutninger i den daglige drift, især i kritiske situationer og ved
h˚andtering af uheld. Systemernes kompleksitet gør det vanskeligt for operatøren
at blive opmærksom p˚a og diagnosticere unormale driftssituationer. Forskningen
i menneske-maskine grænseflader undersøger dette ”situation awareness” prob-
lem med fokus p˚a viden om menneskelig kognition. Form˚alet med denne afhan-
dling er at undersøge, hvorledes operatørens situationsopfattelse og h˚andtering
af kritiske driftssituationer kan forbedres ved konstruktion af beslutningsstøtte-
systemer.
Afhandlingen giver en oversigt over menneske-maskine forskningen inden for
”situation awareness”. Heraf uddrages krav til de systemrepræsentationer og
analyser, som et beslutningstøttesystem skal tilbyde for at operatøren skal kunne
vurdere kritiske driftssituationer. Det begrundes, hvorfor repræsentationer af
systemets form˚al, funktioner og kausale egenskaber med fordel kan anvendes
i analyse og vurdering af kritiske situationer. Tre begrundelser fremføres: 1)
operatørers kognitive aktivitet er m˚alorienteret, 2) operatørerne skal anvende
viden om systemets funktionelle form˚al ved analyse af driftssituationer og 3) op-
eratørerne opfatter, forst˚ar og fremskriver en situation ved anvendelse af kausale
ræsonnementer.
Afhandlingen anvender formelle metoder til funktionel modellering til at de-
finere og modellere driftssituationer. Det vælges at anvende Multilevel Flow
Modeller (MFM), som kombinerer anvendelsen af part-helheds og m˚al-middel
begreber i beskrivelsen af et komplekst system p˚a flere abstraktions niveauer.
MFM repræsenterer ogs˚a kausale relationer og kan derfor ogs˚a bruges til at ræ-
sonnere over a˚rsager og konsekvenser af hændelser i et system. Afhandlingen
udvider eksisterende metoder til kausal ræsonnering i MFM og udvikler nye
metoder til repræsentation af operationel viden og overordnede driftstilstande
(modes). Begge udvidelser er af betydning for anvendelse af MFM modeller
til vurdering af kritiske driftssituationer. Afhandlingen anvender den udvidede
MFM teori til formulering af en procedure for situationsvurdering. Afhandlingen
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omfatter tillige modellering af det primære kølesystem i en nuklear trykvand-
sreaktor (PWR). Modellen anvendes til at demonstrere den udviklede metode
til situationsvurdering.
Preface
This thesis was prepared at the Automation and Control Group, Department of
Electrical Engineering, Technical University of Denmark as part of the require-
ments for acquiring the PhD degree in engineering.
The PhD project focused on fundamental research of the further development
in the functional modeling methodology, Multilevel Flow Modeling (MFM) and
MFM causal reasoning. MFM is invented by Morten Lind, who is co-supervising
this PhD project, and has been developed for the past two decades. The system
knowledge representation requirement in complex systems’ design and operation
has always been a motivation for the research in MFM modeling. This PhD
project is also motivated by applying MFM and MFM reasoning in one area of
the industrial application, which is situation assessment for operator decision
support. This project is funded by OECD Halden Reactor Project (HRP),
SOSPO project, and DTU. The major research is conducted in DTU while the
modeling case used in the thesis is partially the research result from the external
research stay in Institute of Energy Technology (IFE), Halden, which is the host
institute of the HRP project. Although the modeling example is taken from the
nuclear industry, the result of the research is also applicable for system that can
be modeled by using MFM technique.
The thesis is written as a monograph which consists of 6 Chapters, including
the scientific review, theoretical study, and methods demonstration.
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Glossary
Abstraction Hierarchy Abstraction Hierarchy describes causal relations within
an engineering system at different levels of granularity. The hierarchy includes
five levels: Functional purpose, abstract function, generalized function, physical
function and physical form.
Causal Reasoning Causal reasoning is the ability to identify causality: the
relationship between a cause and its effect.
Cognitive System Engineering Cognitive systems engineering involves an
interdisciplinary focus on the systems design with emphasis on the development
of successful human-centered engineered systems.
Ecological Interface Design (EID) Ecological Interface Design is a frame-
work for creating advanced user interfaces for complex engineered systems.
Functional modeling (FM) A type of qualitative modeling approaches that
model a system’s functionality and goals.
Human Factor Human factors (or ergonomics) is the scientific discipline con-
cerned with the understanding of interactions among humans and other elements
of a system. It applies theory, principles and methods to design in order to op-
timize human well-being and overall system performance.
Multilevel Flow Modeling (MFM) A functional modeling methodology rep-
resenting industry plants by using means-end and part-whole decompositions.
Operator Support System Operator support systems are designed to provide
useful information to operators for facilitating system operations.
Pressurized water reactor (PWR) A type of light water reactor used for
nuclear power production. A PWR plant is constituted of a primary side and a
secondary side. In the primary side, the coolant (water) is heated by the energy
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generated by the fission of atoms in the reactor core under high pressure. In
the secondary side, the thermal energy provided by the primary side is used to
generate electricity.
Rule-Based System Rule-based systems are used in computer science as a
way to store and manipulate knowledge to interpret information in a useful
way. They are often used in artificial intelligence applications.
Situation Awareness Situation awareness describes operators’ understanding
of the system and environment when operating engineered systems. It is com-
monly accept that situation awareness involves three stages: the perception of
current elements in the system and environment, the comprehension of their
meaning, and the projection of their status.
Situation Assessment Situation assessment a category of methods and tools
used for evaluating plant situation.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In spite of the high level of automation which is commonly applied to today’s
engineering systems, the knowledge and skills of a human operator plays a cen-
tral role in the systems’ daily operation, critical decision making, and accident
management. The complexity which is often posed as a challenge for managing
modern systems lies not only in the system’s operating environment, the physi-
cal system itself and human activities apart, but also permeates in the manners
of how these three elements can interact with one another during operation.
Figure.1.1 illustrates the elements of an engineering system.
It is noticeable that in Figure.1.1, the three elements in the context of an engi-
neered system: humans, physical system, and the environment are interacting
not only with one another, but also with themselves. First of all, in complex
systems such as a power plant or chemical plant, the operation tasks are not
fulfilled by one person but an organization. This creates interactions among
humans. Secondly, the modern complex system is highly automated, so that
there are complex interactions between the subsystems which realize the indus-
trial process, the safety systems, and the automatic control systems. They work
together to achieve the overall designed operational goal of the physical system.
That is to say, subsystems that constituted the physical system interact with
each other during operations. Finally, the environment also contains unknown
internal interactions, meaning that different events can happen during the same
time period. This combination of events may pose unpredictable effects on the
other two elements in a system. The Fukushima Accident [1] is initiated by two
natural disasters, a severe earthquake and a tsunami, and their combination
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introduced additional complications in dealing with the environment.
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Figure 1.1: The elements of an operating engineered system in context
A complex engineered system such as an industrial plant or product in the con-
text (including the environment, humans, and the physical system), is designed
in such a way that it comprises efforts from different scientific domains. To
design the system, one must understand 1) how different phenomena can be
utilized to realize a specific purpose; 2) how the system should be built so the
processes can be applied by the facilitation of the functions realized by physical
components; and 3) how to built automatic control systems and design human
operations, so that the engineered system can be used to achieve its overall
design goal. Therefore, a significant amount of knowledge is poured into the
system during design phases.
The complexity then introduces great challenges to the use of the system af-
ter it is constructed, even though the system is designed for “easy” operation.
Therefore, operator support systems should be developed with the physical sys-
tem, to provide useful information to the operators or automated systems for
facilitating safe operation and control.
Petersen [2] summarized two types of operator aids for supporting the decision-
making process: one to reduce or avoid higher-level cognitive activities of the
operator by providing preplanned instructions, such as checklists, paper-based
procedures, and conventional expert systems; the alternative approach is to
support the operator’s higher-level cognitive activities, rooted in studies by re-
searchers such as Rasmussen [3], Woods [4], and Vincente [5]. It has been argued
that situation assessment plays a strategic role in decision making, providing the
focus and thus serves to broaden the view of the operators and help them to
frame the operational problems before solving them. This indicates that not
only the knowledge specific for operation (how to carry out actions) is impor-
tant in situation assessment, but to understand and represent all aspects of
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design knowledge is also important so that a situation can be fully interpreted.
System representation (models) for situation assessment is a core task for en-
abling operator support system design. It is also very important to distinguish
the knowledge representation and graphical representation. Model for situa-
tion assessment is a prerequisite to another scientific research area of designing
human-machine interface to present information and analytical result to facili-
tate operation.
1.2 Research Theme
When talking about understanding and assessing the operational situations, all
the elements in Fig 1.1 has to be taken into consideration. One of the challenges
to frame an operational situation of such a system is to solve the problem of
how to accommodate all the relevant elements into one unified and systematic
representation. Only when the operational situation is perceived, understood
and can be represented, we can start to develop tools for assessing the situations.
1.2.1 What is a situation?
Broadly speaking, a situation can be understood as a state, an event, or a
process at a given moment. However, this loosely defined concept does not help
researchers to develop assessment method for it, because to assess something,
means to determine the significance of it in a specific context.
Situation assessment is closely related to the research domain of situation aware-
ness, where the concept of situation (either to be assessed and or be aware of
by the operators) should be in common. Although, there is no agreed defini-
tion of situation awareness, a widely accepted definition comes from Endsley [6],
stating that to be aware of a situation, one has to obtain three levels of knowl-
edge: 1)“the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time
and space”, 2) “the comprehension of their meaning”, and 3) “the projection of
their status in the near future”. This definition gives some level of overview of
what a situation is, suggesting that a situation is not only related to the current
events and states of the system, but also related to the future progression based
on the current condition. However, this does not provide deep insight of the
real contents which consist of a situation. For example, one may ask further
questions such as what are those elements which the operators must perceive
and comprehend and how to model them. Therefore, we try to search for the
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definition of a situation from other research endeavors to understand the core
elements which are included in the concept.
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short cuts
Figure 1.2: Rassmussen’s decision making model [7]
Rassmusen’s decision model [7] in Figure 1.2 provides a general framework to
represent the procedure of information processes involved in making a control
decision in relation to a complex system. It is noticeable that the initiation
(activation) of such a decision making process stems from the detection of a
need for action, terminates with the deployment of the selected procedure based
on the step by step knowledge establishment to solve the problem. Shortcuts
in Figure 1.2 suggest that if countable previous experience is available for the
problem and further knowledge about plant operation can be derived based on a
early stage activity in the decision model, the decision making procedure can be
shortened. The decision model provides one way to frame the concept situation,
for it offers great inputs of what knowledge is required for understanding an
abnormal situation and how to response to it although it does not use the term
situation in itself.
The knowledge that is required for situation assessment however, does not have
the same sequential property and all the knowledge states in the decision model
have to be organized in a different way so the emerged event can be viewed
in context of all knowledge states presented in the decision model. Another
key point that one can derive from the decision model is that, only when an
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action is in need, then the decision making process is triggered. Thus there’s a
requirement for determining whether the situation is of the operator’s concern
or not. This offers some convenience in defining a situation because thus it is
only needed to investigate the definition of the set of the situations which does
require operators’ attention in context of operational situation.
Dewey’s study [8] from philosophy of science provides clues of what constitutes
a situation from a learning perspective. He defined the concept of problematic
situations, as the situations worth noticing, because those are the ones requir-
ing further treatment. From this study, the problematic situation is a situation
where instinctive or habitual responses of the human organism to the environ-
ment are inadequate for the continuation of ongoing activity in pursuit of the
fulfillment of the human’s needs and desires.
Although the definition of problematic situation is about knowledge inquiry, it
offers several key points to understand the nature of a situation. First of all, as
suggested by Burke [9], the term situation (in Dewey’s study [8]), should not be
misunderstood as referring simply to a material context or environment. Rather,
it should be apprehended as a unified matrix of which the learner is an integral
component. Secondly, the term “fulfillment of one’s needs and desires” suggest
that a situation is closely related to goal fulfillment, which is also suggested by
the decision model in Figure1.2. The third point that this definition gives is that
when determining a problematic situation, one must referring to past experience
(habitual responses) and given a projection of the future state (discontinuation
of the fulfillment of needs and desires), which is also hinted to by Endsley’s [6]
formulation of situation awareness.
In Dewey’s definition of a problematic situation, only humans and their environ-
ment are of consideration. However, in complex system, there are three players
as emphasized in Section1.1. To apply this definition, it is needed to determine
the relation between humans and systems. Based on the design relations, the
physical system is constructed to fulfill the design goal of humans, which means
that the physical system serves as the means when considering goal fulfillment
from an operation perspective. Lind [10] discusses the concept of goals and
purposes in the context of modeling complex systems.
We can apply Dewey’s theory to engineering system operation, combined with
the inspiration provided by the decision model and other related definition. A
problematic operational situation means a situation that, under normal opera-
tions the system’s responses to the environment are inadequate for the continu-
ation of ongoing operation to fulfill what the system is designed for, thus certain
actions are required.
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1.2.2 What to assess?
The purpose of assessing operational situations is to facilitate human operators
to fulfill their operation tasks. Separating the problematic situations which re-
quire actions from normal situations is only the starting point for understanding
the problem of situation assessment.
To detect a failure in goal fulfillment, only the knowledge about goal structure
of the system is needed. However, the more important aspect of the assessment
process, it to understand the cause effect of the failure in goal fulfillment and
to reason about the remedial actions that the operator can perform so that the
system can operate to fulfill the overall goal again.
According to the decision model, it should be emphasized that the new goal
to perform the remedial actions (operation) is not necessarily the same on the
goal prior to the failure, and how the new goal is achieved in some cases is
by reformulating the system functions and function goal relations. Therefore,
for situation assessment, the situation contains not only one operation mode
but several. And the transition between different operation modes and the
possibility of the modes transition are all parts of a situation and should be
taken into consideration for assessment.
To summarize, a situation assessment should include the knowledge about:
1. current goal function relations,
2. a detection or prediction of goal failure and the cause effect of the current
event,
3. the desirable operation modes that the system can be brought into by
certain operations in the near future,
4. the possible operation plans.
After the required knowledge is identified, the next step is to find proper rep-
resentation to make the knowledge explicit. For modern industrial plant and
product, the challenge of knowledge representation is rooted in handling system
complexity. The next section discusses how to approach the complexity when
choosing modeling methodology for situation assessment.
1.3 Research Contribution 7
1.2.3 How to approach complexity?
This section discusses the challenge of how to make the knowledge required for
situation assessment explicit so that it can be used by both machines and hu-
mans to deal with the environment. The knowledge representation is challenging
because the required knowledge is very diverse and it is difficult to formulate all
the aspects in a unified way. The challenge also lies in representing the complex-
ity of those systems that we are targeting, which include multiple elements and
relations. The modeling approaches can be divided into two categories. One is
qualitative modeling and the other is quantitative modeling. The goal function
understanding and qualitative representation provide basis for the quantitative
models while the quantitative model can represent the system dynamic in a more
precise way than qualitative models. However, when the system is modeled by
using quantitative methods, the narrative aspects is lasted in the abstraction.
In operational situation assessment, using mathematical formulation to describe
the overall goal and functions of the system is against the explanation purpose.
Qualitative functional descriptions have to serve as an umbrella to cover the
scope of a situation for representing its significance.
When dealing with complexities, abstraction is a natural solution for functional
representations. However the abstraction level has to be determined so that the
analysis result from the constructed representation is still meaningful to serve
its purposes. To gain flexibility for using abstractions in modeling, the core
concept is to decompose the system not only into parts, but also in a means-end
manner. The means-end structure in a system describes how the system goal
is fulfilled by abstract functions and how the functions can be realized. The
abstraction levels changes along when decompose a system along the means-end
dimension, so that it is easy to customize the abstraction levels to fit for the
representation purposes.
1.3 Research Contribution
The discussion in Section1.1 suggests that a proper modeling methodology need
to be chosen as the framework for operational situation assessment in both
knowledge representation and reasoning.
Petersen [2] investigated the fundamental questions associated with the use
of one of the functional modeling approach, namely Multilevel Flow Model-
ing (MFM) for overall assessment of disturbance situations in complex process
plant. Petersen argues that MFM provides an explicit representation of the in-
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tentional structure of process plant in terms of goals and functions, and that it
meets the requirements for situation assessment for supervisory control tasks by
adopting the method for system level knowledge representation. Petersen also
extended the modeling methodology by defining causal relations between differ-
ent modeling concepts, so that the method is equipped with reasoning capability
for determining the possible causes and consequences as well. A prototype which
uses MFM for situation assessment was developed.
However, this pioneering study of using MFM for situation assessment does not
fully explore situation as a concept in the context of plant operation. The present
thesis will provide insights of how MFM models with the suggested extension of
concepts and reasoning capability can define operational situations. Thus the
modeling method can be used for situation assessment.
MFM as a modeling methodology has been extended several times after Peter-
son’s first attempt to use the method for situation assessment. This thesis will
review the state of art development of the MFM and make further extensions of
the modeling methodology, so that the models of MFM are suitable for situation
assessment.
The purpose of this thesis is to define operational situation representation
(model) to reflect the need for the operator to achieve situation awareness and
develop situation assessment procedure based on the developed model. The
main research contribution for situation assessment includes:
1. framing an operational situation from the system perspective in reflection
of how human operator perceive and understand the situation,
2. identify the requirements for model the operational situation, and applying
functional modeling methodology, Multilevel Flow Modeling (MFM), as
the modeling method for situation assessment,
3. extending MFM approach, designing and implementing consequence rea-
soning strategies for MFM, use MFM concepts to define and model oper-
ational modes which constitutes an operational situation.
4. designing assessment procedure by using MFM models and provides a use
case.
1.4 Thesis structure 9
1.4 Thesis structure
The major contents of the thesis are summarized in Fig.1.3. It includes two
parts: 1) Methodology development and 2) Operational situation assessment
application. First it will give a comprehensive explanation of how the cho-
sen functional modeling approach can represent the key concepts of a complex
engineering system for operational situation assessment. The theoretical con-
tribution of the thesis will be explained so that the chosen modeling method is
extended to fit all the requirements of representing process and operation knowl-
edge of a complex system, and furthermore, the developed models are designed
to fit for the purpose of situation assessment. Then by applying the theories
the operational assessment method will be developed. A nuclear power plant,
as a fairly complex and safety critical engineering system, is chosen as exam-
ple domain to demonstrate the modeling and operational situation assessment
procedure.
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Figure 1.3: Thesis content overview
The thesis comprises 6 chapters, Chapter 1 introduces the overall problem and
the research methodology. Chapter 2 provides a scientific review of the current
modeling methodologies and the state of the art of operator support systems and
situation assessment. Chapter 3 provides detailed explanation of the Modeling
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of the primary system in a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) unit. Chapter 4
presents the theoretical contribution of this thesis to further extend the modeling
methodology and reasoning strategy for situation assessment purposes. Chapter
5 demonstrates the operational situation assessment application by using func-
tional models and reasoning. A case study is provided by using the modeling
example from Chapter 3. Chapter 6 will conclude the thesis and present some
future perspectives of this project.
Chapter 2
State Of the Art
The term situation awareness has its common usage [11] in daily life associate
with driving, playing sports and even in activities such as crossing a busy street.
This concept also has long history in military theory, which can be traced back
to the ancient Chinese military general and philosopher Sun Tzu, who proposed
several military strategies in his work “The Art of War”, such as “he who knows
when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious” and “if you know your
enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles”. The
concept of “knowing” is essential when discussion situation awareness. When
people interact with their environment, they want to know what is happening,
what could happen and what kind of options they have in relation to what they
want to achieve. Several literatures [11,12] suggest that the scientific concept of
situation awareness in engineering field is firstly identified in the field of military
aviation. And this subject started to attract more attention in the technical and
academic literature from the late 1980s after the society had witnessed several
severe accidents such as Three Mile Island Accident and several aircraft crashes.
Afterwards this concept of situation awareness, even though with non-agreeable
and debatable definition of itself, becomes an important research domain in a
variety of industries such as in aviation industry, chemical production industry,
and power production industry. This increasing attention and focus on opera-
tors and operations is a result of the increasing system complexity and level of
automation. The purpose of the research endeavors in this field is to eventually
improve situation awareness of the human operators so that they can keep the
system operating in a safe and efficient status. There are three aspects that
are involved in the research theme, including: the fundamental understand-
ing of situation awareness, the methodology for situation assessment, and the
implementation of operator support system for situation awareness.
12 State Of the Art
In all relevant literatures, the terms situation(al) awareness, situation(al) as-
sessment and situation(al) measurement are used with ambiguous definitions
and sometimes interchangeable. For the clearance, in this thesis, the term situ-
ation awareness and situation assessment are both used, though with different
meaning. The latter refers to the status of the engineered system with human
operator, physical system, and the environment enclosed as a whole, while the
former refers to the human’s understanding and reflection of the status (which
has a strong focus on human factor). While both of the terms uses the concept
of situation, however, the former emphasize on the intersubjective aspect of a
situation, while the later emphasize the subjective aspect of the same concept.
In this chapter, relevant literature is reviewed in three major parts. Section
2.1 offers literature review of operator support systems developed based upon
the concept of situation awareness and assessment. The review of the literature
identifies the challenges of how the knowledge of operational situations should be
represented in a systematic way, which leads to the second part of the literature
review in Section 2.2, centered on Functional Modeling (FM) which is argued
as a promising method to supplement the development of support systems for
situation awareness and assessment because it has a strong scientistic basis.
Among the variety of FM methodologies, Multilevel Flow Modeling (MFM)
is the choice of method for modeling in this thesis, for assessing operational
situations. Thus a detailed review of MFM is also offered in Section 2.3. Section
2.4 concludes this section.
2.1 Situation assessment in operator support sys-
tems
As already mentioned above, situation awareness and assessment has rather non-
agreeable definitions and are applied in various of industrial domains. Nofi [11]
suggested that after a review in the field of situation awareness, it seems that
many key researchers agreed that the definition of situation awareness is loosely
defined, and the challenge partially lies on the fact that the understanding of sit-
uation awareness differs between applicable domains. However, these researchers
also agreed that there are generic aspects in situation awareness which can be
applied in general.
The review is arranged in such a way that it firstly introduces the application
of situation assessment so that the reader can understand the key issues in the
applications before the fundamental theory of situation awareness is reviewed.
For the relevance of the case study in the present thesis, literature is reviewed
especially in the application domain of nuclear power production among others.
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However, the reader shall bear in mind that it is the generic approaches and
frameworks that the thesis will examine in depth.
2.1.1 Human factors in operations
A complex industrial plant such as power plants or a highly automated trans-
portation system such as modern aircrafts and ships are often operated by oper-
ators in a control room. Usually, the operators in the control room consist of one
or multiple operators and the number of the crew is different according to the
tasks. The operators’ role in such a plant or craft usually includes monitoring
the system status and manipulating the control devices when necessary. The
operators often perform supervisory roles of information acquisition and inter-
pretation, planning, and decision making. Those tasks are usually complex and
mentally challenging due to the complexity of the system and the environment.
In safety-critical and complex systems such as chemical plants, power plants, and
transportation systems, human errors can be a serious cause of accidents. For
example, in the aviation industry, statistics on the causes of accidents from 1959
through 1989 indicate that flight crew actions were casual in more than 70% of
worldwide accidents involving aircraft damage beyond economical repair. [13] In
the nuclear engineering, an analysis of the abstracts from 180 significant events
reported from the nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the United States that 48%
of the incidents were attributable to human-factor failures [14]. These sever
accidents motivate researchers to focus on the human operators’ performance.
Lee and Soeng suggest [15] that there have been two approaches to prevent
human error during nuclear main control room operations. The first approach
is the provision of better training and education programs for operators. The
second is to improve human machine interfaces (HMIs) with improved interfaces
and operator support systems. These two aspects are drawn from human factor
research.
Ergonomics, or human factors is the scientific discipline concerned with the
understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of a system,
and the profession that applies theory, principles, data and methods to design
in order to optimize human well-being and overall system performance. Among
different specializations within this research domain, cognitive ergonomics is
concerned with mental processes, such as perception, memory, reasoning, and
motor response, as they affect interactions among humans and other elements of
a system. The relevant topics include mental workload, decision-making, skilled
performance, human-computer interaction, human reliability, work stress and
training as these may relate to human-system design and interaction.
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The study of human factors mostly started from the human perspective, the
systems that humans are interacted with are also important for human per-
formance. It is pointed out by Reason [16] that it is imperative for aviation
industry to accept that the failures of people involved in daily routines are
symptoms of deficiencies at the deep foundations of the system. This can also
be applied to other industries. The need for a systematic and comprehensive
approach to cognitive issues in the design of systems involving human operators
has emerged over the past 20 years especially as computer-based technologies
have pushed the nature of operational work in a direction in which cognitive
challenges gained more and more dominating position.
2.1.2 Cognitive systems engineering
Cognitive systems engineering [17,18] involves an interdisciplinary focus on the
systems design with emphasis on the development of successful sociotechnical
systems. A sociotechnical system is one in which humans provide essential
functionality related to deciding, planning, collaborating and managing. The
concept describes most of the engineered systems nowadays and in line with the
context of engineered system that is specified in Figure 1.1, Chapter 1. Drawing
on contemporary insights from cognitive, social and organizational psychology,
cognitive system engineers seek to design systems that are effective and robust.
The central task of the domain is on amplifying the human capability to per-
form cognitive work by integrating technical functions with the human cognitive
processes they need to support and on making that cognitive work more reli-
able. [17]
Elm et al.’s [19] review on cognitive system engineering suggests that at an ab-
stract level of description, the approaches of cognitive system engineering are
straightforward and very similar to the analysis and design strategies used in
other engineering domains. It requires the observation of the field practices and
representation of the knowledge. Thus the acquired knowledge of some form
can facilitate the design of appropriate cognitive support systems. Those de-
sign solutions are then evaluated via computer modeling or human-in-the-loop
simulation. While the approach may sound familiar to many engineers, the
methodologies used for knowledge acquisition, knowledge representation and
cognitive modeling may not. These methodologies have been developed specif-
ically to deal with the complex and nonlinear nature of human cognition; its
hidden interdependencies and those of its processes that are beyond the con-
scious awareness of the operational expert.
Rasmussen’s [20] study in cognitive system engineering distinguishes between
three levels of cognitive behavior of human operators, namely skill, rule and
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knowledge-based behaviors. According to Rasmussen, human use different be-
havior to solve different type of cognitive tasks. The three levels are explained:
Skill-Based Behavior that depends on operator’s direct sensory-motor inter-
action with his environment in a feed-forward manner. (Where no con-
scious attention is required.)
Rule-Based Behavior which is performed on the basis of rules. The rules in
this context can be both internal established mental perceptual cues and
external guidance (such as procedures)
Knowledge-Based Behavior of operators when utilizing explicit models of
the system being supervised to interpret display information and reason
about the system.
Among the three levels of cognitive activities, knowledge-based behavior is the
most demanding type of task and is used only in unfamiliar situations where
know-how and rules for operation are not readily available from previous cases.
The complete decision model (see Figure 1.2) illustrates the decision making
procedure by adopting knowledge-based behaviors during which an operator
has to go through different activities and establish all the required knowledge
to be able to perform the required actions. Some examples of decision making
short-cuts are also identified in the model. For example, the operator can map
his/her observation with either internal or external rules to the tasks he/she
shall perform directly, without formulating the goal explicitly, which indicates
a rule-based behavior.
It is important to notice that there is no indication in the decision model that
each knowledge state should be derived by human or provided by computerized
systems. Combining with the understanding of different cognitive activities, the
skill-based activities can only be improved by accumulating experiences through
training, while the rule- and knowledge-based activities can be supported by
external resources.
Petersen [2] reviewed the human cognitive activities during supervisory con-
trols and discussed different cognitive levels (skill-rule-knowledge [20]) and the
contextual model provided by Bainbridge [21]. Petersen summarizes that it is
important to frame the situation according to the intentional structure of the
system being supervised because the operator activities and actions are sub-
ordinate to the intentions ascribed to the system. During disturbances which
cannot be handled by the automatic control systems, the operator must inter-
vene and actively maintain or restore the goals ascribe to the system that they
are operating.
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According to the understanding of human centered system and the three types of
operator behavior, operator support systems should be developed to facilitate
the operation and they are especially important in the field that knowledge-
based activities dominates operators tasks. In the next section the existing
operator support system in safety critical system is briefly reviewed.
2.1.3 Operator support systems
As the processing and information presentation capabilities of modern comput-
ers increase, the trend is shifting toward the application of modern computer
techniques to the design of advanced decision support system. Kim [22] sug-
gests that the design of instrumentation and control (I&C) systems for various
plant systems is rapidly moving toward full digitalization, with an increased
proportion of automation.
Advanced plants, for example like modernized NPP control room, have been
considerably simplified, and now use large display panels (LDPs) and LCD dis-
plays instead of analogue indicators, hand switches, and alarm tiles. In these
control rooms, operators do not have to move around the room in order to view
indicators or even control devices. Every necessary action is handled in their
position. Moreover, many pursuits have been made to develop operator support
systems that allow more convenient control room operation and maintenance.
The operator support systems aim to provide useful information to operators
for optimizing the workload of operators and to establish convenient operation
environment. However, they could cause not only positive effects but also nega-
tive effects on the system safety. For example, if there is insufficient explanation
and the functionality of the knowledge that used for developing the support sys-
tem is hidden and become transparent to the operator, the adopting of using
support system may cause problem during situations that the support system
cannot provide meaningful aids to the operators.
Kim and Seong [23] identified that since operator support systems could directly
affect the decisions of an operator, their effects should be evaluated carefully.
The new systems could reduce the possibilities of specific types of human errors,
but new types of human errors could occur or possibilities of some human errors
could increase.
There are various kinds of support systems at work for the operators, aiding
with surveillance, diagnostics, and the prevention of human error. Some of
these, such as early fault detection systems [24], are capable of doing tasks
which are difficult for operators. Others, such as operation validation systems,
are intended to prevent human errors [25]. As the control rooms evolve, more
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support systems will be adapted to digital displays and mobile devices.
However, according to the result of operator aids evaluations [26], a support sys-
tem does not guarantee an increase in operator performance and inappropriate
operator support systems or automation systems can have adverse effects. The
report also concludes that some support systems could degrade an operator’s
situation awareness capability and may increase an operator’s mental workload,
for they provide more information for the operator the process.
The operator support system developed in modern control rooms such the MCR
in an NPP is technology based and the performance of the support system is
evaluated mostly through operators’ performance when working with the sup-
port systems [15]. It is arguable that the implementation of the support system
requires theoretical foundations to support the design. And most of the theories
are coming from the study within human factor and cognitive system engineer-
ing. In next section, a narrower research area, namely situation awareness will
be reviewed in depth.
2.1.4 Situation awareness
Following the previous discussion, one may ask the question that what exactly
is the requirement for the human operator to effectively avoid human errors.
This is largely depending on which type of activity is required for the human
operator. If only the rule based behaviors are required, then deployment of more
automation and enhance the reliability of automation system is the preferable
way to increase system operation reliability as a whole (including both human
reliability and system reliability). However, for most of the complex systems,
there is great uncertainty due to the dynamic environment of the systems, mak-
ing the operator aware of the operational situation is an obvious requirement
during that unfamiliar event occurrence. In this case, the introduction of more
automation system does not ensure the minimizing human errors. To the con-
trast, Endsley reviewed much literature which documented the negative effects
of increased automation on operator’s situation awareness, leading to significant
out-of-the-loop performance reduction [27].
Endsley’s research [27] has pointed out that, based on Bainbridge’s view on dif-
ferent levels of automation [28], such reduction in situation awareness for human
operators to operate highly automated systems partly result from poor trans-
parency and deficiencies in the design of the user interface. The operator’s task
is also shift fundamentally from the active observation to the passive response
to system indicators. This shift accompanied by the typical approach of im-
plementing automation systems put the operator in the role of monitor. This
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research also was able to identify alternate automation paradigms, featuring in-
termediate levels of automation, which could minimize these losses of operator’s
awareness.
As mentioned previously, situation awareness is a widely applied concept for
three major research studies mentioned by [29]:
1. How various design decisions associated with automation may negatively
or positively affect situation awareness?
2. How to improve the system technologies, user interfaces, and display de-
signs to support situation awareness?
3. How to develop training approaches for improving situation awareness?
To expand upon their three-stage procedure to achieve situation awareness,
Endsley et. al. [30] describe the three hierarchical phases of situation awareness:
perception, comprehension, and projection by using pilot and operating aircraft
as an example (SA refers to situation awareness in the following quotes):
Level 1 Perception of the elements in the environment: “The first step
in achieving SA involves perceiving the status, attributes, and dynamics
of relevant elements in the environment. The pilot needs to accurately
perceive information about his/her aircraft and its systems (airspeed, po-
sition, altitude, route, direction of flight, etc.), as well as weather, air traffic
control clearances, emergency information, and other pertinent elements.”
Level 2 Comprehension of the current situation: “Comprehension of the
situation is based on a synthesis of disjointed Level 1 elements. Level 2
SA goes beyond simply being aware of the elements that are present to
include an understanding of the significance of those elements in light of
the pilot’s goals. Based upon knowledge of Level 1 elements, particularly
when put together to form patterns with other elements, a holistic pic-
ture of the environment will be formed, including a comprehension of the
significance of information and events.”
Level 3 Projection of future status: “It is the ability to project the future
actions of the elements in the environment, at least in the near term,
which forms the third and highest level of Situation Awareness. This is
achieved through knowledge of the status and dynamics of the elements
and a comprehension of the situation (both Level 1 and Level 2 SA).”
This explanations offers an example of what can be the elements in the operators’
working environment (answering the question posted in Section 1.2.1 in a specific
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domain). However, there is still a lack of formalization and cannot be applied
to general systems.
Based on the levels automation proposed by Sheridan and Verplank [31], End-
sley [27] analysis the 10 level of automation together with the control tasks
(monitoring, generating, selecting and implementing) in the control room. This
study suggests a sharing of tasks between human and automation systems. Ac-
cording to above definition, situation awareness is clearly a subjective concept,
which requires a mental model of the operator. However, the knowledge about
the system goal and function is designed and the operational situation also has
an intersubjective aspect. Thus there is intersubjectivity lies in the concept of
situation. The first level of situation awareness is to perceive, which require
that enough (meaningful) information can be gathered by the operator. How
the information is presented to the operator will highly affect the foundation of
human situation awareness.
Harrald and Jefferson [32] states that the information component of situational
awareness depends on both the particular domain and the users’ dynamic infor-
mation needs. To determine the information required it is necessary to focus on
the basic goals of the decision maker and the major decisions that they need to
make to achieve the goals. From the information required it is then possible to
determine the individual data source that need to be collected. This emphasizes
one of the difficulties with obtaining situational awareness; developing static and
anticipated goals. Harrald and Jefferson summarized the general characteristics
about data requirements based on the levels of situation awareness as follow:
1. Collect the data required to satisfy the decision makers goal. The data
collected needs to directly support the decision maker in arriving at their
objective. While there is often more data collected that is actually required
it is important to group and present the data as information that can be
directly used to achieve a desired result.
2. Data collected should have the attributes necessary to sufficiently describe
a required piece of information.
3. Data must provide the ability to describe relationships between compo-
nents.
4. Data must provide the ability to link the attributes for any given piece
of information to time. It is important to maintain a time-line of what
changes occurred in data values. This will allow the user to obtain Level
3 situation awareness by being able to predict future states.
5. Data must be of sufficient quality to meet the decision making and action
needs.
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Based on the theoretical research, applicable methodologies and applications
are developed to support all the three stages of situation awareness: display de-
sign for supporting mostly in perception and also in comprehension, the system
diagnosis tools support situation comprehension, and the situation awareness
models for projection and prediction. The following sub sections will review
each of these three research areas.
2.1.4.1 Display design for information retrieval
Ecological Interface Design (EID) [33] is a framework for creating advanced user
interfaces for complex engineered systems. Unpredictable events that occur in
dynamic, open systems can lead to unfamiliar situations that are difficult for op-
erators to identify comprehensively through user analysis techniques. The EID
approach begins by generating a work domain model revealing the functional
constraints of a system, this model is then used to structure the visual inter-
face. The resulting design embeds the functional relationships between physical
components into the display at different levels of functional abstraction. This
provides an externalized system model, which should allow for a better un-
derstanding of the system state and support users dealing with unanticipated
events. This approach supplement situation awareness which starts from the
operator’s task analysis rather than work domain analysis of the system and
environment in which the operators work.
The key concept for work domain analysis in the EID approach is the Ab-
straction Hierarchy, which describes causal relationships within an engineering
system at different levels of granularity, placing the high-level functional purpose
at the top and physical functions carried out by components at the bottom [34]:
1. Functional purpose Production flow models, system objectives, constraints
etc.
2. Abstract function Causal structure including mass, energy, and informa-
tion flow topology, etc.
3. Generalized function Standard functions and processes including feed-
back loops, heat transfer, etc.
4. Physical function Electrical, mechanical, chemical processes of compo-
nents and equipments
5. Physical form Physical appearance and anatomy; material and form; lo-
cations, etc.
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AH defines the means-end hierarchy of the system. The same system can also
be physically divided into sub-systems and further into individual components.
This sort of decomposing a system is called part-whole decomposition. By
combining part-whole and functional decompositions, a work domain model is
generated in the form of an Abstraction Decomposition Space (ADS).
As introduced previously, operator behaviors when working with complex sys-
tems can be categorized into three different types: skills-based, rules-based, and
knowledge-based [20]. These categories of behavior require information from
progressively higher levels of the abstraction hierarchy. EID outlines three vi-
sual design principles to ensure that each mode is supported.
• To support skills-based behavior direct manipulation should be used and
the representation should be isomorphic to the part-whole structure.
• To support rules-based behavior a consistent one-to-one mapping between
constraints and the cues or signs provided by the interface should be pro-
vided.
• To support knowledge-based behavior the work domain should be repre-
sented in the form of an abstraction hierarchy to serve as an externalized
system model.
Paulsen also designed for different displays in her PhD thesis [35], adopting
the idea of Rassmussen’s AH but emphasis on representing knowledge that is
originated from plant design. The design framework developed by Pausen use
AH as basis but try to combine functional modeling approach such as Goal-Tree
Success-Tree (GTST) into display design when considering functional knowledge
about the plant. This framework offers an addition to the display’s function
in supporting situation awareness, not only to provide information about the
current function and state graphically, but to consider the underlying process
knowledge.
2.1.4.2 System diagnosis for comprehension
As information is perceived by the operators, the second level of situation aware-
ness is to make sense of the information. Endsley [36] has identified that di-
agnostic tasks is a challenge for operators especially during the comprehension
level of situation awareness.
Petersen [2] suggests that cause-effect reasoning based on the current system
state is a crucial part of understanding a disturbed situation which requires
22 State Of the Art
control actions. He also adopted Rqsmussen’s AH as an initial framework for
developing diagnosis methodologies in context of the system control goals.
In practice, diagnosis is a task performed with the aim of establishing a ba-
sis for formulating the goal of intervention and the particular action to take.
Rasmussen [20] argued that diagnosis is a goal-directed activity inextricably
connected with action, that cannot be separated from the contextual factors
that determine actions. Both Rasmussen [17] and Vicente et al. [37] agreed that
during fault diagnosis, a disturbance is often identified at an abstract level, while
failed components are identified at a lower level of abstraction. This top-down
approach of diagnosis reflects an appropriate way for diagnosis agents such as
human operators to cope with system complexity.
However, as Petersen [2] later identified and also argued by Lind [38], AH is not
a representation in itself, but rather a loosely defined framework for represen-
tation. According to Lind, the abstraction hierarchy has immediate intuitive
appeal to engineers, but is conceptually difficult to apply for modeling. The
means-end and part-whole concepts of AH is adopted by Lind for developing
another Functional Modeling methodology to overcome the problems that shows
in applying AH for modeling and reasoning.
2.1.4.3 Situation assessment methods for prediction
Since situation awareness aims not only to perceive and comprehend but also
to predict the status of a situation in the near future, which is the third level
of the situation awareness, there are various situation assessment approaches to
conduct the prediction. Also because the engineered system is a dynamic and
collaborative process, the development of efficient assessing methods usually
require data integration with the support of computer-based intelligent tech-
niques.
Several tools have been adopted for assessing situations. Among those, studies
have reported that machine learning techniques can provide an effective method
of intelligent prediction by extracting rules from previous data to generate new
assessment results. For instance, Lu et al. [39] developed a support vector
machine-based assessment approach which has the ability to learn the rules
from previous assessment results and generate the necessary warnings for a
situation. They used a synthesized, artificially generated data set to illustrate
the effectiveness of their proposed situation assessment approach. A neural
network-based situation assessment module was developed by Brannon et al. [40]
to provide a high level of SA for decision makers in force protection. Naderpour
[41] pointed out that despite the usefulness of machine learning techniques for
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situation assessment, their use in real environments is very limited because of
the insufficiency in the training data.
Bayesian theory has also been widely considered in the situation assessment
configuration in complex and safety-critical process under uncertainty. Miao
[42]developed a computational model and a model-based situation awareness
metric to quantify and measure operator situation awareness. The developed
model is used to provide explicit representation of the operator’s fundamental
functions of information processing, situation assessment, and decision making
in the system operation. Kim and Seong [43] developed an analytic model
for the situation assessment of NPP operators also based on Bayesian inference.
However, there is certain limitation for implementing these methods because the
lack of a fundamental support to define a situation (or making assumptions).
Naderpour and Lu developed an expert system-based situation assessment method
for a chemical plant [44] and extended it to incorporate the ability of neural net-
works to project the state of the environment in to the near future. However,
because of the lack of appropriate data for abnormal situations, it could not
be implemented in the real world. They also developed a situation awareness
support system [41] based on goal-directed task analysis methodology for the
development of a situation awareness support system to help operators in ab-
normal situations. However, similar problem remains for how to understand
situation as a fundamental concept rather than analyze a situation based on the
tasks of operator.
These models are useful for the operator support system to facilitating the
prediction of plant situation development based on situation awareness, but do
not emphasis on the semantic meanings of the data which is collected from the
system.
2.1.5 Requirement for knowledge representation
Previous discussions in Section 2.1 provide an overview of development in sup-
port situation awareness and assessment. Figure 2.1 shows the research activities
in the related area. Human operators create a reflection of the physical system’s
status through establishment of knowledge. This knowledge is graphically vi-
sualized by using displays. The operator understand the system function and
goals and go through the three states of perception, comprehension and pro-
jection to reach situation awareness and decide how to operate in the specific
situation. The representation of the engineered system for situation assessment,
should reflect the cognitive procedure for facilitating the operators to generate
the mental model.
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Figure 2.1: Modeling context for situation assessment.
One of the challenges has been identified by Endsley is that the automation
system give negative effect on operator’s situation awareness. Therefore, the
automatic control actions, should be represented to the operator in context of
the same intentional structure as the human operation. These control intentions,
should be represented together with the process goal-function relations.
Therefore, the modeling approach is selected within the category of functional
modeling, which represent system in a functional abstraction level, which can
facilitate the human operator to build their mental model for understanding the
situation.
2.2 Functional modeling
Functional Modeling comprises concepts, methods and tools which for repre-
senting the purposes and functional organization of complex dynamic systems.
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Lind [45,46] and Chittaro [47] among other researchers has been promoting that
models representing functional knowledge are useful for improving the perfor-
mance of system diagnosis, which is part of the operators tasks for understanding
the situation.
Lind [45] suggested two basic motivations to use a FM method. The first is that
the concepts of FM provide a systematic framework for formalizing intersub-
jective knowledge which is shared among participants in design and operation
of complex systems, i.e. engineers and operators. The second is motivation is
that FM is a systematic approach to apply different perspectives and degrees of
abstraction in the description of a system and to represent shifts in contexts of
purpose. These abilities are crucial for handling semantic complexity.
It is also argued by Rasmussen [3] in relation to operator support systems for
complex process plants that there is a motivation for utilizing functional models
based on the fact that this type of knowledge is closely related to the way
operators conceive the process being supervised.
In this section, literature related to the functional concepts and functional mod-
eling methodologies is reviewed.
2.2.1 Functional concepts
Functional and means-end concept are often used intuitively in all engineering
domain. But to apply the concepts for modeling, formalization is required.
AH [3] provide a general framework to represent complex system at different
abstraction levels by using functional concepts. For each of the abstraction
level, functional concepts can be decomposed in the part-whole dimension. This
is the key contribution to the pioneering research development to use functional
concepts for modeling complex work domains.
However, the concepts of functions and purposes which are used in AH has their
ambiguity and the means-end relation proposed in AH also lack explicit expla-
nation. Lind [38] analyzed the problem with applying AH for modeling activities
and emphasize that it is not possible to derive knowledge about the functional
organization of a complex system from an analysis of its physical constitution
alone. Functions are inextricably connected with goals and acquiring knowledge
of system functions presupposes knowledge of a particular goal context.
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2.2.1.1 Functions
Lind [46] identified four aspects of the concept of a function in an engineering
domain.
Functions are social facts
Functions are ascribed to items or systems depending on the interest of a
user. They are subjective in an ontological sense but objective in an epis-
temic sense because having a function is a fact which cannot be disputed.
This is to say that one has a function of a certain kind is true according
to the knowledge shared by a community of designers and users. These
types of facts are intersubjective and are called social facts by Searle [48]
and distinguished from (physical) brute facts which are objective. This
social aspect of functions reflects their dependence on purposes or goals.
Functions are relative to goals
Function is not an intrinsic property of a physical structure but is related
to a particular intention or goal by its user. The same physical object
can be ascribed with different functions in different goal contexts. This
suggests that functions are concepts that relative to the users’ intention.
It is not meaningful to discuss functions without their goal context.
Functions represent the static aspect of system compare with roles
Functions should be distinguished from the concept of roles, where func-
tion implies the dynamic aspects of the physical system (changes), while
roles implies the static aspects of the functions. During the course of func-
tion realization, function implies the change that introduce by a certain
action through its preparation to its execution and eventualization, while
roles are the abstract features which will persist during all action phases.
Functions are realized by structure with certain disposition
When functions is ascribed to physical structures, they must have the
capability of realizing it. That is to say functions and roles of entities are
dependent on the physical structures’ dispositions. (The disposition of an
item includes all possible ways it could interact with the environment, its
functions and roles is a subset of its dispositions.)
2.2.1.2 Means-end structure
With this understanding of the concept of a function, Lind [49] abstract the
means-end representation independently of the means-end structure in AH. In
a means-end relation the different aspects of the means-end relation connect the
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means for action (the structure and the dispositions) with the potentials and
opportunities available for action here and now (the roles and the functions) and
objectives to be achieved in the future. One important aspect of the means-end
concept specified by Lind is that the ordering of the elements (goal, function, and
structure) in the means-end relation should not be seen as forming a hierarchy.
A hierarchy would imply that the elements were ordered according to a principle
of subordination, but this is not always the case. As indicated, the ordering has
temporal aspects but is fundamentally related to the distinction between the
potential and the actualization of an action.
Lind [46] also mentions that in modeling complex system, usually several means-
end related activities need to be modeled. Therefore, the interrelations between
different means-end relations (from physical structure to goal) need to be con-
sidered. Lind suggests that the goals in means-end relations can be defined
differently, so that one means-end relation can link to one of the elements in
another means-end relation through its goal. There are four different kinds of
goals according to Lind.
• to achieve the state produced by the action/function;
• to execute the function or serve a role;
• to enable another function or role;
• to produce a structural means for another function . . .
Figure 2.2 shows the means-end relation and means-end structure.
2.2.2 Functional modeling methodologies
2.2.2.1 Goal-Tree-Success-Tree
Goal Tree-Success Tree (GTST) method proposed by Modarres [50] is a deep
knowledge approach that was devised to represent complex dynamic domain
knowledge. This approach can model the underlying principles of a given pro-
cess domain in a hierarchical way. GT identifies the hierarchy of the qualities of
the system and decomposing the system objectives in the means-end dimension,
representing the functions which support the system goals. Both main and sup-
port functions, are considered in GT. The main functions are functions directly
involved in achieving the goal, whereas, the support functions are needed to
support and realize the main functions. For example, the goal function of safely
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Figure 2.2: Means-end structure. [46]
generating electric power in a nuclear power plant is attained by a combina-
tion of many functions as heat generation, heat transportation, emergency heat
transportation, heat to mechanical energy transformation, mechanical to elec-
trical energy transformation. Each of these functions then require the support
of other functions. [51] ST represents the hierarchy of the objects of the system
and decomposes the system along the part-whole dimension, building from the
whole system to the parts necessary to attain the last levels of the GT. This
hierarchy is built identifying the elements that are part of the parent objects. As
for the GT, two types of objects are distinguished: main and support objects.
The first ones are directly needed to achieve the main functions, whereas the
second ones are needed for the operation of the main objects. [50] For example,
generating power plants, electric power transmission and distribution networks
are the support objects to provide ac power to a pump.
Hu and Modarres [52] proposed to use GTST combine with the Dynamic Mas-
ter Logic Diagram (DMLD) for representing full-scale time-dependent behavior
and uncertain behavior of complex physical systems. The DMLD is an exten-
sion of the Master Logic Diagram (MLD) to model the dynamic behavior of
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a physical system. It identifies the interactions between parts, functions and
parts and functions, in the form of a dependency matrix and it adds the dy-
namic aspect by introducing time-dependent fuzzy logic. Ferrario and Zio [53]
adapted the GTST-DMLD framework for developing safety assessment method.
A similar framework including the GTST-MPLD (Master Plant Logic Diagram)
framework proposed by Modarres.
However, GTST model does not equip with systematic graphical representation
that can be used and the model is largely depends on system descriptions. There
is a lack of semantic foundation and formalization of the methods. GTST model
alone does not support formalized analysis method for reasoning and inference.
2.2.2.2 Function block diagram
A Functional Block Diagram (FBD) [54] in systems engineering and software
engineering is a block diagram, which describes the functions and interrelation-
ships of a system. The FBD has four components:
• Functions of a system pictured by blocks,
• input and output elements of a block pictured with lines and,
• the relationships between the functions,
• the functional sequences and paths for matter and or signals.
FBD can be combined with flow charts to be developed in a specific type of
diagrams called Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD). The FFBD approach
is originated from 1950s, [54] as a multi-tier, time-sequenced, step-by-step flow
diagram of a system’s functional flow. FFBDs show the same tasks identi-
fied through functional (part-whole) decompositions as FBD and display the
function blocks with logical, sequential relationship to connect them. Each
functional block in FFBDs must be linked with logic symbols to represent the
relations between functions.
FBD is different from the other functional modeling approaches in a sense that
it does not emphasize the functional concepts of the system (such as goals and
functions). FBD does not offer abstraction representations as Functional models
usually do, although it is commonly considered as one of the functional modeling
approach. In FBD, functions are viewed as simple input-output blocks and can
only represent the connectivity between subfunctions rather than deal with the
means-end decomposition and abstraction.
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2.2.2.3 Multilevel flow modeling
Multilevel Flow Modeling (MFM) is a methodology for modeling of industrial
processes on several interconnected levels of means and part-whole abstractions.
The basic idea of MFM is to represent an industrial plant as a system which
provides the means required to serve purposes in its environment. MFM has
a primary focus on representation of plant goals and functions and provides
a methodological way of using those concepts to represent complex industrial
plant. [55]
The development of the conceptual foundations of MFM modeling language,
the tools and applications have been ongoing for more than two decades. The
basic ideas of MFM were conceived by Lind [56] and developed over the years
by his and other research groups. The research is originated from Rasmussen’s
AH, and attempts to solve problems related to representing complex systems in
human machine interfaces for supervisory control by adopting the idea of means-
end structure and abstraction. But later on MFM has been further developed
into a broader research field dealing with modeling for design and operation of
engineered systems, and try to tackle the fundamental representation problems.
[38]
2.2.2.4 Other modeling methodology
Function Flow Diagram (FFD) is a very similar functional modeling method
with FBD/FFBD. FFD is a network representation of the system which portrays
the system in terms of its component functions and the logical interdependencies
or flows between the functions. FFD is also not an ideal approach for modeling
complex system for the purpose of situation assessment because it suffers the
same problem with FBD.
Marcos [57] proposes to use a functional modeling approach called D-higraph
to represent a complex system by capturing both the functional and the struc-
tural aspects of the process plants. D-higraphs are an extension of an existing
formalism called Higraphs, which can be understood as a combination and ex-
tension of conventional Directed Graphs and Euler/Venn diagrams. Mata et
al. [58] proposed methods for applying D-higraphs to diagnose abnormal situ-
ations. Although the logical structure of D-higraphs can enable reasoning and
inferences, however, the method does not give a lot of input on modeling the
semantic complexity of the engineered system.
MFM modeling is chosen to be the fundamental modeling methodology for the
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project, because of the following points:
• it is the method that has the ability to approach the complexity issue for
representing complex system for cognition purposes;
• MFM models causality between different functions and goals which provide
the user a systematic way to conduct causal reasoning by using developed
models;
• MFM also developed a set of control functions, which describe the control
intentions together with the process model. [59] This Modeling approach
covers the conceptual requirements for knowledge representation in this
study.
A more detailed review on MFM research is provided in Section 2.3.
2.3 Current MFM theory
As mention previously, MFM is a modeling methodology for representing com-
plex systems at different abstraction level of specifications. It has been used for
modeling engineering system in several safety critical domains such as nuclear
power plant [60] [61] and chemical engineering system [62] [61]. The conceptual
foundations, the development of MFM modeling language, tools, and appli-
cations have been undergoing for more than two decades. The most recent
introduction for MFM can be found in [55] [63].
The further development of MFM theory is an undergoing project which also
includes the present PhD project. A most recent version of MFM is introduced
in this section. Most of the review content is based on the [55]. However, certain
changes are made because of the updates from the research since 2011, and the
changes will be specified in the following text.
2.3.1 MFM concepts
2.3.1.1 Objective and threats
MFM distinguishes between system goals in two different categories based on
the nature of the concepts. One is to achieve a certain state, while the other
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is to avoid an undesirable state. These two can be expressed by using only one
concept of goal with different logical expressions. However, the differentiation
between the two concepts is the key to understand safety issues of complex
system. Goals in MFM is not expressed only by the target states only, but
has to be expressed by using target together with a means-end relation (will be
introduced later). Table 2.1shows the MFM symbols for MFM goal target.
Table 2.1: Definition of MFM targets.
Terminology Symbol Definition
objective An objective represents a desirable state which
should be produced or maintained.
threat A threat represents an undesirable state which
should be destroyed or suppressed.
2.3.1.2 Flow functions
In contrast to other functional modeling methodologies, MFM adopts a specific
functional ontology. In MFM functions are defined in relation to the processing
of flows of mass and energy. MFM is based on a set of six generic flow functions
representing different primitive operations performed on either mass or energy
flow. The list of MFM flow functions are shown in Table 2.2 and 2.3.
Flow functions in MFM are not isolated. They has to be included in a function
structure. In MFM, a function structure represents a set of functions connected
by causal relations. A function structure can contain mass and energy flow
functions and control functions. Three subtypes of are therefore distinguished:
mass flow structures, energy flow structures and control flow structures.
2.3.1.3 Causal relations
Causal relation in MFM specifies the causality between MFM flow functions.
The terminology of MFM causal relations is specified in Table 2.4.
2.3.1.4 Means-end relations
There are two types of means-end relations. The first type of means-end relation
should be link to MFM target to form description of objectives in the model.
2.3 Current MFM theory 33
Table 2.2: Definition of MFM flow functions. (1)
Terminology Symbol Definition
Source A source represents the function of a system serving
as an infinite reservoir of mass or energy. No physi-
cally realizable has in principle unlimited capability
to deliver mass or energy. However, the source func-
tion is used to provide an adequate abstraction of
the physical phenomena considered.
Sink A sink represents the function of a system serving as
an infinite drain of mass or energy. As for the source
function, this function can be used in many cases as
an adequate abstraction.
Storage A storage represents a system which serves as an
accumulator of mass or energy. A storage function
can have any number of connections and any num-
ber of enabling conditions. An example could be the
function of a tank when used as a device for accu-
mulation of a fluid, in this example we are dealing
with a mass storage. Another example could be the
storage of energy in a boiler by heating the water.
Balance A balance represents the function of a system which
provides a balance between the total rates of incom-
ing and outgoing flows. Each balance function can
have any number of connections and any number of
conditions
These relations includesproduce, maintain, destroy, and suppress and the end
of these relations is a MFM target. The second type of means-end relation
including producer-product (pp) relation and mediate relation is used to describe
the relation between function and a goal function. The second type of means-
end relation indicates a direct shift of perspective of function structure. These
relations are used when the function structure realize a functional end (activity)
rather than a target state. These relations include producer-product and mediate
and the end of these relations is a MFM function. The list of Means-end relations
is shown in Table2.5.
It should be noticed that the means-end relation together with the target state,
for example “to produce an object” is the “end” in the means-end relation, and
the function structure is the means to achieve the end.
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Table 2.3: Definition of MFM flow functions. (2)
Terminology Symbol Definition
Transport A transport represents the function of a system
transferring mass or energy between two systems or
locations. A transport function has one upstream
and one downstream connection to an influence rela-
tion. The downstream connection point is indicated
by the arrow head representing the direction of flow.
Note that the flow direction is not identical to the
directions defined by the influence relations.
Barrier A barrier represents the function of a system that
prevents the transfer of mass or energy between two
systems or locations. Typical examples of systems
which implement barrier functions are the cladding
on nuclear fuel rods, heat isolating material and a
trap in water systems
2.3.1.5 Conditional relations
The fulfillment of an objective and emerge of a threat could disable or enable a
flow function. A condition relation which is a special means-end relation (inter-
activity-relation), describes the relation between a flow function which may be
enabled by an objective or disabled by the threat. The definition of conditional
relations are shown in Table 2.6. Although that these two relations is defined
together in [55] with the MFM control relation actuation (which will be intro-
duced in the next section), these two should be distinguished from the actuation
relation. This is because the condition can only be realized by objective fulfill-
ment in a means-end structure. The control functions can “actuate” on the
condition of a function rather than has a direct relation to serve as condition
for a function realization.
2.3.1.6 Control function and control relations
Von Wright’s action types and the extensions with descriptions proposed by
Lind [64] provide a formal foundation for the definition of elementary control
functions. The introduction to how the control functions are introduced in the
MFM ontology is provided in [59]. The control function and control relations
are listed in Table 2.7.
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Table 2.4: Definition of MFM causal relations.
Terminology Symbol Definition
Influencer A flow function F (source, sink, storage or balance)
is connected with a transport T upstream or down-
stream with an influencer relation if it has the role
of influencing the amount of substance transported
by T.
Participant A flow function F (source, sink, storage or balance)
is connected with a transport T upstream or down-
stream with a participant relation if the system real-
izing F has the role of passively providing or receiving
substance for the transport T.
2.3.1.7 Roles and structures
The existing MFM concepts also includes the lower level in the mean-end struc-
ture. The concept of roles and structures is used to link the functional repre-
sentation to the physical system. However, MFM ontology on both roles and
structures is not solidly defined, thus there is no agreeable MFM concepts is
implemented in the current modeling tool.
Previous researchers who adopted MFM methodology often use a direct ap-
proach to associate physical structures with MFM functions. [] However this
is not an elegant solution to solve the problem because the relation between
physical structure and system function has to be supported by fundamental
means-end theory.
Lind [65] introduced a preliminary analysis for extending MFM functions to
enable the representation of roles. MFM roles are defined in relation between
physical structure and the function, which is clearly suggested in the means-end
structure. Wu [66] identified the need for the roles that need to be introduced
in MFM models for chemical engineering applications. She also proposed four
roles namely: object, agent, patient, instrument to model system functions so
that the developed model can be used in HAZOP analysis with the complete set
of guide words. However, to include roles in MFM models is still a challenge.
With the absence of a definite role ontology in the current MFM methodology,
this thesis try to abridge the structure-function relation through state evaluation
rather than trying to define the structure-function relation.
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2.3.2 MFM reasoning
Because MFM models a complex systems’ objectives and functions with different
type of relations, the developed model can be used to analyze the dependency re-
lations between different functions and objectives. Reasoning with MFM models
is based on cause-effect relations which are generic i.e. independent of the par-
ticular modeling object. MFM is therefore very effective for building knowledge
bases for model based expert systems. The need to develop rules for reason-
ing about causes and effect which is a characteristic of rule based systems is
eliminated entirely and the effort is reduced to building the MFM.
The cause-effect relations are associated with goal-function and function-function
patterns in MFM models. These patterns are defined by influence relations in-
terconnecting the flow functions within the flow structures and the means-end
relations making connections between flow structures. For each of the influence
relations and the means-end relations there is a corresponding set of cause-effect
relations relating a state of a function or goal with the state of another function
or goal in the model. These generic cause-effect relations can be implemented
as a rule base system for MFM reasoning.
Petersen [2] has developed a set of rules using an earlier version of MFM ontol-
ogy where the causal relations are defined differently from the present thesis. To
support comprehensive reasoning of MFM, the causal relation has been further
developed in recent years. Lind introduces the new causal reasoning foundation
in [67]. In this thesis, the MFM causal reasoning will be re-examined in con-
text of norm and fault occurrence to extend on the MFM reasoning algorithm
implemented before 2012.
2.3.3 Tools and application
MFM methodology has well defined graphical symbols, and MFM models can
be built by using computerized tools. Petersen [2] has implemented a MFM
model builder prototype in a G2 system for using the same platform to develop
expert system for reasoning about the root causes of disturbances by using MFM
models.
Lind and his research group later developed a Microsoft Viso template for MFM
model building process. And another software which is called MFMWorkbench
is developed by using Java Expert system Shell (Jess) to reason about root
causes after the MFM models have been developed in Microsoft Visio.
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Recently, Thunem et al. [68, 69] has developed a Java-based program MFM-
Editor which offers a friendlier user environment for MFM model building. And
MFM-Editor is later updated as MFM Suite which is developed in relation
with this PhD project [70]. The author of this thesis has been developing the
reasoning package which can be plug-in the MFM Suite as analysis tool box for
Reasoning about causes and consequences. A screen shot is provided in Figure
2.3.
Figure 2.3: Screen shot of MFM Suite.
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Table 2.5: Definition of MFM means-end relations.
Terminology Symbol Definition
produce A produce relation connects an objective with a func-
tion structure if one or several functions in the struc-
ture contribute to produce the objective.
maintain A maintain relation connects an objective with a
function structure if one or several functions in the
structure contribute to maintain the objective.
suppress A suppress relation connects a threat with a function
structure if one or several functions in the structure
contribute to suppress the objective.
destroy A destroy relation connects an threat with a function
structure if one or several functions in the structure
contribute to destroy the objective
pp A transport represents the function of a system
transferring mass or energy between two systems or
locations. A transport function has one upstream
and one downstream connection to an influence rela-
tion. The downstream connection point is indicated
by the arrow head representing the direction of flow.
Note that the flow direction is not identical to the
directions defined by the influence relations.
mediate A barrier represents the function of a system that
prevents the transfer of mass or energy between two
systems or locations. Typical examples of systems
which implement barrier functions are the cladding
on nuclear fuel rods, heat isolating material and a
trap in water systems
Table 2.6: Definition of MFM conditional relations.
Terminology Symbol Definition
enable An enable relation connects a function with an ob-
jective. It is used when the function is enabled when
the objective is satisfied. All functions can be en-
abled.
disable A disable relation connects a function with a threat.
It is used when the function is disabled when the
threat is emerged. All functions can be disabled.
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Table 2.7: Definition of MFM control functions and actuation relation.
Terminology Symbol Definition
Steer To steer is the function of a system which is produc-
ing a new state in the controlled system.
trip To trip is the function of a system which is destroying
an actual state of the controlled system.
regulate To regulate is the function of a system which is main-
taining an actual state of the controlled system.
suppress To suppress is the function of a system which is sup-
pressing a potential new state of the controlled sys-
tem.
actuation An actuation relation connects a control function
with a function structure containing a flow function
which is the direct object of control.
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2.4 Chapter summary
This chapter reviewed the problem or situations assessment posed in the oper-
ation in complex industrial plants. It is important to note that although the
situation awareness is a subjective concept which require the precise mental
model of a situation in the minds of operators, the knowledge source of for op-
erators to generate such a mental model is objective and lies in the system that
they are interacting with.
Therefore, it is important to abstract the knowledge of the system situation in
a representation which is most suitable to human perception. The choice of
modeling methodology is crucial to enable the development of support system
for situation assessment and situation awareness.
Human understanding of the situation and their generated intentional behav-
iors are based upon the functionalities and the design intentions of the system
itself. Functional modeling approach is a great tool to model system goal func-
tion aspects and can handle the system complexity at the same time because
it adopted the means-end structure. Thus the FM approach should be adopted
as modeling method for situation assessment to facilitate human cognitive ac-
tivities. MFM as a mature functional modeling methodology is equipped with
the capability of covering all aspects for the purpose of supporting situation
assessment in complex systems. However the modeling concepts and reasoning
strategies of MFM need to be extended to fulfill the operator support tasks.
MFM has been adopted for various modeling applications, the literature about
MFM modeling procedure and syntax is rare and scattered. The next chap-
ter will introduce the detailed MFM modeling syntax and procedure, and use
sufficient examples to demonstrate the modeling techniques.
Chapter 3
MFM Modeling Procedure
and the PWR Model
Readers can get some insights of how to built MFM models for the process
by previous literatures [2, 55, 71]. Huessen and Lind [59, 72] explains how to
model the control function on top of the process model. However, there’s no
comprehensive instructions for modeling by using the latest developed MFM
modeling ontology and syntax. The purpose of this section is to introduce the
present version of the modeling technique.
The Chapter will start with a detailed explanation of the MFM syntax and
using partial models to explain how to use MFM functions to represent different
physical structures in Section 3.1. A small example of how to model a thermal
power plant at a very abstract level will be explained. And a procedure for MFM
modeling is summarized. Section 3.2 will be dedicated to explain a model of a
PWR primary system in a fairly detailed representation. Section 3.3 concludes
this chapter.
3.1 MFM modeling procedure
3.1.1 MFM syntax
As already introduced in Section 2.3, MFM represents a complex system by
using both means-end and part-whole decompositions. Along the means-end
dimensions, MFM represents a system in terms of objectives and flow functions
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at different levels of abstractions. And each of the flow-structures in an MFM
model includes a set of different flow functions which decompose a function
structure in the part-whole dimension. Control functions and control objectives
are independent of the process model but are linked to the process model by
control relations. Sometimes, adding control functions to the process model may
impose changes to the flow functions. Examples will be provided shortly.
As opposed to the functional modeling methodologies such as GTST [22], MFM
has a well-defined ontology rooted in action theory and regarding mass and
energy flow balance which based upon using first principle phenomenological
information to represent internal process and system relations.
3.1.1.1 Flow functions
In an MFM model, flow functions do not exist outside their flow structures. The
flow structure indicates whether the function included is a mass flow function
or a energy flow function. Inside of each flow structures, flow functions are
never isolated but has to be connected with other flow functions. While source
and sink functions represent the boundaries of a flow structure, meaning that
the flow in this function structure enters from the source and disappear from
the sink. The mass or energy flows beyond the source and sink function is not
of concern in a particular flow structure. The storage functions represent the
storage capability inside a flow structure, while the balance functions represent
the system’s capability of balancing the total inflow rate and out flow rate. All
the source, sink, storage, and balance functions are separated in physical space
within a flow structure, thus all the functions has to be connected through
transport functions (or barrier functions) to form a flow structure. Because
the transport or barrier function are the only functions represent the mass or
energy flow should or should not go from one stationary function to another. The
arrows inside a transport function indicates the flow direction. Therefore, for
each of the flow functions, one must distinguish between the in-port (upstream)
connection and the out-port (downstream) connection.
The function connection rules are illustrated in Table 3.1 below.
3.1.1.2 MFM relations
The four type of relations in MFM should also be used by following the MFM
syntax introduced in the following sections.
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Table 3.1: The connection syntax of between flow functions.
(sto/bal is abbreviation for storage or balance)
Flow Functions (Num. of)In-port (Num. of)Out-port
source (0)n/a (1)transport
sink (1)transport (0)n/a
transport (1)source/sto/bal (1)sink/sto/bal
barrier (1)sto/bal (1)sto/bal
sto/bal (1-n)transport (1-n)transport
Causal relations
Causal relations should be used in two different occasions. Firstly, they should
be used between different flow functions to indicate the causality between them.
Because the nature of flow function connections, the transport or barrier func-
tion will always be causal to both its in-port connection and out-port connection.
Therefore, the causal relations that used between flow functions only indicate
that whether there is a active influence by flow functions of source, sink, storage,
or balance to the connected flow functions of transport or barrier. If a trans-
port or barrier function is influenced from the in-port connection or out-port
connection, an arrow (influencer relation) should be marked at the connection
port, otherwise, a box (participant relation) should be marked at the connection
port. The second usage of the causal relation is to indicate whether there is a
influence relation from a control objective to its control function.
Table 3.2: The syntax of causal relations.
Causal relations start end
influencer source/sink/storage/balance transport/barrier
participant source/sink/storage/balance transport/barrier
Means-end relations
MFM distinguishes between two types of means-end relations.
One type is the means-end relations that used between a target (objective or
threat) and a flow function, which indicates that the target is the end that
is realized by using the function as a means through the specific means-end
relation. These relations includes produce, maintain, suppress, and destroy.
The purpose of distinguishing between the four relations is to make sufficient
expression of the models semantic meanings to enable reasoning and explaining
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a situation. Therefore, the four relations has to be used according to the MFM
syntax. Produce and maintain have to be used between a flow function with
a positive target (an objective), while suppress and destroy have to be used
between a flow function with a negative target (a threat).
The second type of means-end relations are used between flow functions in
different flow structures that represent different abstraction levels.
Table 3.3: The syntax of means-end relations.
Means-end relations start end
produce/maintain flow function objective
suppress/destroy flow function threat
pp/mediate flow function flow function
In MFM terminology, all the functions that are linked to the start of the means-
end relations is called main function. Semantically, one flow structure in a whole
is the means to realize a target objective or a purposeful function. However,
MFM means-end relation links the function which is directly responsible for the
change of status of targets or states of the purposeful function in another flow
structure is tagged as main function in the means flow structure. The syntax
serves the purpose to organize causal reasoning which will be explained in detail
in Chapter 4.
Conditional relations
A conditional relation is used to link a target to a flow function, which indicates
that the target state is the pre-condition for enabling or disabling a flow function
at another abstraction level.
Table 3.4: The syntax of conditional relations.
conditional relations start end
enable objective flow function
disable threat flow function
Control relations
Control relations are the actuation relations from a control function to a flow
function. The actuation relations can have three different meanings including
adjusting, enabling and disabling.
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Table 3.5: The syntax of control relations.
control relations start end
actuation control function flow function
3.1.2 Modeling Mass and Energy Flow with causal rela-
tions
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Figure 3.1: Model source functions
As stated in the function definition in Section 2.3, there is no physical struc-
ture can provide infinite mass or energy, thus in practical modeling, the source
function represent the inflow boundaries. To enable reasoning about the abnor-
mality of a source function later in Chapter 4, any quantity of mass or energy
can be represented as source depending on the modeling perspective. Consider
the physical components in Figure 3.1(a1), a water tank connected with an out-
let pipeline. The function of the physical structure can be considered as a mass
source connected with a transport function, as shown in Figure 3.1(b). The
influencer relation indicates that the states of the source function has a influ-
ence to the transport function. Compare Figure 3.1(a1) with Figure 3.1(c1),
an obvious difference is that the water flow rate which is transported out of a
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source function is regulated by the pump rather than influenced by the states of
the available water source. In this case, the physical structure in Figure 3.1(c1)
has to be modeled as in Figure 3.1(d) according to MFM syntax.
The physical components in Figure 3.1(a2) shows a burner which is used to boil
water in the boiler. Consider the energy balance, that the burner has a function
of energy source to produce heat. The energy source clearly influence how much
heat is transported out of the source. Therefore, the physical structure in Figure
3.1(a2) can also be represented by using MFM flow function in Figure 3.1(b)
within an energy flow structure. Figure 3.1(c2) shows a engine cooling loop. The
energy flow in this context is the heat transported from the heated engine to
the cooling tower. This small system can also be represented by using a energy
source and transport function. Compare Figure 3.1c2) with Figure3-1(a2), the
difference is that in Figure 3.1(c2), the coolant flow control the energy flow rate
while the energy source (heated engine) does not. Therefore, Figure 3.1(c2) can
be represented as Figure 3.1(d) by using MFM flow functions in a energy flow
structure.
We define a source with a participant role is a potential source, where a source
with an influencer role is a current source.
Sink functions
Sink
V1
 
 
(a) (b) 
Electrical load
Bus
 
 
(c) (d) 
  
 
 
 
 
Water Source
P1
 
Burner
 
 
(a1) (a2) (b) 
   
Water Source
V1
 
Cooling
M
Engine
 
 
(c1) (c2) (d) 
 
Figure 3.2: Model sink functions.
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Similarly to the source, there are two type of sinks. According to the semantic
meaning of a sink function, normally we do not consider the volume of a sink.
This means that in most systems, a sink function do not influence its upstream
transport function. Figure 3.2(a) shows a sink example which can be modeled
in MFM by using Figure 3.2(b) in a mass flow structure.
However in some energy flow structure, energy sinks do influence the transports
which are connected to the them. Consider the electrical load which is connected
to a distribution network in Figure 3.2(c), the state of the load directly influence
how much energy is transported into it. The load cannot be modeled as storage
function because the energy flows is not stored. Electrical loads certainly have
the function of an energy sink thus they can be represent in MFM as energy
sinks but with a influencer role to its upstream transport. Figure 3.2(c) can
be represented by using the MFM functions in Figure 3.2(d) in an energy flow
structure.
Storage functions
Any component who has a volume of capacity to store mass or energy (or both)
can serve the function of storage, thus it can be represented by a storage function
in MFM. Figure 3.3(a) illustrates four different layouts for the in-port and out-
port connections of a water tank. The difference rests on fact that whether the
level inside the water tank influence the in and out flow rate in the system.
All the layouts can be represents with transport-storage-transport connections,
with the storage serving different causal roles to its upstream and downstream
transport functions. The MFM representation of the mass flow function of
Figure 3.3(a) is shown in Figure 3.3(b).
One can also consider that the water tank as an energy storage for the water
it contains can carry energy (for example in form of heat). Thus the function
of the water tank can also be represented by using the same MFM function in
Figure 3.3(b) but in an energy flow structure. During MFM modeling, physical
components can realize several different functions in both mass and energy flow.
Those functions that are realized by the same physical components viewed from
different perspective often have means end relations as well. In the case of
the water tank example, the mass storage function mediate the energy storage
function of the water tank. This relations can be represented by the MFM
model in Figure 3.3(c).
Note that a storage function can have multiple transport functions connected
to either the in-port or the out-port of the storage functions as the physical
component of a storage tank can have multiple inlets.
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Figure 3.3: Model storage functions.
Balance functions
Balance is a function to maintain the equalization of the input and output flow
rate. A balance can have multiple upstream and downstream transport functions
connected to it. The balance function is achieved by either matching the input
flow rate to the output flow rate, or matching the output flow rate to the input
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flow rate. Therefore, at least one influencer role has to be attached to a balance
function, meaning at least one transport function has to be influenced by the
balance function. Otherwise, the balance function has no means to balance the
flow, which suggests that the balance function does not exist.
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Figure 3.4: Model balance function.(1)
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Figure 3.5: Model balance function.(2)
Considering the physical system shown in Figure 3.4(a) where a water tank is
connected with one inlet and one outlet. It is quite similar to the layout of
the example in Figure 3.3, except that there is a controller to maintain the
level of liquid in the tank constant by manipulating the outlet pump. To model
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Figure 3.6: Model balance function.(3)
the mass flow of this physical system, we should consider the tank has a flow
balance function because the purpose of which is to maintain constant level and
the means of achieving this is to use the automatic control to match the outlet
flow with the inlet flow. In MFM modeling this system can be modeled as in
Figure 3.4(b) in a mass flow structure.
Consider a similar system in Figure 3.4(c), instead of having the controller
manipulate the outlet pump as in Figure 3.4(a), assuming the controller can
control the inlet flow to match the outlet. The MFM mass flow model is shown
in Figure 3.4(d).
If two water tanks are connected in series by using a section of pipeline. The
first water tank is physically located higher than the lower tank to insure a
constant flow direction. In Figure 3.5(a), the pipe has a balancing function
which matches the water outlet rate in the first tank with the water inlet rate
in the second tank. This Physical layout can be modeled in as shown in Figure
3.5(b).
Another energy balance example is shown in Figure 3.6. The physical system
is a heat exchanger in a cooling loop. The heat exchanger has the function of
balancing the heat transport between two loops.
Control Functions
Consider the physical system in Figure 3.4(a), if there is a need to model the
controller’s function separately and not including it as part of the process, the
physical system can also be modeled as in Figure 3.7, with explicit control
functions represented in the MFM model. The control objective is to maintain
level (volume) inside the water tank, the means for the controller to control the
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level is to actuate on the outlet pump.
Figure 3.7: Modeling control functions.
3.1.3 MFM model of simple heating system
In this section, an small modeling example will be demonstrated. The subject
of modeling is shown in Figure 3.8.
In Figure 3.8, different level of system goal is summarized and the goal is trans-
lated in terms of MFM objectives. Among the objectives, maintaining temper-
ature is the main concern of the system functionality.
In the MFM methodology, the first consideration is how the main objective is
achieved. The temperature is clearly related to the energy flow functions which
are realized by the physical structure. Figure 3.9 shows the general consideration
by adopting the means-end decomposition of the system. The temperature is
maintained, by the heat energy flow from the burner to the radiator, and then
dissipated to the environment. This is modeled in the energy flow structure
efs1. MFM function sou1 in Figure 3.9 represent the function of the combustion
process as an energy source. According to the previous discussion of the MFM
syntax, this energy source is a current source for it controls how much energy is
injected into the system. The source function is linked by a transport function
to a storage in the system in form of heat (sto1). Afterwards, the energy is
further transported to the radiator that serves the function of an energy sink
(sin1).
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• G1: Maintain Comfort 
• O1: Maintain room temperature at 20 
degree 
 
• G2: Ensure that fuel can burn 
• O2: Maintain flow ratio within 
conditions for combustion 
 
• G3: Ensure that pump can rotate 
• O3: Maintain oil flow within 
condition for lubrication 
 
• G4: Ensure that water can move 
• O4: Maintain water level above limit 
Figure 3.8: The physical layout of a simple heating system.
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Figure 3.9: Modeling of the energy flow structure of a simple heating system.
When the basic energy flow is modeled in the heating system, we can decompose
the system function along the means-end dimension, asking questions of how the
energy is transported from the burner to the radiator. The answer that the heat
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is transported by circulating the water. Further question of how the water is
circulated can also be asked, and the answer is by using the pump. If the pump
in the system is viewed as a physical component that does not need to consider
its inner function, the function modeling procedure ends with the components.
However, the pump can be viewed as a system as well, and functions of the pump
can also be decomposed into more detailed functional representation. The water
is transported by means that of the pump converting electrical energy to kinetic
energy. Therefore, the mass flow of water transportation can be be modeled as
the end of the pumps inner energy flow structure. The modeling procedure is
illustrated in Figure 3.10. mfs1 represents the water flow structure and efs2
represents the energy flow structure for the pump. In efs2, tra5 represents
the energy transport which turns into kinetic energy to move the water, tra6
represents the energy which turns into heat loss during the operation.
Figure 3.10: MFM model of the simple heating system with three flow struc-
tures.
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3.1.3.1 Level of abstractions
As already experienced, an MFM model can be decomposed along the line of
means-end relations. Each function in MFM can be considered to be realized by
physical subsystem or components directly. However, it can also be decomposed
in the functional representation. This offers great flexibility for MFM to model
a complex system in a very abstract way but keep the decomposition capability
for exploring the system functionality in detail. The previously developed model
in Figure 3.10 can be further decomposed as shown in Figure 3.11
Figure 3.11: Detailed MFM model of the simple heating system.
The function flow structure of the water injection system, pump lubrication
system, and the combustion process is added to the model in Figure 3.11. Both
the water injection and the pump lubrication serve as conditions for the pump
to work properly, and the combustion process serves as condition for the energy
source function to be available in the system.
A MFM model can also be decomposed along the part-whole dimension. For
example, in the modeling procedure of this simple heating system, the water
3.1 MFM modeling procedure 55
circulation (mfs1) is modeled without any storage function because when the
circulation is considered, the mass flow is perfectly balanced by bal1 and there
is no adding or taking water from the system. However, when the water injec-
tion is considered (mfs4), the volume of the system has to be considered as a
storage function (sto4) to represent the functionality of the system. The model
aggregation or decomposition can also be seen in the more complex modeling
example in the following section.
3.1.4 MFM modeling procedure
Lind and Zhang [46] summarized two different modeling approaches to model a
system by using MFM. For a modeling activity that involves previous modeling
experience, the model can be developed by a decomposition strategy, which is
to decompose the physical system into subsystems by determine different mass
and energy flows. Then Model each of the subsystems respectively and make
connections between subsystem models afterwards by using causal relations or
means-end relations. This method may increase the efficiency of the modeling
procedure. When the modeling activity is unfamiliar to the modeler, the basic
approach has to be adopted. Basic MFM modeling combines both the top down
and the bottom up modeling approach. The modeling steps are indicated as
below.
Step 1. Understand and determine the system objectives and the main mass
and energy flows. Analyze the means-end relation between different flow
structures and their objectives.
Step 2. Identify sources and sinks for each flow structure. Identify storage
functions and balance functions between sources and sinks according to
the choice of abstraction level. Connect these functions by using trans-
port functions following the MFM syntax. Determine the causal relations
between adjacent functions.
Step 3. Review the means-end relations between flow structures and identify
the main function and the target function for each means-end relation. If
the main function or target function cannot be identified precisely due to
over-abstraction (lack of detailed function representation in the model),
decompose the existing functions and then try to identify the main func-
tion or target function again.
Step 4. Review the developed model and add extra means-end relations for
existing functions if needed.
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Note that this modeling procedure is not necessarily to be strictly followed once
a modeler is sufficiently familiar with the MFM modeling technique. However
it can serve as a general guideline for beginners when first starting to use the
methodology.
3.2 Primary system of a pressurized water reac-
tor
Pressurized water reactors (PWRs) constitute the large majority of all Western
nuclear power plants and are one of three types of light water reactor (LWR),
the other types being boiling water reactors (BWRs) and supercritical water
reactors (SCWRs). In a PWR, the primary coolant (water) is pumped under
high pressure to the reactor core where it is heated by the energy generated by
the fission of atoms. The heated water then flows to a steam generator where
it transfers its thermal energy to a secondary system where steam is generated
and flows to turbines which, in turn, spin an electric generator. In contrast to a
boiling water reactor, pressure in the primary coolant loop prevents the water
from boiling within the reactor. All LWRs use ordinary water as both coolant
and neutron moderator.
PWR can be divided into two major sub-systems, the primary system which
transport nuclear energy to generate heat and the secondary system which trans-
fer heat into electric power. In PWR, the mass flow of primary system and of
the secondary system is strictly separated to prevent the release of radiation.
However, the energy flow of the primary system and secondary system is con-
nected. For demonstration purposes, only the primary system is modeled in this
thesis. View from the perspective of the primary system, the secondary system
has a sole function which is to serve as an energy sink. In MFM the separation
of subsystems according to the perspective and functionalities is easy to achieve,
for source and sink function in MFM defines the modeled system boundary.
Figure 3.12 shows a diagram of the PWR primary system that is to be modeled.
The system includes three Reactor Cooling Loops (RCL). Each RCL contains
a Steam Generator (SG), a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) and a cold-leg col-
lector (CC) connected to the main circulation pipeline. The pressurizer surge
line is connected to the second RCL. The system also includes the Chemical
and Volume Control System (CVCS), and the safety injection system. In this
system the low pressure safety injection pumps are combined with residual heat
removal pumps, and the high pressure injection pump is combined with the inlet
charging pump from the CVCS. The control rods, which are not illustrated in
the diagram, are also to be modeled in this case. In this section, a step by step
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Figure 3.12: Diagram of the Ringhals PWR primary system.
explanation is provided to model the PWR primary system by using the MFM
technique.
3.2.1 System objectives
Following the steps describe in Section 3.1.4, the objectives and mass/energy
flows need to be determined first. The main operational objective for the PWR
primary system is to generate and transport energy (in the form of heat). This
objective is achieved by transporting the heat produced in the reactor to the
SGs. The energy will be further transported from the primary side coolant loop
to the secondary steam line inside the SGs. The energy is transported by means
of the water circulation in the RCLs. The objectives can be summarized as
follow.
1. maintain heat production,
2. maintain delivery of produced heat for power production,
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3. maintain water level in RCS,
4. maintain water circulation in RCS,
5. maintain the average temperature and pressure (energy level) in the sys-
tem.
3.2.2 RCS mass and energy flow
Two major flow structures (one energy flow and one mass flow) can be easily
identified. The coolant (mass) flow has three circulation in the physical structure
and all the coolant belongs to the same body of object. while the heat transfer
(energy flow) in the system is directional.
For the energy flow, the reactor is considered to be the energy source, and
two energy sinks can be identified from the process. The first energy sink is
the SGs in which the primary system energy flows to the secondary system.
Afterwards, the secondary system uses the heat generated in the reactor to
produce steam, which in turn moves the turbine to generate electric power and
deliver the power further into the grid. The energy sink function is realized not
only by the physical components of a single SG, but is realized by SG plus the
whole secondary system. This has to be emphasis because in MFM, physical
components and MFM flow functions do not have a one to one mapping but a
many to many mapping. The second energy sink is provided by the emergency
cooling system. During the safety injection period, the heat that is generated
from the reactor will be consumed by additional coolant.
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Figure 3.13: MFM model of the energy flow structure of the PWR primary
system.
The model of the energy flow is shown in Figure 3.13. Noted that the function
names of the partial models shown in the figures are not definite, they may vary
from the final complete model shown in Figure 3.18.
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During the normal energy production, tra44 delivers the generated heat from
the primary to the secondary side. The remaining heat will circulate back to
the general energy storage stoheat through the cold legs. During emergency
situations, when sinpp is not available, the energy is removed through sinem,
by using the emergency cooling facilities.
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Figure 3.14: Mass flow structure of the RCL system with pressurizer.
The mass flow structure can be considered as a closed system during operation
and modeled only using different storage functions to represent the water storage
capacity of the reactor vessel, SGs, CCs, and the pressurizer. Figure 3.14 shows
an MFM model of the RCLs with the pressurizer. The transport function traps
represents the pressurizer spray line.
However, considering the operational aspects, the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
is failing when any single cooling loop fails to meet the operational requirements,
and from a functional perspective it is reasonable to represent (through abstrac-
tion) the three reactor cooling loops as one coolant circulation loop. This offers
a simpler model with full function representation of the RCLs. So in the general
model, the water circulation can be represented in MFM as in Figure 3.15.
The make-up system is not modeled in this study, so the CVCS can be considered
as the water storage with an open loop from a source to a sink (omitting the
recycling of the boron and water) that is connected directly to influence the
level in the RCS.
In Figure 3.15 stovct represents the function of the VCT tank for storing water.
Additionally, another water source can be considered, which is the function of
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Figure 5. An abstract MFM mass flow of the RCS system. 
 
Figure 6. MFM model mass flow of RCS and CVCS. 
Additionally, another water source can be considered, which is the function of the Reactor Water Storage 
Tank (RWST). There is also another sink function which is realized by the component of the Pressurizer 
Relief Tank (PRT). Two partial models are shown in Figure 7. 
 (a)                  (b) 
Figure 7. Partial MFM models of the RWST (a) and the PRT (b). 
Boron injections and control rods insertions are modelled with separate mass flows. Both of them can be 
modelled by using the model shown in Figure 8. Here we consider the storage function as the total 
amount of boron or inserted rods, which influences the reactivity in the reactor. Transport «tra34» and 
«tra35» represent the process of injection and removal, respectively. 
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Figure 3.15: Abstract mass flow structure of the RCL system with pressurizer
and VCT.
the Reactor Water Storage Tank (RWST). There is also another sink function
which is realized by the component of the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT). Two
partial models are shown in Figure 3.16.
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The make-up system is not modelled in this study, so the CVCS can be considered as the water storage 
with an open loop from a source to a sink (omitting the recycling of the boron and water) that is 
connected directly to influence the level in the RCS.
Figure 5 can be extended into the model shown in Figure 6, where «sto_vct» represents the function of 
the VCT tank for storing water. 
Figure 5. An abstract MFM mass flow of the RCS system. 
Figure 6. MFM model mass flow of RCS and CVCS. 
Addition lly, another ater source can be considered, which is the function of the Reactor Water Storage 
Tank (RWST). There is also another sink function which is realized by the component of the Pressurizer
Relief Tank (PRT). Two partial models are shown in Figure 7.
(a)         (b) 
Figure 7. Partial MFM models of the RWST (a) and the PRT (b). 
Bor n injecti ns and control rods insertions are modelled with separate mass fl ws. Both f them can be 
modelled by usi g the model shown n Figure 8. Here we onsider the storage function as the total 
amount of boron or inserted rods, which influences the reactivity in the reactor. Transport «tra34» and 
«tra35» represent the process of injection and removal, respectively.
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Figure 3.16: Additional mass flow functions in the mass flow structure.
3.2.3 Boron Injectio a d Rod Control
Through two methods, that an operator or the control system can influence the
reactivity in the system, which are used to control the energy production in
the system: one is the control rods insertion, and the other is boron injection
through CVCS. These two can be modeled as two additional mass flows, which
serves as alternative conditions in energy transportation.
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Boron injections and control rods insertions are modeled with separate mass
flows. Both of them can be modeled by using the model shown in Figure 3.17.
Here we consider the storage function as the total amount of boron or inserted
rods, which influences the reactivity in the reactor. Transport tra34 and tra35
represent the process of injection and removal, respectively.
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Figure 8. MFM model of boron injection/removal or control rods insertion/removal. 
After the above discussions, one can combine all the partial models already derived and make proper 
modification (adding additional storages, balances, and transports) to produce a complete MFM model of 
the process from Figure 2. The proper means-end relations need to be drawn between different flow 
structures. A complete MFM model of the PWR primary side is shown in Figure 9. Notice that four 
additional energy flow structures are added to the model. The energy flows «efs2», «efs3» and «efs4» 
represent the energy flow within the RCPs, the high head safety injection pump (also used as CVCS 
charging pump), and the low head safety injection pumps (also used as Residual Heat Removal Pumps), 
respectively.   
The main function in each of these three energy flows provides means to transport water in different 
parts of the coolant mass flow in «mfs1». For the modelling demonstration purpose, an additional 
function of the charging pump is also modelled in Figure 9, which is to provide the pressure for RCP 
seals. In the figure, «bar1» represents a functional barrier which is conditioned by the pump energy flow. 
However, during normal operation, the water flow through the pump seals is too small to make an impact 
on the system function, and thus can be neglected during the modelling.  
 
Figure 9. A complete MFM model of the PWR primary system. 
The fourth energy flow structure that has not been mentioned in the previous discussion is «efs5», which 
represents the pressure control function of the pressurizer. The pressurizer is an important component of 
the PWR system and requires detailed energy balance representation. The energy flow structure «efs5» 
is overlapping with «efs1» for the reason that the pressurizer has the function of controlling the pressure 
of the whole primary system. Therefore, «efs5» can also be viewed as a detailed representation of 
«sto8» in «efs1». Because it is chosen to model the pressurizer vapour phase («sto20») and liquid phase 
(«sto22») separately in «efs5», for the purpose of representing the functional thermal dynamic aspects, 
the function of the pressurizer in the mass flow «mfs1» is also decomposed into vapour storage and 
liquid storage. Between the mass flow and energy flow of the pressurizer dynamic, the energy gathered 
in the two different phases drives the form changes through one phase to another, while the energy is 
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Figure 3.17: MFM model of boron injection/removal or control rods inser-
tion/removal.
3.2.4 Complete PWR prima y s stem model
After the above discussions, one can combine all the partial models already
derive and mak proper modification (adding additional storages, balanc s,
and transports) to produce a complete MFM model of the process from Figure
3.12. The proper means-end relations need to be drawn between different flow
structures. A complete MFM model f the PWR prim ry side is shown in
Figure 3.18. Notice that four additional energy flow structures are added to the
model. The energy flows efs2, efs3 and efs4 represent the energy flow within
the RCPs, the high head safety injection pump (also used as CVCS charging
pump), and the low head safety injection pumps (also used as Residual Heat
Removal Pumps), respectively.
The main function in each of these three energy flows provides means to trans-
port water in different parts of the coolant mass flow in mfs1. For the mod-
eling demonstration purpose, an additional function of the charging pump is
also modeled in Figure 3.18, which is to provide the pressure for RCP seals.
In the figure, bar1 represents a functional barrier which is conditioned by the
pump energy flow. However, during normal operation, the water flow through
the pump seals is too small to make an impact on the system function, and thus
can be neglected during the modeling.
The fourth energy flow structure that has not been mentioned in the previ-
ous discussion is efs5, which represents the pressure control function of the
pressurizer. The pressurizer is an important component of the PWR system
and requires detailed energy balance representation. The energy flow structure
efs5 is overlapping with efs1 for the reason that the pressurizer has the func-
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tion of controlling the pressure of the whole primary system. Therefore, efs5
can also be viewed as a detailed representation of sto8 in efs1. Because it is
chosen to model the pressurizer vapor phase (sto20) and liquid phase (sto22)
separately in efs5, for the purpose of representing the functional thermal dy-
namic aspects, the function of the pressurizer in the mass flow mfs1 is also
decomposed into vapor storage and liquid storage. Between the mass flow and
energy flow of the pressurizer dynamic, the energy gathered in the two different
phases drives the form changes through one phase to another, while the energy
is transported alongside with the form changes. The MFM means-end relation
producer-product is used to describe the influence from energy storages sto20
and sto22 to the mass transports tra6 and tra5, while the MFM mediate rela-
tions are used to describe the influence from the mass transports tra6 and tra5
to the energy transports tra52 and tra51.
Remembering the objective summary in the beginning of Section 3.2.1, in Fig-
ure 3.18, obj2 and obj5 represent objective 1) and 2), obj4 and obj3 represent
objective 3) and 4), obj6 represent objective 5).
Some decomposition is done for the model, for example the additional storage
(sto13) and balance (bal3) functions are added to fully describe the function
of the CCs in the system. However, the model presented in this section is still
a highly abstract functional representation of the process, but it serves well
for the purposes of further demonstrating how to add operational knowledge
into the existing model. The ability to choose the level of abstractions to fit
the modeling purpose is one of MFM’s features for dealing with complexity.
The causal relations between functions are not explained in this paper. These
relations describe the influence between function states based on the mass and
energy conservation rules. The reasoning rules will be explained in detail in
Chapter 4 and an updated version is also included in the appendix as summary
tables. These can provide a hint for modeling these relations.
The causal relations between different functions within a flow structure allow the
model to be used for causal reasoning (reason about causes and/or consequences
for abnormal function states).
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3.3 Chapter summary
In this Chapter, the MFM syntax and MFM modeling technique is thoroughly
explained. It is a big supplement to the existing literature about MFM modeling
where the models are not usually explained but being used for other purposes.
It should be noticed that MFM is a modeling methodology has formalized se-
mantic syntax and graphical representations. And it has great flexibility to
represent the same system with different level of abstractions according to the
user’s need. Macros [57] has pointed out in his PhD thesis that MFM tend to get
more complex when the physical system get more complex is a false conclusion.
The MFM functions model with causal relations is sufficient to capture the
dependencies between different functions thus MFM models can be used to
analyze the functional event propagation. This will be introduced in the next
chapter.
Chapter 4
MFM Extension for
Assessing Operational
Situations
The distinguishing between intersubjective situation and subjective situation is
of great importance because the aim of this thesis is to model the intersubjec-
tive perspective of the situation in reflection of the human perception. This is
directly the opposite way to approach situation assessment with the research on
situation awareness, where the mental model is core for situation representation.
However, the two research strategies are not contradict with each other but just
have different emphasis. It is assumed that to achieve situation awareness, the
mental model of an operator has to be an accurate reflection to the real world.
Thus the strategy of providing situation assessment support in this PhD project,
is to represent the real world situation as closely to how humans reflect on it.
This chapter deals with theoretical problems in defining a situation from the
intersubjective perspective and adopts MFM as the methodology to represent
operational situation. The existing tools lies in the MFM research is not suf-
ficient for this representation. Thus this chapter offers extensions of the MFM
tool box to make the modeling approach available for situation assessment.
The requirement for situation representation is discussed in Section 4.1 while
Section 4.2 to 4.5 will introduce the development of the MFM theory to fulfill
the requirements. Section 4.6 summarize this chapter.
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4.1 Representing situations
4.1.1 Intersubjectivity and subjectivity
Dewey [8] defines a problematic situation as a situation where instinctive or
habitual responses of the human organism to the environment are inadequate
for the continuation of ongoing activity in pursuit of the fulfillment of one’s
needs and desires. Burke [9] suggest that the term situation (in Dewey’s study),
should not be understood as only referring to a material context or environment,
but rather should be apprehended as a unified integration of the human and the
his/her material world.
At first glance, this definition hinted that a situation is subjective and it is a
reflection of the objective world from a personal perspective. Viewing a situation
from an subjective perspective, the term fulfillment of one’s needs and desires
suggests that a situation is closely related to the human’s goal fulfillment. This
indicates that the objective existence of the environment must be viewed in
the context of the human desire (goals). If the goal is different, the situation,
however the objective substances are the same, is a different situation.
In Dewey’s formulation of problematic situation, only humans and their envi-
ronment are of consideration. However, in complex systems, there are three
elements as it is emphasized in Section1.1. In addition to human and environ-
ment, there’s also the artifact (engineered system) that has to be considered.
The problem of applying the definition is to determine who is the material con-
text and whose goal is in consideration during the operation of the engineered
systems.
Lind [10] suggests that goals and purposes are concept only subject to humans
not the natural objects. However, he also suggests that there is a distinguish-
ing between natural objects and artifacts. Based on the design relations, the
physical system is constructed to fulfill the design expectation of the humans
(designers), which means that the physical systems is designed as an artifact to
serve as a means to achieve certain goals when talking about goal fulfillment
from an operational perspective.
Thus there is an aspect of the goal of the system operation in an operational
situation which is independent of the human operator. And to insure the ef-
fective and successful in operation, the fulfillment of the systems’ design goals
dominates the operators’ operational goal. This means to the human opera-
tor, the system goal is a required knowledge for them to operate the system.
This knowledge about the system’s designed operational goal is not a subjective
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concept, but is a social fact like the concept of function mentioned previously.
Which is to say that the goal is intersujective and it has to be agreed between
the designers and the operators.
This suggests that if the system can be represented in context of the system’s
designed operational goal, they can become the use of operators to match a
situation with their own operational goal.
If Dewey’s theory of situation is applied to the system operations, a problem-
atic operational situation means a situation that, under normal operations the
system’s responses to the environment are inadequate for the continuation of
ongoing process to fulfill what the system is designed for. Thus a situation exist
not only in an operator’s mind, but can be associated with the goal and function
of the system. Therefore, it is possible to represent the intersubjective aspect
of a situation explicitly and the representation can be evaluated.
4.1.2 Function and action
The definition of a problematic operational situation only solve the problem
of distinguish the objective and interobjective part of a situation, but did not
provide framework of modeling a situation. A situation also lies in the material
world. In the engineered systems, for an operator, the immediate material world
is not only the environment, but also the physical constitution of the engineered
system. The designed operational goal fulfillment is depends on the means to
realize the goals.
To model a situation, only model the system’s goal structure is obviously not
sufficient for it to be used by the operator. The system goal structure must
be developed such that the operator can understand how the system goal is
achieved. Eventually, the system goal is all achieved by the lowest level in the
means-end relation, which is the physical components and physical process. But
because the complexity of the systems that is dealt with in the engineering field,
there’s a need to solve the problem of complexity.
The means-end structure is extremely useful for the purpose of approaching
the systems complexity, as the operator can understand the means-end dimen-
sion when reason about system goal achievement. The concept of function is
introduced as intermediate level in a means-end relation to support the goal
structure, so that the system can be represent at a sufficient abstraction level
for human to comprehend.
Another important aspect about function lies in how a function is defined. The
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concept of function is closely relate to action. Lind [10] suggests that in a means-
end relation, the physical system serve as the means for action, while function
describes potentials and opportunities available for action here and now. For
the operator, to operate is to act; while for the system, to function is to act.
The functional level description of a system can therefore unify the human oper-
ation and the system function at the same abstraction level. According to this
observation, it is argued that for operational situation assessment, functional
representation of the physical system is desirable.
4.1.3 Perception, comprehension and projection
Dewey’s definition of situation indicates that when determining a problematic
situation, one must refer to the past experience to make inferences (habitual
responses is no longer sufficient) and make a projection of the future state of goal
fulfillment (discontinuation of the fulfillment of needs and desires). Endsley’s
situation awareness model [6] also suggests that, to achieve situation awareness
during operation of a dynamic system, the situation itself cannot be viewed
statically. On top of the perception of a situation, Endsley emphasizes two
further states of awareness, namely comprehension and projection.
To understand the dynamic aspect of a situation, the concept of event has to be
examined. Intuitively, the difference between an event and a situation is that an
event happens while a situation persists. Events are normally responsible for the
change of situations. To be aware of the situation, one has to understand how
different events can affect the system status. However, a change of a situation
does not rely on a certain event but only depends on how events will impact
the goals and objectives. Event is an external input to a system which causes
the change of system behavior, which depending on the means-end relations,
change the states of the system function and the status of the goal fulfillment.
Therefore, to support situation assessment, it is not sufficient to describe the
general composition of a system’s functions and goals. The means-end relations
has to be represented explicitly to evaluate the event dynamics and system
goal. In a complex system, normally, events do not only propagate through the
means-end dimension, but also through the same level of abstraction. Something
happened in part of the system which can affect the whole system performance.
Therefore, the dependency relations along the part-whole dimension also has to
be represented for the purpose of understanding a situation.
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4.1.4 Representation requirements
It is argued in the above section that to represent an operational situation for
the operator, the system goal structure has to be developed so the operator
can understand how the goal is achieved. And to cope with the complexity of
the engineered systems, representations adopt means-end decomposition is ex-
tremely useful. Functional level of representation is a good solution because the
concept of function unified the process behavior, and the human behavior. Also
based on the dynamic feature of situation assessment and event propagation,
functions and goals relations has to be modeled explicitly so that the model can
be used to inference that how event can affect the goal and objectives of the
system.
The adopted modeling methodology MFM has all the required features for rep-
resenting operational situations in a engineered system like a power plant. How-
ever, before it can be used to assess the situations, the reasoning schema of the
MFM has to be extended.
MFM models has been used mainly as a fault diagnosis tool in previous ap-
plications. But the dependency relations (both causal relations and means-end
relations) in MFM suggest that it can also be used to make prediction of the
system status. However, the consequence reasoning of MFM has not been im-
plemented previously and the root-cause reasoning is only implemented using a
previous version of MFM concepts (which is less sophisticated in representing
dependency relations). There is also a lack of formalization of function states
for MFM concepts. In Section 4.2 the author will first develop the complete set
of function states is developed and in Section 4.3, a causal reasoning algorithm
based on the latest version of MFM concepts is introduced.
4.2 MFM states and status
Lind [67] has introduced the basic principles for MFM models to be used for
causal reasoning. However, the definitions of function states is absent. Previous
MFM literatures adopted the function states set that Petersen [2] developed with
basic understanding of MFM flow functions. However, to use the MFM models
for causal reasoning and make the reasoning result meaningful, functional un-
derstanding of the state and status is also required. Thus in this section, the
MFM function states and their status will be redefined.
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4.2.1 Review of the functional concepts
Functional concepts have been the subject of investigations for a long time and
are still within both philosophy of science, cognitive psychology, biology and
artificial intelligence. In engineering systems, functionality is often discussed
as a teleological term where the purpose of a function plays an important role
for explaining the function itself. Wimsatt [73] introduced a general schema for
teleological function statements, which is given by the Equation 4.1.
F [B(i), S, E, P, T ] = C (4.1)
It can be read as “According to theory T , the function F of item i , in producing
behavior B , in system S in environment E relative to purpose P is to bring
about consequence C”.
The elements in Wimsatt’s equation are all highly relevant for the operational
functions in engineering systems and are necessary for the further discussion
of how to define and evaluate function state and status, though some of the
elements can be changed to terms that are more specific for the operational
function in engineered systems.
In engineering systems, talking about “the function of x is A” usually means “x
is designed/used to do A”, where A is an action to do and x is the subject/agent
who perform the action. Implicitly, the statement also normally refers to another
object y that is done A by x . For example, a pump’s function is to transport,
and in a certain system, water maybe implied as the object which is being
transported. However the function of the water is being transported is rarely
discussed even though it is usually equally importance to the pumping function.
Therefore the behavior in the equation is changed into an action (a subset of
behavior) A(x,y) with an agent x and an object y .
The theory in Equation 4.1 refers to the knowledge at how a function is recog-
nized as a function in a given perspective. A physical entity may do a lot of
things (that is to say, has many dispositions), for example, a pump may trans-
port water, produce heat, create noises, but in a given water circulation system,
the pump’s function is to transport water. This means that the assumptions
are being made when a function is defined that one have the knowledge of the
system and the kinds of causal laws assumed to be applicable to the description
and explanation of the operation of the system. More specifically, it means that
the ways of disposition selection is known. The theory is described as the dis-
positions of the items selected under the context in Equation 4.2, where cntx
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is the given context, Dx and Dy are the disposition chosen function for agent x
and an object y .
T = Dx(cntx)Dy(cntx) (4.2)
The purpose of a function in an engineering system refers often more directly to
the achievement of a specific state (either local or within system), which is more
commonly described as a function goal G. The Function equation is changed
into Equation 4.3.
F [A(x, y), S, E,G,Dx(cntx)Dy(cntx)] = C (4.3)
Equation 4.3 can be read as “By chosen disposition Dx of item x and Dy of item
y under the context of cntx , the function F of item x , in executing action A to
item y , in system S in environment E relative to achieving G is to bring about
consequence C”. It is important to note that the goal (G) and the consequence
(C ) is not the same concept, where the goal represents the intention of the
action and the consequence is the achievement of the goal. Function describes
the process that the consequence brought about by the action is the fulfillment
of the goal.
4.2.2 Means-end relation
Despite the importance of the general concept of function and its elements in-
troduced above, they do not provide sufficient basis for developing a formalized
methodology to model the functional aspects of the system and for providing
guidance for defining function states. There is a lack of the temporal resolution
(dynamic aspect) and relations between each functional element. Means-end re-
lations has to be brought up to create a more detail explanation of how elements
of functional concepts are linked. Firstly, we need to examine the function from
outside of its entities and goal. When a goal rather than a purpose is introduced
in the functional elements, there is a more direct relation between function and
its goal, which can be described as a means (function) to an end (goal). The
function itself is realized by means of the physical structure that is assumed to
have the necessary dispositions to fulfil the roles, which are required to carry
out the function related action. In Figure4.1, the grey boxes describe means-end
relationship between entity function and its goal. The transformation describes
the expected change from the current state to the goal state. The functional
72 MFM Extension for Assessing Operational Situations
roles (i.e. of agent x and object y) fulfillment are the prerequisites for the
possibility of the transformation.
The different aspects of the means-end relation connect the means for action (the
structure and the dispositions) with the potentials and opportunities available
for action here and now (the roles and the functions refer to the current time
instance and location in the system) and goals to be achieved in the future.
The means-end structure in Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2 explains the functional
concepts offer a preliminary sense of how to assess the function, but only in an
off-line context. However, by talking about evaluation of operational functions,
real actions have to be considered. During operation, a function appears in the
form of its action, and only the action can bring about the consequences to be
evaluated at the execution level. An action has to be carried out in a certain
sequence, which is as action phases from bottom to the top in the red box in
Figure4.1.
From the perspective of actions phases, several assessment aspects for an oper-
ational function can be identified, namely potentiality, opportunity, execution
and achievement. The dashed lines in Figure 4.1 indicate that to which action
phase is the assessment aspect refers to. During execution, there are different
stages that an action can be performed in. First it has to be initialized and then
triggered. In complex systems, most functions require constant performance of
the action to fulfil their objectives after their triggering. In case of the comple-
tion of the action, it has to be terminated according to the goal requirement.
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Figure 4.1: Means-end relation for functions and for their assessment
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4.2.3 Abnormal states and status
For each of the assessment aspect, a binary value (True or False) can be assigned
to indicate whether the action phase is reached or not. According to the above
discussion, the corresponding function element status can be derived. They are
shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Function status assessment according to action phases.
Assessment
Phases
Status
(True) (False)
Function Potentiality Available Not available
(role)-Structure Opportunity Enabled Disabled
Function-Execution
Initialization Initialized Not initialized
Triggering Triggered Not triggered
Performance On-going Suspended
Termination Stopped Aborted
Function-Objective Goal-achievement Achieved Not achieved
Interaction Interaction Effective Ineffective
In the case that the goal achievement is directly related to the performance, a
norm is usually assigned to the function according to what kind of performance
can provide consequences that fulfil the objective. And in qualitative analysis,
based on how far the performances deviated from the norm (how far the con-
sequence deviated from the desired norm), different performance states can be
assigned to the function during execution. Note that the function goal can be
a certain state or it can be a condition for another function to be performed in
the same system. In this case the interaction between different functions is also
an aspect to be evaluated.
The action performance and the interaction between functions require special
treatment. For the performance aspect, qualitative scales can be assigned to a
function to evaluate the efficiency of objective achievement. In general, function
states can be either normal state (means that the outcome of the function is
within the normal range), or abnormal(that the outcome of the function is
beyond normal range). For complex system, there are different levels of control
methods to keep the function performance to be close to its norm. Accordingly
it is convenient to define different abnormal states based on the level of effort
of controllability. For example, the abnormal states can be either deviation,
abnormal, or critical. This is summarized in Table 4.3. Deviation means the
function state is slightly deviate from the normal state but within the normal
range, abnormal means that the function states is beyond normal range but
within a certain limitation defined by the system, and critical means the function
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states is beyond abnormal states and it may cause serious consequences.
Table 4.2: Functional performance assessment.
Assessment Context States
Performance Singular Normal, Deviation, Abnormal, Critical
Interaction between functions describes how one function state affects another
function state. The interaction is different in nature based on the relationship
between different functions. Generally speaking, one function state can influ-
ence another function on either status in Table 4.1 or 4.3. Two examples are
suggested in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Functional influences assessment.
Assessment Interaction Influence
Influence of States Causal relation to increase, to decrease
Influence of Status Means-end relation to enable, to disable
During operation, it is the functions’ performance states that are the subject
being assessed, and the assessment is bounded by the enablement (Opportunity)
of a function. When a function is disabled, the performance evaluation process
ceased because the function loose the opportunity to goes into execution and
the functional structure of the system may be subject to change. This indicates
a mode shift which will be introduced later in this chapter. For MFM function,
a set of flow function performance state is summarized in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: MFM flow function abnormal performance states.
Flow Functions Abnormal performance states
source low low, low, high, high high
sink low low, low, high, high high
transport low low, low, high, high high
barrier leak
storage low low, low, high, high high
balance sourcing, leak, block
Except balance functions and barrier functions, the other flow functions may
have two categories of abnormal states: high states or low states. The abnormal
states in transport function refers to the flow rate while the abnormal states in
storage function refers to the volume. The states of source and sink function
refers to their potentiality. A function can be still enabled but in a critical
performance sate, upon which situation, high high and low low states are de-
fined. The high high and low low states refers to the boundaries of a function’s
performances in MFM.
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For balance function, sourcing refers the abnormal states in the in-port flow
balancing, and the leak refers to the abnormal states in the out-port flow bal-
ancing. Block state of a balance function refers to the boundaries of the balance
performance. If a balance is in block state, then all the transport function that
is connected to the balance function are in low low states.
4.3 Causal reasoning
Causal reasoning is the ability to identify causality: the relationship between
a cause and its effect. Because MFM decomposes a complex system in both
means-end and whole part dimensions, the cause-effect in both dimensions has
to be considered. MFM constructs the model by using building blocks that
correspond to functions and goals. It describes energy and mass flow structures
in a physical system with different level of decompositions, and provides an
abstract representation which is independent of individual components in the
physical systems. However their functionality is truthfully represented.
Reasoning in MFM models is based on dependency relations between states of
objectives and functions. Each function can be either enabled or disabled. For
any enabled functions a list of performances state is drawn in Table 4.4. Two to
three MFM functions that connected together through causal relations is called
a MFM pattern. With the MFM syntax introduced in Chapter 3 as constrains,
there is a finite set of MFM patterns. These MFM patterns together with a
hypothesis of function performance states are used for MFM causal reasoning.
4.3.1 Causal reasoning on part-whole dimension
On the part-whole dimension, the cause-effect relation is modeled by using
causal roles between flow functions. As introduced in [67], there are two types
of causal influences in MFM along the part-whole dimension.
The first type of influences is called a direct influence, which describes how
transport functions influence other flow functions. Because of the nature of
a flow structure, the state of a transport function will always influence the
mass or energy flow in the flow structure in both its upstream and downstream
directions, thus influence all the functions that are connected to them.
The other type of influences is called an indirect influence, which describes how
the transport function is influenced by other flow functions. Because the non-
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transport flow functions presented in a flow structure may or may not have an
active influence on the mass or energy flow in the flow structure, their effect on
the flow states are described by using the MFM causal roles. As already intro-
duced in Chapter 3, a non-transport flow function can have either a influencer
role or a participant role to one of the transports that are connected to it.
Balance function is a special flow function because it has the ability to balance
the flow, thus it will propagate the flow state from one transport function that
is connected to it to other transport functions, if assuming the balance is not
in abnormal state. Therefore, there are special influence rules concern balance
functions as explained below.
Barrier is a function which does not have a directional property on it. The
barrier function has a binary status of whether it is enabled or disabled. Thus
the state of a barrier function is not considered in this section.
Direct influence without balance function
Direct influence is a cause-effect relation between a transport function and other
flow functions. After considering the MFM syntax, it is easy to deduce that
only source and storage can be the upstream functions for transport, while
only storage and sink functions can be the downstream function connected to
a transport. Both influencer and participant relations describe the indirect
influences, but these relations do not affect the direct inference. A consequence
(effect) inference will start from a proposition (either evidence or a prediction)
of the transport state under the assumption that the non-transport function is
enabled.
Firstly, we consider how a transport function state will influence its upstream
functions. When a transport function is in a “high” flow state, the possible con-
sequence is that its upstream function is in a “low” state because the transport
draws more mass or energy out of its upstream function than in the normal
situation. Considering pumping water from a tank, if the flow rate of the outlet
water is higher than normal condition, then a possible consequence is that the
water tank will have a lower volume than normal. A reasoning rule example can
be stated as follow:
IF a transport “tra1” has a “low” state, THEN a possible consequence for the
abnormal state is that its upstream source function “sou1” will have a “high”
state.
To the contrast, if the transport has a “low” state of the flow rate, then the
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possible consequence is that the upstream function will accumulate more vol-
ume than its normal condition. In the extreme situation that if the transport
have “high high” or “low low” state, the possible consequence to its upstream
functions will be “low low” or “high high”.
The consequence reasoning rules for the four MFM patterns are shown in Table
4.5. In this section the, all the tables has a first row to indicate the composition
of the MFM patterns. The middle column shows the symbols of the MFM
patterns while the other columns show the abnormal function states. Column in
a table which is marked in red all indicates the initial abnormal states, the other
column of state is the deduced states. Brackets with non-transport function
indicate whether the function has an influencer or a participant role. In direct
influence, causal roles do not affect inference.
Table 4.5: Consequence reasoning rules for direct influencing downstream.
water is higher than normal condition, then a possible consequence is that the water tank will 
have a lower volume than normal.  A reasoning rule example can be stated as follow: 
IF a transport ``tra1’’ has a ``low’’ state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal 
state is that its upstream source function ``sou1’’ will have a ``high’’ state. 
To the contrast, if the transport has a ``low’’ state of the flow rate, then the possible consequence 
is that the upstream function will accumulate more volume than its normal condition. In the 
extreme situation that if the transport have ``high high’’ or ``low low’’ state, the possible 
consequence to its upstream functions will be ``low low’’ or ``high high’’. 
The consequences reasoning rules for the four MFM patterns are shown in Table \ref{creason1}. 
In this session the, all the tables has a first row to indicate the composition of the MFM patterns. 
The middle column shows the symbols of the MFM patterns while the other columns show the 
abnormal function states. Column in a table which is marked in red all indicates the initial 
abnormal states, the other column of state is the deduced states. Brackets with non-transport 
function indicate whether the function has an influencer or a participant role. In direct influence, 
causal roles do not give difference during inference.  
source/storage (in/pa) pattern transport 
low low 
 
high high 
low high 
high low 
high high low low 
 
Considering the four MFM patterns which link a transport function to its downstream functions as 
shown in Table \ref{creason2},  ``high’’ volume of the upstream source or storage is a possible 
consequence for a ``high’’ flow downstream transport, while ``low’’ flow rate of the transport 
function will possibly result in a ``low’’ volume in the downstream function. In the extreme 
situation that if the transport have ``high high’’ or ``low low’’ state, the possible consequence to 
its upstream functions will be ``high high’’ or ``low low’’. 
transport pattern (in/pa) sink/storage  
high high 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
The root cause reasoning follows the same pattern, when reasoning about the root cause based on 
direct influence, the inferences start from an abnormal state of an upstream source function or 
storage function, or a downstream storage function or a sink function. One example of the 
reasoning rules can be stated as: 
Considering the four MF patterns which link a transport function to its down-
stream functions as shown in Table 4.6, “high” volume of the upstream source or
storage is a possible consequence for a “high” flow downstream transport, while
“low” flow rate of the transport function will possibly result in a “low” vol-
ume in the downstream function. In the extreme situation that if the transport
have “high high” or “low low” state, the possible consequence to its upstream
functions will be “high high” or “low low”.
Table 4.6: Consequence reasoning rules for direct influencing upstream.
water is higher than normal condition, then a possible consequenc  is that the w r tank will 
have a lower volume than normal.  A reasoning rule example can be stated as follow: 
IF a transport ``tra1’’ has  ``low’’ state, THEN a ossible cons quence for the normal 
sta e is that its upstream source function ``sou1 ’ will have a ``hig ’’ state. 
To the contrast, if the transport has a ``low’’ state of the flow rate, then the possible consequence 
is that the upstream function wi l accumulate more volum  than it  normal condition. In the 
extreme situation th t if the transport have ``high high’’ or ``low low’’ state, the possible 
consequence to its upstream functions will be ``low low’’ or ``high high’’. 
The consequences reasoni g rules for the four MFM patterns are shown in Table \ref{creason1}. 
In this session the, all the tables has a first row to indicate the composition of the MFM patterns. 
The middle column shows the symbols of the MFM patterns while the other columns show the 
abnormal function states. Column in a table which is marked in red all indicates the initial 
abnormal states, the other column of state is the deduced states. Brackets with non-transport 
function indicate whether the function has an influencer or a participant role. In direct influence, 
causal roles do not give difference during inference.  
source/storage (in/pa) pattern transport 
low low 
 
high high 
low high 
high low 
high high low low 
 
Considering the four MFM patterns which link a transport function to its downstream functions as 
shown in Table \ref{creason2},  ``high’’ volume of the upstream source or storage is a possible 
consequence for a ``high’’ flow downstream transport, while ``low’’ flow rate of the transport 
function will possibly result in a ``low’’ volume in the downstream function. In th  extreme 
situation t at if the transport have ``high high’’ or ``low low’’ state, the possible consequence to 
its upstream functions will be ``high high’’ or ``low low’’. 
transport pattern (in/pa) sink/storage  
high high 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
The root cause reasoning follows the same pattern, when reasoning about the root cause based on 
direct influence, the inferences start from an abnormal state of an upstream source function or 
storage function, or a downstream storage function or a sink function. One example of the 
reasoning rules can be stated as: 
The root cause reasoning follows the same pattern, when reasoning about the
root cause based on direct influence, the inferences start from an abnormal state
of an upstream source function or storage function, or a downstream storage
function or a sink function. One example of the reasoning rules can be stated
78 MFM Extension for Assessing Operational Situations
as:
IF source function “sou1” has a “high” state, THEN a possible cause for the
abnormal state could be its downstream transport “tra1” has a “low” state.
Table 4.7: Cause reasoning rules for direct influencing downstream.
IF source function ``sou1’’ has a ``high’’ state, THEN a possible cause for the abnormal 
state could be its downstream transport ``tra1’’ has a ``low’’ state. 
source/storage (in/pa) pattern transport 
high high 
 
 
low low 
high low 
low high 
low low high high 
 
The root cause reasoning of direct influence with downstream transport is summarized in 
Table\ref{rreason1}. The root cause reasoning of direct influence with upstream transport is 
summarized in Table \ref{rreason2}. 
transport pattern (in/pa) sink/storage  
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
One may notice that in the direct influence the separation between four level states, does not give 
any additional in result then the two level abnormal states. However, this is not true in the indirect 
influence. 
\subsubsection*{Indirect Influence without balance function} 
To reason about indirect influence, it is necessary to separate the influencer or participant relation.  
First, upstream source functions or storage functions with an influencer role are considered. 
When reasoning in downstream direction, ``high’’ states of the upstream source or storage will 
result in ``high’’ states of the downstream transport, while ``low’’ states of the upstream source or 
storage will result in ``low’’ states of the downstream transport.  Considering the potential source 
in this case, when the source function has a high potential, it will push out mass or energy in a 
higher flow rate. One of the reasoning rules can be described as follow: 
IF a source ``sou1’’ has a ``influencer role’’ to its downstream transport AND has a 
``low’’ state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is that its downstream 
transport function ``tra1’’ will have a ``low’’ state. 
``low low’’ state and ``high high’’ state of the upstream functions give similar inference result in 
this two patterns. The other reasoning rules for the two patterns are summarized in Table 
\ref{creason3}. 
 
 
The root cause reas of direct influ nce with downstream transport is sum-
marized in Table 4.7. he r ot cause reasoning of direct influence with upstream
transport is summarized in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Cause reasoning rules for direct influencing upstream.
IF s urce function ``sou1’’ has a ``high’’ state, THEN a possible cause for the abnormal 
state could be its downstream transport ``tra1’’ has a ``low’’ state. 
source/storage (in/pa) pattern transport 
high high 
 
 
low low 
high low 
low high 
low low high high 
 
The root cause reasoning of direct influence with downstream transport is summarized in 
Table\ref{rreas n1}. The root cause reasoning of direct influence with upstream transport is 
summarized in Table \ref{rreason2}. 
transport pattern (in/pa) sink/storage  
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
One may notice that in the direct influence the separation between four level states, does not give 
any additional in result then the two level abnormal states. However, this is not true in the indirect 
influence. 
\subsubsection*{Indirect Influence without balance function} 
To reason about indirect influence, it is necessary to separate the influencer or participant relation.  
First, upstream source functions or storage functions with an influencer role are considered. 
When reasoning in downstream direction, ``high’’ states of the upstream source or storage will 
result in ``high’’ states of the downstream transport, while ``low’’ states of the upstream source or 
storage will result in ``low’’ states of the downstream transport.  Considering the potential source 
in this case, when the source function has a high potential, it ill push out mass or energy in a 
higher flow rate. One of the reasoning rules can be described as follow: 
IF a source ``sou1’’ has a ``influencer role’’ to its downstream transport AND has a 
``low’’ state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is that its downstream 
transport function ``tra1’’ will have a ``low’’ state. 
``low low’’ state and ``high high’’ state of the upstream functions give similar inference result in 
this two patterns. The other reasoning rules for the two patterns are summarized in Table 
\ref{creason3}. 
 
 
One may notice t t in the direct i fluence the separation between four level
state , doe not give any additional in result than the t o level abnormal states.
However, this is not true in the indirect influence.
Indirect i fluence wi ho t balance func ion
To reason bout irect influence, it is necessary to distingui h between the
influencer or participant relatio .
First, upstre m source functions or storage fu c ions with an influencer role
are considered. Wh n reasoning in d wnstream dir ction, “high” st e of the
upstream source or storage will result in “high” ates of the downstream trans-
port, while “low” states of the upstream source or storage will result in “low”
states of the downstream transport. Considering a potential source in this case,
when the source function has a high potential, it will push out mass or energy
in a higher flow rate. One of the reasoning rules ca be described as ollow:
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IF a source “sou1” has an “influencer role” to its downstream transport AND
has a “low” state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is that
its downstream transport function “tra1” will have a “low” state.
“low low” state and “high high” state of the upstream functions give similar
inference results in these two patterns. The other reasoning rules for the two
patterns are summarized in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9: Consequence reasoning rules for indirect influencing upstream with
influencer relation.
source/storage (in) pattern  transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
The ``high’’ volume in the downstream sink or storage will give a saturation effect, and therefore 
result in low flow of the upstream transport; whereas a ``low’’ volume will draw more mass or 
energy from the upstream transport. One of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF a sink ``sin1’’ has a ``influencer role’’ to its upstream transport AND has a ``low’’ 
state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is that its upstream transport 
function ``tra1’’ will have a ``high’’ state. 
``low low’’ state and ``high high’’ state of the downstream functions give similar inference result 
in this two patterns as well. The other reasoning rules for the two patterns are summarized in 
Tabel \ref{creason4}. 
transport pattern (in) sink/storage 
low low 
 
 
high high 
low high 
high low 
high high low low 
 
When reasoning about root causes for the four patterns in Table \ref{creason3} and 
\ref{creason4}, the inference table in Tabel \ref{rreason3} and \ref{rrreason4} are not match the 
consequence reasoning. This is a very important observation, for the causal reasoning in MFM 
has underlying temporal information. In the consequence reasoning, the deduced hypothesis 
(effect) should not be prior to the initial state, while in the root cause reasoning, the deduced 
hypothesis (cause) should be happened before the initial state. 
For the root cause reasoning rules to reason about causes for the abnormal state in a transport 
function with an influencer role attached to its upstream source or storage function, one of the 
reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport function ``tra1’’ has a ``high’’ state AND its upstream source function 
``sou1’’ has a ``influencer role’’ to it, THEN a possible cause for the abnormal state 
could be ``sou1’’ has a ``high’’ state. 
The other inference rules for the two MFM patterns are listed in Table \ref{ rreason3}. 
source/storage (in) pattern transport 
high high 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
The “hig ” volume in he downstream sink or storag will give a sa uration
effect, and therefore res lt in low flow of the upstream transport; whereas a
“low” volume will draw ore mass or energy fr m the upstream transport. One
of the reasoning rules can be stated as:
IF a sink “sin1” has an “influencer role” to its upstream transport AND has
a “low” state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is that its
upstream transport function “tra1” will have a “high” state.
“low low” state and “high high” state of the downstream functions give similar
inference result in these two patterns as well. The other reasoning rules for the
two patterns are summarized in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Consequence reasoning rules for indirect influencing downstream
with influencer relation.
source/storage (in) pattern  transport 
high high 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
The ``high’’ volume in the downstream sink or storage will give a saturation effect, and t erefore 
result in low flow of the upstream transport; wher as a ``low’’ volu e will draw more mass or 
energy from the upstream transport. One of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF a sink ``sin1’’ has a ``influencer role’’ to its upstream transport AND has a ``low’’ 
state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is that its upstream transport 
function ``tra1’’ will have a ``high’’ state. 
``low low’’ state and ``high high’’ state of the downstream functions give similar inference result 
in this two patterns as well. The other reasoning rules for the two patterns are summarized in 
Tabel \ref{creason4}. 
transport pattern (in) sink/storage 
low low 
 
 
high high 
low high 
high low 
high high low low 
 
When r asoning about root causes for the f ur patterns in Table \ref{creason3} and 
\ref{creason4}, the inference table in Tabel \ref{rreason3} and \ref{rrreason4} are not match the 
consequence reasoning. This is a very important observation, for the causal reasoning in MFM 
has underlying temporal information. In the consequence reasoning, the deduced hypothesis 
(effect) should not be prior to the initial state, while in the root cause reasoning, the deduced 
hypothesis (cause) should be happened before the initial state. 
For the root cause reasoning rules to reason about causes for the abnormal state in a transport 
function with an influencer role attached to its upstream source or storage function, one of the 
reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport function ``tra1’’ has a ``high’’ state AND its upstream source function 
``sou1’’ has a ``influencer role’’ to it, THEN a possible cause for the abnormal state 
could be ``sou1’’ has a ``high’’ state. 
The other inference rules for the two MFM patterns are listed in Table \ref{ rreason3}. 
source/storage (in) pattern transport 
high high 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
When reasoning about root causes for the four patterns in Table 4.9 and 4.10, the
inference table in Tables 4.11 and 4.12 are not match the consequence reasoning.
This is a very important observation, the reason is that the causal reasoning in
MFM has underlying temporal i formati . In the consequence reasoning, the
deduced hypothesis (effect) should not be prior to the initi l state, while in
80 MFM Extension for Assessing Operational Situations
the root cause reasoning, the deduced hypothesis (cause) happened before the
present state.
For the root cause reasoning rules to reason about causes for the abnormal state
in a transport function with an influencer role attached to its upstream source
or storage function, one of the reasoning rules can be stated as:
IF transport function “tra1” has a “high” state AND its upstream source func-
tion “sou1” has an “influencer role”, THEN a possible cause for the abnormal
state could be “sou1” has a “high” state.
The other inference rules for the two MFM patterns are listed in Table 4.11.
Table 4.11: Cause reasoning rules for indirect influencing upstream with influ-
encer relation.
source/storage (in) pattern  transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
The ``high’’ volume in the downstream sink or storage will give a saturation effect, and therefore 
result in low flow of the upstream transport; whereas a ``low’’ volume will draw more mass or 
energy from the upstream transport. One of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF a sink ``sin1’’ has a ``influencer role’’ to its upstream transport AND has a ``low’’ 
state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is that its upstream transport 
function ``tra1’’ will have a ``high’’ state. 
``low low’’ state and ``high high’’ state of the downstream functions give similar inference result 
in this two patterns as well. The other reasoning rules for the two patterns are summarized in 
Tabel \ref{creason4}. 
transport pattern (in) sink/storage 
low low 
 
 
high high 
low high 
high low 
high high low low 
 
When reasoning about root causes for the four patterns in Table \ref{creason3} and 
\ref{creason4}, the inference table in Tabel \ref{rreason3} and \ref{rrreason4} are not match the 
consequence reasoning. This is a very important observation, for the causal reasoning in MFM 
has underlying temporal information. In the consequence reasoning, the deduced hypothesis 
(effect) should not be prior to the initial state, while in the root cause reasoning, the deduced 
hypothesis (cause) should be happened before the initial state. 
For the root cause reasoning rules to reason about causes for the abnormal state in a transport 
function with an influencer role attached to its upstream source or storage function, one of the 
reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport function ``tra1’’ has a ``high’’ state AND its upstream source function 
``sou1’’ has a ``influencer role’’ to it, THEN a possible cause for the abnormal state 
could be ``sou1’’ has a ``high’’ state. 
The other inference rules for the two MFM patterns are listed in Table \ref{ rreason3}. 
source/storage (in) pattern transport 
high high 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
For the root cause reasoning rules to reason about causes for the abnormal state
in a transport function with an influencer role attached to its downstream sink
or storage function, one of the reasoning rules can be stated as:
IF transport function “tra1” has a “high” state AND its downstream sink func-
tion “sin1” has an “influencer role”, THEN a possible cause for the abnormal
state could be “sou1” has a “low” state.
The other inference rules for the two MFM patterns are listed in Table 4.12.
Table 4.12: Cause reasoning rules for indirect influencing downstream with in-
fluencer relation.
For the oot cause reasoning rules to reason about causes for the abnormal state in a transport 
function with an influencer role attached to its downstream sink or storage function, one of the 
reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport function ``tra1’’ has a ``high’’ state AND  its downstream sink function 
``sin1’’ has a ``influencer role’’ to it, THEN a possible cause for the abnormal state could 
be ``sou1’’ has a ``low’’ state. 
The other inference rules for the two MFM patterns are listed in Table \ref{ rreason4}. 
transport pattern (in) sink/storage 
high high 
 
low low 
high low 
low high 
low low high high 
 
Indirect influence with a participant means the transport controls the flow rate. Therefore, 
abnormal states from a downstream storage or sink will not give any consequence to its upstream 
transport, unless the function reach a situation state ``high high’’. When the downstream function 
in this two patterns become ``high high’’, the transport will be in a ``low low’’ state due to the 
saturation.  
The MFM patterns and the only inference rule for them is listed in Table \ref{creason5}. The rule 
can be stated as: 
IF a sink ``sin1’’ has a ``participant role’’ to its upstream transport AND has a ``high 
high’’ state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is that its upstream 
transport function ``tra1’’ will have a ``low low’’ state. 
transport pattern  (pa) sink/storage 
low low 
 
high high 
- high 
- low 
- low low 
 
Similarly, for the upstream source function or storage function who have a participant role to its 
downstream transport function, only when the state become ``low low’’ indicate that the source 
or storage is of a near empty state, it is possible for  the transport to become ``low low’’ state. 
The reasoning rules for these two patterns are shown in Table \ref{creason6}. The reasoning rule 
can be sated as: 
IF a source ``sou1’’ has a ``participant role’’ to its downstream transport AND has a 
``low low’’ state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is that its 
downstream transport function ``tra1’’ will have a ``low low’’ state. 
Indirect influence i a participant means that the transp rt dominates the
flow rate. Therefore, bnormal states from a downstream storage or sink will
not give any consequence to its upstream tr nsport, unless the function reaches
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a situation state “high high”. When the downstream function in these two
patterns become “high high”, the transport will be in a “low low” state due to
the saturation.
The MFM patterns and the only inference rule for them is listed in Table 4.13.
The rule can be stated as:
IF a sink “sin1” has a “participant role” to its upstream transport AND has a
“high high” state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is that
its upstream transport function “tra1” will have a “low low” state.
Table 4.13: Consequence reasoning rules for indirect influencing upstream with
participant relation.
For the root cause reasoning rules to reason about causes for the abnormal state in a transport 
function with an influencer role attached to its downstream sink or storage function, one of the 
reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport function ``tra1’’ has a ``high’’ state AND  its downstream sink function 
``sin1’’ has a ``influencer role’’ to it, THEN a possible cause for the abnormal state could 
be ``sou1’’ has a ``low’’ state. 
The other inference rules for the two MFM patterns are listed in Table \ref{ rreason4}. 
transport pattern (in) sink/storage 
high high 
 
low low 
high low 
low high 
low low high high 
 
Indirect influence with a participant means the transport controls the flow rate. Therefore, 
abnormal states from a downstream storage or sink will not give any consequence to its upstream 
transport, unl ss the function reach a situation state ``high high’’. When the downstr am function 
in this two patterns become ``high high’’, the transport will be in a ``low low’’ state due to the 
saturation.  
The MFM patterns and the only inference rule for them is listed in Table \ref{creason5}. The rule 
can be stated as: 
IF a sink ``sin1’’ has a ``participant role’’ to its upstream transport AND has a ``high 
high’’ state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is that its upstream 
transport function ``tra1’’ will have a ``low low’’ state. 
transport pattern  (pa) sink/storage 
low low 
 
high high 
- high 
- low 
- low low 
 
Similarly, for the upstream source function or storage function who have a participant role to its 
downstream transport function, only when the state become ``low low’’ indicate that the source 
or storage is of a near empty state, it is possible for  the transport to become ``low low’’ state. 
The reasoning rules for these two patterns are shown in Table \ref{creason6}. The reasoning rule 
can be sated as: 
IF a source ``sou1’’ has a ``participant role’’ to its downstream transport AND has a 
``low low’’ state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is that its 
downstream transport function ``tra1’’ will have a ``low low’’ state. 
Similarly, for the upst source function r storage function that have a par-
ticipant rol to its d wnstream transport function, only hen the st te becomes
“low low” indicates that he source r storage is of a near empty state, it is
possible for the transport to become “low low” state. The reasoning rules for
these two patterns are shown in Table 4.14. The reasoning rule can be sated as:
IF a source “sou1” has a “participant role” to its downstream transport AND
has a “low low” state, THEN a possible consequence for the abnormal state is
that its downstream transport function “tra1” will have a “low low” state.
Table 4.14: Consequence reasoning rules for indirect influencing downstream
with participant relation.
source/storage (pa) pattern transport 
high high 
 
- 
high - 
low - 
low low low low 
 
When inference about root causes for a transport, only the ``low low’’ states may have been 
caused by a flow function with a participant role. One of the possible causes is that the upstream 
source function or storage function with a participant role has a ``low low’’ state, the other is that 
the downstream sink function or storage function with a participant role has a ``high high’’ state. 
The root cause reasoning for these four MFM patterns is summarized in Table \ref{rreason5} and 
\ref{rreason6}. 
source/storage (pa) pattern transport 
- 
 
high high 
- high 
- low 
low low low low 
 
transport pattern (pa) sink/storage 
high high 
 
- 
high - 
low - 
low low high high 
 
\subsubsection*{ Influence through balance function} 
A balance function ensures that its input and output flow are equal. When reasoning about direct 
influence from transport to balance, the transport on the other side of the balance has to be taken 
into account. We first examine the balance with single in-port and single out-port. 
First we examine the MFM patterns in Table \ref{cbalreason1}.  When a transport function has 
an abnormal state, and it has linked to a downstream transport through a balance function 
between them, it is possible for the abnormal state propagate downstream, when the balance has 
an influencer role towards the downstream transport. One of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra1’’ is connected to a downstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an 
``influencer role’’ to its downstream transport ``tra2’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, 
THEN a possible consequence is ``tra2’’ will have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ 
is ``normal’’. 
The consequence reasoning rules are listed in the Table. 
 
When r asoning a t r ot causes for a t ansport, only the “low low” stat s
may have een caused by a flow function with a participant role. One of the
possible ca ses is that the pstream source fu ction or storage function wi h a
participant role has a “low l w” state, the other is hat the downstream sink
function or storage function with a participant role has a “high high” state. The
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root cause reasoning for these four MFM patterns is summarized in Tables 4.15
and 4.16.
Table 4.15: Cause reasoning rule of indirect influencing upstream with partici-
pant relation.
source/storage (pa) pattern transport 
high high 
 
- 
high - 
low - 
low low low low 
 
When inference about root causes for a transport, only the ``low low’’ states may have been 
caused by a flow function with a participant role. One of the possible causes is that the upstream 
source function or storage function with a participant role has a ``low low’’ state, the other is that 
the downstream sink function or storage function with a participant role has a ``high high’’ state. 
The root cause reasoning for these four MFM patterns is summarized in Table \ref{rreason5} and 
\ref{rreason6}. 
source/storage (pa) pattern transport 
- 
 
high high 
- high 
- low 
low low low low 
 
transport pattern (pa) sink/storage 
high high 
 
- 
high - 
low - 
low low high high 
 
\subsubsection*{ Influence through balance function} 
A balance function ensures that its input and output flow are equal. When reasoning about direct 
influence from transport to balance, the transport on the other side of the balance has to be taken 
into account. We first examine the balance with single in-port and single out-port. 
First we examine the MFM patterns in Table \ref{cbalreason1}.  When a transport function has 
an abnormal state, and it has linked to a downstream transport through a balance function 
between them, it is possible for the abnormal state propagate downstream, when the balance has 
an influencer role towards the downstream transport. One of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra1’’ is connected to a downstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an 
``influencer role’’ to its downstream transport ``tra2’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, 
THEN a possible consequence is ``tra2’’ will have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ 
is ``normal’’. 
The consequence reasoning rules are listed in the Table. 
 
Table 4.16: Cause reasoning rule of indirect influencing downstream with par-
ticipant relation.
source/storage (pa) pattern transport 
high high 
 
- 
high - 
low - 
low low low low 
 
When inference about root cause  for a transport, only the ``low low’’ states may have been 
caused by a flow function with a participant role. One of the possible causes is that the upstream 
source function or storage function with a participa t role has a ``low low’’ state, the other is that 
th  downstream sink function or storage function with a participant role has a ``high high’’ state. 
The root cause reasoning for these four MFM patterns is summarized in Table \ref{rreason5} and 
\ref{rreason6}. 
source/storage (pa) pattern transport 
- 
 
high high 
- high 
- low 
low low low low 
 
transport pattern (pa) sink/storage 
high high 
 
- 
high - 
low - 
low low high high 
 
\subsubsection*{ Influence through balance function} 
A balance function ensures that its input and output flow are equal. When reasoning about direct 
influence from transport to balance, the transport on the other side of the balance has to be taken 
into account. We first examine the balance with single in-port and single out-port. 
First we examine the MFM patterns in Table \ref{cbalreas n1}.  Whe  a transport function has 
an abnormal state, and it has linked to a downstream transport through a balance function 
between them, it is possible for the abnormal state propagate downstream, when the balance has 
an influencer role towards the downstream transport. One of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra1’’ is connected to a downstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an 
``influencer role’’ to its downstream transport ``tra2’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, 
THEN a possible consequence is ``tra2’’ will have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ 
is ``normal’’. 
The consequence reasoning rules are listed in the Table. 
 
Influence through balance function
A balance function ensures that its summed input and summed output flow are
equal. When reasoning about direct influence from transport to balance, the
transport on the other side of the balance has to be taken into account. We first
examine the balance with single in-port and single out-port.
First we examine the MFM patterns in Table 4.17. When a transport function
has an abnormal state, and it is linked to a downstream transport through a
balance function between them, it is possible for the abnormal state to propagate
downstream, when the balance has an influencer role towards the downstream
transport. One of the reasoning rules can be stated as:
IF transport “tra1” is connected to a downstream balance “bal1” AND “bal1”
has an “influencer role” to its downstream transport “tra2” AND “tra1” has a
“ high” state, THEN a possible consequence is “tra2” will have a “high” state,
ASSUMING “bal1” is “normal”.
The consequence reasoning rules are listed in the Table.
Similarly, when a transport function has an abnormal state, and it has linked to
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Table 4.17: Consequence reasoning rules for indirect influencing upstream.
transport (in /pa) balance (in) transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
Similarly, when a transport function has an abnormal state, and it has linked to an upstream 
transport through a balance function between them, it is possible for the abnormal state propagate 
upstream, when the balance has a influencer role towards the downstream transport. One of the 
reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra2’’ is connected to an upstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an 
``influencer role’’ to its upstream transport ``tra2’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, 
THEN a possible consequence is ``tra1’’ will have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ 
is ``normal’’. 
The consequence reasoning rules for these two MFM patterns are listed in Table 
\ref{cbalreason2}. 
transport (in) balance (in/pa) transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
If the balance function only have participant roles attached to other transport function except the 
abnormal transport, there is no inference can be drawn from the MFM pattern through a balance 
function. The abnormal state does not propagate through the balance.  
For the root cause reasoning, if a transport with an abnormal state are connected to a balance and 
the balance has a influencer role upon it, then the causes for the abnormal state of the transport 
can be because the abnormal states of another transport which is connected to the balance at the 
other direction.  
In Table \ref{rbalreason1}, one of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra1’’ is connected to a downstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an 
``influencer role’’ to ``tra1’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, THEN a possible cause is 
the downstream transport ``tra2’’ have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ is ``normal’’. 
transport (in) balance (in/pa) transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
an upstream transport thro gh a alance function between them, it is possible
for the abnormal state prop g te upstream, when e balance has a influencer
role towards th downstream transport. One of the reasoning rules can be stated
as:
IF transport “tra2” is connected to an upstream balance “bal1” AND “bal1”
has an “influencer role” to its upstream transport “tra2” AND “tra1” has a “
high” state, THEN a possible consequence is “tra1” will have a “high” state,
ASSUMING “bal1” is “normal”.
The consequence reasoning rules for these two MFM patterns are listed in Table
4.18.
Table 4.18: Consequence reasoning rules for indirect influencing do nstream.
transport (in /pa) balance (in) transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low l w low 
 
Similarly, when a transport function has an abnormal state, and it has linked to an upstream 
transport through a balance function between them, it is possible for the abnormal state propagate 
upstream, when the balance has a influencer role towards the downstream transport. One of the 
reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra2’’ is connected to an upstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an 
``influencer role’’ to its upstream transport ``tra2’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, 
THEN a possible consequence is ``tra1’’ will have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ 
is ``normal’’. 
The consequence reasoning rules for these two MFM patterns are listed in Table 
\ref{cbalreason2}. 
transport (in) balance (in/pa) transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
If the balance function only have participant roles attached to other transport function except the 
abnormal transport, there is no inference can be drawn from the MFM pattern through a balance 
function. The abnormal state does not propagate through the balance.  
For the root cause reasoning, if a transport with an abnormal state are connected to a balance and 
the balance has a influencer role upon it, then the causes for the abnormal state of the transport 
can be because the abnormal states of another transport which is connected to the balance at the 
other direction.  
In Table \ref{rbalreason1}, one of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra1’’ is connected to a downstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an 
``influencer role’’ to ``tra1’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, THEN a possible cause is 
the downstream transport ``tra2’’ have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ is ``normal’’. 
transport (in) balance (in/pa) transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
If the balance funct only have participant roles a tached to ther tra sport
function except the abnormal t a sport, there is no inference can be drawn
from the MFM pattern hrough a balance function. The abnormal state does
not propagate through the balance.
For the root cause reasoning, if a transport with an abnormal state is connected
to a balance and the b lance has an influence role upon it, then a cause for
the abnormal state of the transport can be because of the abnorm l states of
another transp rt which is connected t the balance at he other direction.
In Table 4.19, one of the reasoning rules can be stated as:
IF transport “tra1” is connected to a downstream balance “bal1” AND “bal1”
has an “influencer role” to “tra1” AND “tra1” has a “ high” state, THEN
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a possible cause is that the downstream transport “tra2” has a “high” state,
ASSUMING “bal1” is “normal”.
Table 4.19: Cause reasoning rules for indirect influencing upstream.
transport (in /pa) balance (in) transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
Similarly, when a transport function has an abnormal state, and it has linked to an upstream 
transport through a balance function between them, it is possible for the abnormal state propagate 
upstream, when the balance has a influencer role towards the downstream transport. One of the 
reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra2’’ is connected to an upstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an 
``influencer role’’ to its upstream transport ``tra2’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, 
THEN a possible consequence is ``tra1’’ will have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ 
is ``normal’’. 
The consequence reasoning rules for these two MFM patterns are listed in Table 
\ref{cbalreason2}. 
transport (in) balance (in/pa) transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
If the balance function only have participant roles attached to other transport function except the 
abnormal transport, there is no inference can be drawn from the MFM pattern through a balance 
function. The abnormal state does not propagate through the balance.  
For the root cause reasoning, if a transport with an abnormal state are connected to a balance and 
the balance has a influencer role upon it, then the causes for the abnormal state of the transport 
can be because the abnormal states of another transport which is connected to the balance at the 
other direction.  
In Table \ref{rbalreason1}, one of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra1’’ is connected to a downstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an 
``influencer role’’ to ``tra1’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, THEN a possible cause is 
the downstream transport ``tra2’’ have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ is ``normal’’. 
transport (in) balance (in/pa) transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
In Table 4.20, one of the reasoning rules can be stated as:
IF transport “tra1” is connected to a downstream balance “bal1” AND “bal1”
has an “influencer role” to “tra1” AND “tra1” has a “ high” state, THEN
a possible cause is that the downstream transport “tra2” has a “high” state,
ASSUMING “bal1” is “normal”.
Table 4.20: Cause reasoning rules for indirect influencing downstream.
In Table \ref{rbalreason2}, one of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra1’’ is connected to a downstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an 
``influencer role’’ to ``tra1’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, THEN a possible cause is 
the downstream transport ``tra2’’ have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ is ``normal’’. 
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
\subsubsection*{ Influence by balance function} 
The transport function which is connected to a balance function can also be influenced by the 
malfunction of the balance. The balance has three abnormal state, namely sourcing, leak, and 
block. The abnormal state will influence its upstream and downstream transport function 
separately.  
 
transport pattern balance pattern transport 
(not low) 
 
(pa/in) leak (in) 
 
 
low/low low 
high/high high (in) leak (pa/in) (not high) 
low/low low (pa/in) block (pa/in) low/low low 
low/low low (in) sourcing (pa/in) (not low) 
(not high) (pa/in) sourcing (in) high/high high 
 
 
balance (in) pattern transport 
sourcing 
 
high/high high 
leak low/low low 
block low/low low 
 
transport pattern (in) balance 
high/high high 
 
leak 
low/low low block 
low/low low sourcing 
 
transport pattern (pa) balance 
high high 
 
- 
high - 
low - 
low low block 
 
Influence on the same side of balance function
Balance is a multi-in-port and multi-out-port function, and the transports con-
nected to the same side of a balance function influence the state of each other,
if assuming the balance is in normal function and it has influencer role to the
transport function. Table 4.21 shows the balance pattern for reasoning in the
same side of a balance function.
Because that balance function balance the summed inflow and summed outflow
to be equal, therefore, if a out port transport is in a “high” state, that means
the tra sport on the same side of a balance will decrease its in flow rate if the
balance has an influencer role to it. The other reasoning rules are all listed in
Table 4.21.
However, shown in Table 4.22, even if the transport on the out-port has abnor-
mal state, then no inference can be drawn to conclude the state of the transport
4.3 Causal reasoning 85
function if the balance only have a participant role on them. One of the reason-
ing rule in Table 4.22 can be stated as:
IF transport “tra1” and “tra2” are both downstream transport to balance“bal1”
AND “bal1”has an “influencer role” on “tra2”, AND “tra1” has “high” state,
THEN a possible consequence is that “tra2” will have a “low” state.
Table 4.21: Consequence reasoning rules for transports on the same side of a
balance. (1)
HWR-1118 
• root cause propagation – influence between two output branches. red colour indicates the
known proposition (the consequences in this section). green colour indicates normal state
assumptions.
transport (in) balance (in/pa) transport normal 
high high low low 
high low 
low high 
low low high high 
transport (pa) balance (in/pa) transport normal 
high high - 
high - 
low - 
low low - 
• consequence propagation – influence between two output branches. red colour indicates the
known proposition (the causes in this section). green colour indicates normal state
assumptions.
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport normal 
high high low low 
high low 
low high 
low low high high 
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport normal 
high high - 
high - 
low - 
low low - 
- 19 - 
Table 4.22: Consequence reasoning rules for transports on the same side of a
balance. (2)
HWR-1118 
• root cause propagation – influence between two output branches. red colour indicates the
known proposition (the consequences in this section). green colour indicates normal state
assumptions.
transport (in) balance (in/pa) transport normal 
high high low low 
high low 
low high 
low low high high 
transport (pa) balance (in/pa) transport normal 
high high - 
high - 
low - 
low low - 
• consequence propagation – influence between two output branches. red colour indicates the
known proposition (the causes in this section). green colour indicates normal state
assumptions.
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport normal 
high high low low 
high low 
low high 
low low high high 
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport normal 
high high - 
high - 
low - 
low low - 
- 19 - 
Based on the consequence reasoning, one may deduce the root cause reasoning
rules. They are summarized in Table 4.23. One of the reasoning rule can be
stated as:
IF transport “tra1” and “tra2” are both downstream transports to balance“bal1”
AND “bal1”has an “influencer role” on “tra1”, AND “tra1” has “high” state,
THEN a possible cause is that “tra2” has a “low” state.
However if the balance only has a participant role to the transport in abnormal
state, then no root cause reasoning can be deduced for that transport function.
This is shown in Table 4.24.
Transports that are connected to the in-port of a balance have the same rea-
soning rules in both consequence reasoning and root cause reasoning.
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Table 4.23: Cause Reasoning rules for transports on the same side of a balance.
(1)
HWR-1118 
• root cause propagation – influence between two output branches. red colour indicates the 
known proposition (the consequences in this section). green colour indicates normal state 
assumptions. 
transport (in) balance (in/pa) transport normal 
high high 
 
low low 
high low 
low high 
low low high high 
 
transport (pa) balance (in/pa) transport normal 
high high 
 
- 
high - 
low - 
low low - 
 
 
 
• consequence propagation – influence between two output branches. red colour indicates the 
known proposition (the causes in this section). green colour indicates normal state 
assumptions. 
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport normal 
high high 
 
low low 
high low 
low high 
low low high high 
 
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport normal 
high high 
 
- 
high - 
low - 
low low - 
 
- 19 - 
Table 4.24: Cause reasoning rules for transports on the same side of a balance.
(2)
HWR-1118 
• root cause propagation – influence between two output branches. red colour indicates the
known proposition (the consequences in this section). green colour indicates normal state
assumptions.
transport (in) balance (in/pa) transport normal 
high high low low 
high low 
low high 
low low high high 
transport (pa) balance (in/pa) transport normal 
high high - 
high - 
low - 
low low - 
• consequence propagation – influence between two output branches. red colour indicates the
known proposition (the causes in this section). green colour indicates normal state
assumptions.
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport normal 
high high low low 
high low 
low high 
low low high high 
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport normal 
high high - 
high - 
low - 
low low - 
- 19 - 
Influence by balance function
The transport function which is connected to a balance function can also be
influenced by the malfunction of the b lance. The balance has three abnormal
state, namely “sourcing”, “leak”, and “block”. The abnormal state will influence
its upstream and downstream transport function separately.
Table 4.25: Consequence reasoning rules for a malfunctioning balance.
In Table \ref{rbalreason2}, one of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra1’’ is connected to a downstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an
``influencer role’’ to ``tra1’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, THEN a possible cause is 
the downstream transport ``tra2’’ have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ is ``normal’’.
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport 
high high high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
\subsubsection*{ Influence by balance function} 
Th  transport function which is connected to a ce function can also be influ nced by the 
malfunction of the balance. Th  balance has three abnormal state, namely sourcing, leak, a d 
block. The abnormal state will influence its upstream and downstream transport function 
separately.
transport pattern balance pattern transport 
(not high) (pa/in) leak (in) low/low low 
high/high high (in) leak (pa/in) (not low) 
   low low (pa/in) block (pa/in)    low low 
low/low low (in) sourcing (pa/in) (not high) 
(not low) (pa/in) sourcing (in) high/high high 
balance (in) pattern transport 
sourcing high/high high 
leak low/low low 
block low/low low 
transport pattern (in) balance 
high/high high leak
low/low low block 
low/low low sourcing
transport pattern (pa) balance 
high high - 
high - 
low - 
low low block 
In Table 4.25, the MFM pattern for each row is indicated in the balance column.
Reasoni g rules for the first row in the table can be stated as:
IF balance “bal1” has an “influencer role” t its downstream transport “tra2”
AND “bal1” has “leak” state, THEN a possible consequence is “tra2” will be
in “low” state OR “low low”. ASSUMING that the upstream transport “tra1”
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is not “high” OR “high high”.
The reasoning result when the balance is leaking, assuming the upstream trans-
port is not in a high state, means that the mass or energy flow has unexpected
out-port transport function. Thus there are two possibilities for consequence
reasoning. Firstly, the designed out-port transport function’s flow rate will de-
crease according to the reasoning rules for the transports function on the same
side of a balance if the balance has an influencer role. Another possibility is
that the designed in-port transport function will increase if the balance has an
influencer role. While for the same MFM pattern, if a balance is sourcing, it
means that the mass or energy flow has unexpected in-port transport function
attached. One may deduce the reasoning rules accordingly.
For the root cause reasoning, if a transport has a balance as influencer, the
“high” or “high high” on the upstream side can be because the balance is “leak”,
while “low” or “low low” can be because the balance is “sourcing”. Another
possibility for the “low low” state is that the balance function is “block”. When
the balance only has a participant role to the transports, only with “low low”
state of a transport can draw hypothesis on the state of a balance. Table 4.26
to 4.29 summarized the reasoning rules.
Table 4.26: Cause reasoning rules for transport function in a balance pattern.
(1)
In Table \ref{rbalreason2}, one of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra1’’ is connected to a downstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an
``influencer role’’ to ``tra1’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, THEN a possible cause is 
the downstream transport ``tra2’’ have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ is ``normal’’.
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport 
high high high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
\subsubsection*{ Influence by balance fu ction} 
The transport function which is connected to a balance function can also be influenced by the 
malfunction of the balance. The balance has three abnormal state, namely sourcing, leak, and 
block. The abnormal state will influence its upstream and downstream transport function 
separately.
transport pattern balance pattern transport 
(not low) (pa/in) leak (in) low/low low 
high/high high (in) leak (pa/in) (not high) 
low/low low (pa/in) block (pa/in) low/low low 
low/low low (in) sourcing (pa/in) (not low)
(not high) (pa/in) sourcing (in) high/high high 
balance (in) pattern transport 
sourcing high/high high 
leak low/low low 
block    low low 
transport pattern (in) balance 
high/high high leak
low/low low block 
low/low low sourcing
transport pattern (pa) balance 
high high - 
high - 
low - 
low low block 
Table 4.27: Cause reasoning rules for transport function in a balance pattern.
(2)
In Table \ref{rbalreason2}, one of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra1’’ is connected to a downstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an
``i fluencer role’’ to ``tra1’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, THEN a possible cause is 
the downstream transport ``tra2’’ have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ is ``normal’’.
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport 
high high high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
\subsubsection*{ Influence by balance function} 
The transport function which is connected to a balance function can also be influenced by the 
malfunction of the balance. The balance has three abnormal state, namely sourcing, leak, and 
block. The abnormal state will influence its upstream and downstream transport function 
separately.
transport pattern balance pattern transport 
(not low) (pa/in) leak (in) low/low low 
high/high high (in) leak (pa/in) (not high) 
low/low low (pa/in) block (pa/in) low/low low 
low/low low (in) sourcing (pa/in) (not low)
(not high) (pa/in) sourcing (in) high/high high 
balance (in) pattern transport 
sourcing high/high high 
leak low/low low 
block low/low low 
transport pattern (in) balance 
high/high high leak 
   low low block 
low/low low sourcing 
transport pattern (pa) balance 
high high - 
high - 
low - 
low low block 
4.3.2 Causal reasoning on means-end dimension
Causal reasoning across means-end dimensions is depend on the means-end de-
scription in MFM model. There are three different type of influences. The one
related to function performance is the means-end relation of “producer-product”
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Table 4.28: Cause reasoning rules for transport function in a balance pattern.
(3)
In Table \ref{rbalreason2}, one of the reasoning rules can be stated as: 
IF transport ``tra1’’ is connected to a downstream balance ``bal1’’ AND ``bal1’’ has an 
``influencer role’’ to ``tra1’’ AND ``tra1’’ has a `` high’’ state, THEN a possible cause is 
the downstream transport ``tra2’’ have a ``high’’ state, ASSUMING ``bal1’’ is ``normal’’. 
transport (in/pa) balance (in) transport 
high high 
 
 
high high 
high high 
low low 
low low low low 
 
\subsubsection*{ Influence by balance function} 
The transport function which is connected to a balance function can also be influenced by the 
malfunction of the balance. The balance has three abnormal state, namely sourcing, leak, and 
block. The abnormal state will influence its upstream and downstream transport function 
separately.  
 
transport pattern balance pattern transport 
(not low) 
 
(pa/in) leak (in) 
 
 
low/low low 
high/high high (in) leak (pa/in) (not high) 
low/low low (pa/in) block (pa/in) low/low low 
low/low low (in) sourcing (pa/in) (not low) 
(not high) (pa/in) sourcing (in) high/high high 
 
 
balance (in) pattern transport 
sourcing 
 
high/high high 
leak low/low low 
block low/low low 
 
transport pattern (in) balance 
high/high high 
 
leak 
low/low low block 
low/low low sourcing 
 
transport pattern (pa) balance 
high high 
 
- 
high - 
low - 
low low block 
 
Table 4.29: Cause reasoning rule of transport function in a balance pattern. (4)
 
 
 
balance (ba) pattern transport 
- 
 
high high 
- high 
- low 
block low low 
 
\subsection{Rule-Based System} 
All the reasoning patterns and inference formulas introduced in section \ref{} can be 
implemented into a rule-based system as reasoning rules.  
Existing rule-based system development environments offers inference engines with reasoning 
algorithm that can perform the reasoning automatically. A rule-based software tool has been 
developed by the authors’ research group by using Jess (Java Expert System Shell). A reasoning 
rule contains two parts. Jess uses an enhanced version of the Rete algorithm to process rules. Rete 
is a very efficient mechanism for solving the difficult many-to-many matching problem. Jess has 
many unique features including backwards chaining, inheritance capability, and working memory 
queries. It is suitable for applications when rules needed to be fired repeatedly based on newly 
generated information.  
In Jess rules, the left-hand side (LHS) of the rules contains the conditions that need to be matched, 
while the right-hand side (RHS) of the rules produces the inference result if the left-hand side is 
matched. When running Jess applications, LHS of the rule need to be matched with knowledge 
base facts. For MFM reasoning, the LHS contains two parts, one is the MFM reasoning patterns, 
the other is a proposition indicate a state of one of the functions in the examined pattern. The 
reasoning engine will try to search the fact base for facts that satisfied all the conditions specified 
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1) the information of the inferred function and state;  
2) justifications that the inference based;  
3) the rules that is used; and  
4) the assumptions associate with the inference. All of above information is necessary to test the 
availability and truthfulness of the proposition. 
The reasoning software works in two distinguishable steps. One is proposition generation and the 
other is reasoning maintenance. After a trigger (starting node) and the evidences (abnormal states) 
are registered to the reasoning system, the inference engine will first generate further propositions 
and “mediate” relation. Because these two relations provide a direct shift of
perspective when mod ling system fu ctions, which means that the fu ctions
in different function flow structures repre ent the function of the same physical
structure with different perspective. Therefore, there are direct influence on
function states between the two ends of a “pp” or a “mediate” relation. The
reasoning rules are summarized in Table 4.30.
Table 4.30: Con equence reasoning rule for fu c ion- unc ion means-end rela-
tion.
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During the modeling procedure offered in Chapter 3, it is identified that “pp”
relation in MFM have different semantical meaning. The relation can indicate
that the two function linked by the relation is bounded by the same function
states or the opposite function states.
Unless causal relations in MFM, means-end relation for inference is directional,
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because means-end relation indicates the temporal relation between the means
and the end, where means has to be present prior to the end. Thus only the
means function’s abnormal states will propagate through means-end relation
when reason about consequences. While when reason about possible causes, the
reasoning process go from the end function state to deduce the means function
states.
The other cause effect consequence inference along means-end relation goes from
a function to its objective. As already mentioned in Chapter3, the syntax of
MFM offers constrains for modeling these means-end relations. An objective
can only be linked to the end of “produce” and “maintain” relations, while a
threat can only be linked to the end of “destroy” and “suppress” relations. Any
flow functions can serve the means to these four means-end relations and the
abnormal states in the flow function will result in the “false” of in an objective,
but “true” of in a threat. The consequence reasoning rules are summarized in
Table 4.31
Table 4.31: Consequence reasoning rules for function-target means-end relation.
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The third kind of inference reasoning about how the state of an objective or
threat can influence the functions that they support through a conditional re-
lation. As an objective can only link to a “enable” relation, and a threat can
only link to a “disable” relation, semantically, it is easy to understand that the
true state of an objective will result in the enablement of the function, and true
state of an threat will result in the disablement of the function. The consequence
reasoning rules are summarized in Table 4.32.
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Table 4.32: Consequence reasoning rules for function-target means-end relation.
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The root cause reasoning rules for the means-end relations can be deduced
accordingly for all means-end relation has directional indication when using for
causal reasoning.
4.3.3 Reasoning propagation
In MFM, there is no isolated function or objective. All system objectives and
functions are either linked by causal relations or means-end relations. That is
to say, MFM model is formed by combining MFM patterns. This enable the
propagation of the reasoning process. A hypothesis of abnormal state of a func-
tion can propagate to either its upstream function or its downstream function.
In this way, if the reasoning process starts with one function, a reasoning path
can be generated.
And because most of the MFM functions is parts of two or more MFM patterns
(except source and sink function who does not serve as main-function), the
reasoning path will branch out. All the reasoning result for one session of
reasoning activity (either consequence reasoning or root cause reasoning) will
generate multiple hypothesis paths, and all the hypothesis reasoning path will
form a tree structure.
If the reasoning start with any function in a MFM model, and both root cause
reasoning and consequence reasoning is performed, the reasoning result will form
a bow-tie structure, so that all possible cause-effect paths deduced involving one
MFM function can be generated.
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4.3.4 Rule Based System for MFM Consequence Reason-
ing
All the reasoning patterns and inference formulas introduced previously can be
implemented into a rule-based system as reasoning rules.
Existing rule-based system development environments offers inference engines
with reasoning algorithm that can perform the reasoning automatically. A rule-
based software tool has been developed by the author based upon the previous
implementation of MFM workbench, using Jess (Java Expert System Shell)
programming.
A reasoning rule contains two parts. Jess uses an enhanced version of the Rete
algorithm to process rules. Rete is a very efficient mechanism for solving the dif-
ficult many-to-many matching problem. Jess has many unique features includ-
ing backwards chaining, inheritance capability, and working memory queries. It
is suitable for applications when rules needed to be fired repeatedly based on
newly generated information.
In Jess rules, the left-hand side (LHS) of the rules contain the conditions that
need to be matched, while the right-hand side (RHS) of the rules produces the
inference result if the left-hand side is matched. When running Jess applications,
LHS of the rule need to be matched with knowledge based facts. For MFM
reasoning, the LHS contains two parts, one is the MFM reasoning patterns,
and the other is a proposition indicating a state of one of the functions in the
examined pattern. The reasoning engine will try to search the fact base for
facts that satisfied all the conditions specified on the LHS, and when a match
is found, the rule will be activated. Then the RHS suggests a new proposition
according to the inference formula. The proposition that implemented in the
software including the following information:
1. the information of the inferred function and state;
2. justifications that the inference based;
3. the rules that are used; and
4. the assumptions associate with the inference.
All of above information is necessary to test the availability and truthfulness of
the proposition.
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The reasoning software works in two distinguishable steps. One is proposition
generation and the other is reasoning maintenance. After a trigger (starting
node) and the evidences (abnormal states) are registered to the reasoning sys-
tem, the inference engine will first generate further propositions based on the
rules (encoded patterns and formulas), and then test the availability of the
propositions with all the assumptions. Sophisticated strategies and dependency
structures are included to test the propositions and retract the false or conflicted
ones. All the propositions, after being generated and validated, are organized in
a tree structure so that several casual paths can be identified. The assumptions
and the dependency structures are useful for interpreting the reasoning result.
Another advantage of using Jess as programming language except its fast algo-
rithm is that it is fully integrated with Java program and can reason about Java
objects (as Jess facts) directly. The rule-based system developed by the author
is now integrated with the MFM model editor software (MFM Suite), a Java
based model building tool developed by Thunem [70] whereby the reasoning
result can be displayed graphically with the models.
The reasoning system modules are shown in Figure 4.2. To reason about the
cause effect by using MFM models, three basic knowledge bases are required:
MFM reasoning rules, the MFM models, and the reasoning propositions.
MFM reasoning rules are independent, which means the rule-base remains the
same for all reasoning activities of the same kind for all MFM models. For
modularization, MFM root cause reasoning rules and consequence reasoning
rules are implemented in different rule bases so that the reasoning process can
be initiated separately.
The MFM models has to be loaded to the system before any reasoning pro-
cess can be done. The MFM models has a special internal representation in
the knowledge base, which contains MFM entities and MFM relations. All of
MFM entities and relations are defined based on their types (source, objective,
influencer etc.) and are assigned with a unique name. All the connectivity in-
formation of the model is documented as the property of MFM relations. The
transport functions has the special property to identify flow directions. Flow
function structures is also defined as MFM entities with unique names and in-
formation about the functions that they contained is also documented.
Because the MFM has a set of specific syntax, the syntax verification module
is also implemented as a set of reasoning rules. After syntax verification, MFM
models are stored in a knowledge base and those information should be available
for all the reasoning activities. This knowledge base remains constant during
reasoning propagations thus it is called a static data base.
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During MFM reasoning, The reasoning processes are initiated by at least one
propositions inserted about MFM function states as trigger evidence. The
propositions including two different types. One is evidence, which is the func-
tions state according to interpretation of the physical system. The other type
are predictions (propositions based on consequence reasoning) or postdictions
(propositions based on root cause reasoning). The knowledge base contains
information of deduced function states is called dynamic data base, since the
information is changing during the reasoning.
The MFM reasoning procedure is demonstrated in Figure 4.2. Since the rule
base is already programmed in the system, the reasoning starts with the loading
of a MFM model and verification of the syntax. After the syntax has been
checked and the model has been properly stored in the knowledge base, evidence
is inserted in the dynamic knowledge base. This initiates the reasoning process
by call upon the reasoning engine to start firing reasoning rules according to
the MFM patterns it recognized from the static database, the function states
propositions it recognized from the dynamic database. When a rule is fired,
a suggestion of new proposition will be generated. This suggestion will be
tested with all the existing propositions to test that whether there’s a conflict
between the newly suggested proposition and the already validated propositions.
If a conflict is found, the newly suggested proposition will be abandoned, and
the proposition which result in the newly suggested one will be searched and
retracted as well. The reasoning process will be continue until no new rules can
be fired. The reasoning result will be collected and stored in a tree structure
and presented in the user interface.
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Figure 4.2: Reasoning procedure for developing rule-based system.
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4.4 Operational Mode
Mode is a system level description about plant operation and it gives context
for system analysis. Operational mode is a concept which is closely related to
operational situation but the relation between mode and situation is similar
to the relation between function and action. Operational mode and operational
situation should be defined in the same sphere of the conceptual space, however,
the distinguish between the two is also important for situation assessment.
4.4.1 The concept of mode
Lind defines modes in [74] as that a mode is the means or the manner (the
ways) by which a purpose is reached. Follow this definition, Lind specified the
modes of a system in relation to the means-end modeling framework. In the
means-end dimension, between each pair of the end and its means, the relation
has an interpretation in terms of mode as shown in Table 4.33.
Table 4.33: End-means relation Interpretation in terms of mode.
End←Means Interpretation in terms of mode
goal ← objective meeting an objective is a particular way to reach a
goal (the purpose)
objective ← function performing a function is a particular way to achieve
an objective (the purpose)
function ← role performing a role is a particular way of contributing
to a function (the purpose)
role ← structure providing a structure is a particular way to realize a
role (the purpose)
Each of the mode interpretations in Table 4.33 leads to two complementary
mode types. One type assumes that the end is given and specifies the alternative
means (end to means). The other type assumes a given set of means and specifies
the end which they achieve (means to end). MFM models are by definition
multilevel representations and the mode types defined above would in most
practical cases produce hierarchical mode structures, which is to say one mode
may include a combinations of sub-modes of various types. As an example, an
objective mode could include several function modes. Lind defines a set a mode
which can be represented by using MFM models. However, in the current version
of MFM modeling facilities, the means-end abstractions only defines three level
of concepts: objective, function, and structure. Since the means-end relation
follows the rule of transitivity, modes based on those three level of concepts can
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be abstracted according to the MFM modes definition. This is shown in Table
4.34.
Table 4.34: End-means relations in MFM and corresponding modes types.
End←Means Purpose Mode type
objective←function
(produce, maintain,
destroy, suppress)
To reach the
objective
Function-objective mode (end-to
means)
A mode is here defined as a set of system func-
tions used to realize a given objective. A mode
would then be described the objective and a
flow or control structure and there could be
different alternative structures for the same
objective each characterizing a particular pro-
cess or control mode for the system.
Objective-function mode (means to
end)
A mode is here defined by an objective which
is served by a set of given functions. There
could be several objective-function modes be-
cause different alternative objectives may be
served by the same set of functions.
function←structure
(realize)
To realize
a function
Structure-Function mode (end to
means)
A mode is here defined as a set of physi-
cal components which realize a given func-
tion (through fulfill a particular role). Dif-
ferent components can realize the same func-
tion. Each set of components and the func-
tion would define a mode. This mode concept
is useful for describing redundant components
in the system.
Function-Structure mode (means to
end)
A mode is here defined by a set of functions
which is realized by the same component or
components configuration.
During operation, it is efficient to analyze the system from a top-down manner
which means that the operational situation is defined by the top level of objec-
tive and to analyze the alternative means to achieve it. Also the operational
situation is defined by goal(objective) fulfillment, that is to say the situation is
corresponding to a function-objective mode in MFM, and different structure-
function modes, is enclosed in one situation. When considering operability of a
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special components to fulfill other function goals out of design perspective, the
function-structure modes and objective-function modes are useful because the
analysis of modes provide alternative functionality of the system components.
4.4.2 Mode shifts and definition of operational situation
The MFM mode types defined above can be used to characterize transitions dur-
ing different plant phases through means-end relations. [74] A transition could
be between modes of same type, for example between two function-objective
modes when there is a transition between alternative function sets for the same
objective. If the primary objectives remains the same in the system, however,
the objectives are unfulfilled, a mode change is required either from function-
objective relations or the structure-function relations. In the later situation, an
example could be that a redundant component has to be used to realize the
same function (the structure-function relation changes) so that the same objec-
tive fulfillment can be restored. In the former situation, the function structure
has to be changed (the function-objective mode changes) for no structure com-
binations can realize the same function structure. When the function-objective
mode changes, the physical structures may have to be re-configured as well. The
mode change may be very complex and require a full understanding of operation
constrains.
The modes transitions indicate the operability of a system, which means they
indicate the changes of actions for fulfill the objective, or the structures who
serves a role in the action. On top of the changes of functional perspectives,
there is also the suggestion and command for the mode shift which is of great im-
portance for situation assessment. Considering another situation, if the primary
objective cannot remain the same in the system after an objective failure, new
objectives has to be defined so that the current available functions (who can be
realized by the available structures) can realize them. The change of objectives
indicate a shift of perspective in a system level, which marks a new situation.
All levels of the means-end structure need to be changed according to the new
objectives. In this light, MFM can be used to organize operational knowledge
of the system, by representing a system in different operational modes. The
modes shifts is used to define operational situation in the assessment procedure
in next section.
To summarize this section, an operational situation in MFM is defined as the
system is operating to fulfill the same set of objectives. A secured situation is
when the function-objective mode of the system can maintain the fulfillment of
the objectives without function-objective mode shifting in the near future. The
mode shift between different function-objective modes or different structure-
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function modes are defined as operational modes within the same situation. An
operational situation constitutes of all operational modes which maintain the
fulfillment of the current system objectives. The operational situation becomes
problematic when the mode shift within the situation is required.
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Figure 4.3: Operational modes in MFM.
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4.5 Representing operational knowledge
From the previous modeling procedure in Chapter 3, it is obvious that building
MFM model for a specific system requires a significant amount of process knowl-
edge as well as operational knowledge. For example, to model the means-end
relations between the boron injection and removal function structure and the
energy source in the energy flow in Figure3.18, the modeler has to understand
that how the operation can be done (the possibility of injection and removal).
This knowledge can be used to specify the actuation control roles associated
with MFM flow functions. [72] The control actions of manipulating the physical
system to achieve the control goal can either be done by using automatic con-
trol system or human operator. For boron control in PWR plant, both manual
and automatic control are available. A set of four MFM control functions is
defined in MFM ontology. [59] In contrast to the classical signals and systems
perspective, control functions have a special role in the perspective of means-end
modeling. Control function structures represent a system’s operational intention
structures explicitly while the intentional structure for operation is only implied
in the process function representations. Comparing the human operation and
the automatic control added to the process, though the means and media for
assessing situation and response are very different, the operational intentions
are the same. Therefore, the author of the present thesis also propose to use
the MFM control functions to model human operator action.
By using the same control functions to represent automatic control action and
possible operator action together also serves the purpose to help the human
operator to understand the automatic control systems. Zhang et al. introduce
the idea of representing operational knowledge by using MFM control functions
in [75]. This work requires more theoretical support thus the result is not
included in this thesis for situation assessment procedure.
4.6 Chapter summary
This chapter discusses the intersubjective aspects of a situation and makes the
connection between the system goal and functions with different elements in the
intersubjective situation. A situation is represented by using MFM models, the
assessment procedure requires the assessment standard to evaluate MFM func-
tions status and performances. By using means-end and the relation between
functions and actions, a set of MFM function states is defined in this Chapter.
Causal reasoning rules is explained in detail in this chapter and the implemen-
tation of a rule-based system for MFM causal reasoning is briefly introduced.
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The concept of operational mode is explained follow the previous work by Lind
[74] and the mode shift is explained. The operational situation is defined based
on objective-function mode. In the next chapter, the assessment procedure
will be developed based on the concept of situation which is developed in this
chapter. A case study will be introduced by using the PWR model.
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Chapter 5
Operational Situation
Assessment
In the previous chapter, the MFM modeling methodology is extended to be used
for representing both the process knowledge, and the operational knowledge.
This chapter elaborates further the requirements for situation assessment and
demonstrate how the MFM models can be used for this purpose. Firstly, the
situation assessment procedure is provided and a case study with the PWR
model which is developed in Chapter 3 is used for the demonstration.
5.1 Procedure for functional assessment
Section 4.2.2 analyzes what aspects are need to be assessed for an operational
function, and based on the action phases, each function status can be reached
only by first reaching the previous status. It had been argued that during oper-
ational situation assessment, the essential evaluation aspect is the goal achieve-
ment of an operational function. Considering a single function, the goal is
usually achieved by the stable performance of an action or a successfully per-
formed action. Therefore if the goal is not successfully fulfilled, the execution
of the action needs to be examined. If the execution of the action is not prop-
erly carried out, the opportunity to take the action and the availability of the
physical entities need to be evaluated to determine the status of the function.
This is the process of the diagnostic assessment for a single function, which is
illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Considering the means-end relation and the action phases, abnormal perfor-
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Figure 5.1: Diagnostic assessment procedure for single functions.
mance, disabled function, or loss of physical entity must happen no later than
the failure of goal achievements. For an engineering system, various instru-
mentation systems is deployed and they provide additional observability (for
example, detection of mechanical failures or abnormal function performance
states) of the system rather than the goal fulfillment. In this case, prognostic
assessment can be performed for a single function. For example if the loss of
entity can be detected at an early stage, the failure of goal achievement can be
predicted if no alternative action is performed. Figure 5.2 shows the prognostic
assessment procedure for a single function.
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 explains the assessment of a single function. A func-
tion’s status or states can also be influence by other functions due to dependency
relations. This influence can happen at any stage of different action phases. For
example, a goal of a function can be “to provide potentiality or opportunity of
another function”, or “to influence the performance of another function”. In
MFM models, the causal dependencies of functions and objectives of a system
is represented explicitly, and the functional assessment can be performed in a
functional level.
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Figure 3: Prognostic assessment procedure of a single function 
The previous discussion explains the assessment of a single function. A function’s status or 
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function. If the causal network of functions and goals of a system can be modelled with 
some modelling tools, the functional assessment can be performed in a system level. In 
following two sections, a modelling approach will be introduced to illustrate the function 
states and status interaction.  
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Figure 5.2: Prognostic assessment procedure for single functions.
The situation assessment procedure is initiated by the detection of an abnormal
event. It is assumed that prior to this abnormal event, the system is operated
in one operational mode, which means a specific set of physical components are
in use to perform actions to realize the system functions, so that the system
functions are all in normal states to realize the a set of system operational
goals. As indicated in Figure 5.2 the detection of the event can be from either
means-end level of a single function node. However, the prognostic assessment
indicates a possible failure in realizing the functional objective in any case of
the detection of the abnormal event.
A single functional performance abnor ality will further influ nce oth r func-
tions. The a alysis can be done by using MFM model to perform consequence
reasoning for this operating mode. Mean while, he diagnosti analysis should
be done o find the ro t-cause of the losing of the function, si ce a single func-
tion failure can be a result of any one of the three possible scenarios: abnormal
performance, disabled function or loss of physical components. In the third
scenario, the function itself is the root cause for the failure in function realiza-
tion. In the second scenario, the function is conditioned by other subsystem
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who realize a function structure in the functional level. Thus further functional
root-cause analysis can be performed when the function structure is presented
in the MFM model. Otherwise, the function itself can be considered as the root-
cause of the failure in the functional level. In the first scenario, the functional
performance is dependent on the flow functions in the same function structures
in MFM, therefore, a root-cause analysis should be performed to trace the de-
pendency structure backwards to find the root cause in the functional level,
and then analysis how the root cause function is realized by physical structures.
This is done also by using the MFM model of the specific operating mode.
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Operation Situation Assessment 
Root-cause 
reasoning 
Search for 
alternative 
structure-
function mode 
Diagnostic 
analysis for 
single function 
Detection of 
Abnormal Function 
Loss of Entity or 
Disposition 
Detection of 
Disabled Function 
Start 
Prognostic 
analysis for 
single function 
Consequence 
reasoning 
Identify 
objective failure 
Search for 
alternative 
function-
objective mode 
T/F 
New structure-
function mode 
New function-
objective mode 
T/F 
Objective failure
New situation 
End 
N
o alternative 
Exist 
alternative
 
N
o 
alternative 
Exist 
alternative
11 
Figure 5.3: Operational situation assessment procedure.
When the situation becomes problematic after an abnormal event happens and
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is detected, the diagnostic analysis result is important for indicating how the
function-structure operation mode should be changed so that the failed function
can be realized by alternative means (physical structures). For example, there
might be redundant components who can realize the same functions. Thus those
components should be activated so the abnormal function can be re-established
and return to a normal state. The operator’s task is to activate or to monitor
the activation by automatic control system. The procedure may contains several
different steps of observations and actions which is beyond the present modeling
scope of functional models, thus detailed action plan (operating procedures)
should be available.
However, if the root-cause function cannot be re-established and brought back
to normal state, the situation assessment should be proceed to analyze the
prognostic result. The prognostic analysis will predict further function failure by
tracing the dependency relations, and eventually objective failure of the system.
In this case, the objective-function mode should be change so that another set
of function structure should be selected to realize the same objective. There
might be a situation when not all the objectives of the system prior to the
abnormal event should still be presented as major objectives. Normally, the
safety objective should be the primary concerns in of the system.
Following the above discussion, the situation assessment procedure is summa-
rized in Figure 5.3. It is important to notice that if there’s no function-objective
operation mode available for the current state of objectives, a change of system
objectives is required. Normally, during abnormal situations, the safety objec-
tives should be set as primary objectives so that the plant can be restored and
bring back to the normal situation. When the objective structure changes, the
dependency relations in MFM can be used to analyze which functions are re-
quired to realize the new function-objective mode based on the new objectives.
This however, has not yet been automated and implemented in the MFM Suite.
Thus some of the analysis in the following sections are done manually.
5.2 Function structure relation
MFM models decompose the physical system in multiple dimensions (both
means-end and part-whole), so the connections between individual MFM func-
tion and physical components are not obvious. One MFM function may be
realized by a set of different physical components either in the same time pe-
riod or in different time periods, while one physical component may provide the
means to serve different functions either at the same time or different time. As
introduced in Chapter 4, these defines a set of structure-function modes and
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function-structure modes.
The function-structure relationship is a fundamental problem related to the
theoretical aspect of the functional concepts, which is still an open issue in
extending the MFM methodology itself. The functional models without the
function-structure connection can be used for system level analysis by itself,
when the different nodes for initiating the situation assessment in Figure 5.3
is treated with the same procedure and go through two diagnostic steps and
all prognostic steps in parallel. however, the observations for function states
is still deeply depending on the states of the physical system. To limit the
scope of this thesis, and focus on the functional analysis, a direct connection
between function states and the components measurements during operation is
established in MFM Suite without considering the complicated mapping from
physical structure to its functionalities. The purpose of setting up the connec-
tion is to interpret the measurements coming from the process simulation (or
potentially a real plant) as function states according to human understanding
of the process and the scenario.
Any further analysis in the physical level requires detail modeling between phys-
ical structure and MFM functions which is not part of this Chapter but will be
discussed as perspective based on the work of this thesis.
After obtaining the function states through measurements from the instrumen-
tation system, MFM model can be used for diagnosis and prognosis as already
introduced in the reasoning section in Chapter 4.
5.3 Case Study with PWR primary system
In this section, the PWR primary system that is being modeled by using MFM is
used as the study case for demonstrating two key points in situation assessment.
The first is to show the importance of using functional models in different opera-
tional modes. The second is to demonstrate that how the assessment procedure
is applied. Note that the model developed in Section 3.2 is used in this section,
thus reader may require to refer to Section 3.2 while reading this section.
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5.3.1 Cause and consequence reasoning for a LOCA situ-
ation
In Chapter 3 Figure 3.18, a comprehensive MFM model is developed to repre-
senting all the functions of the physical system that is illustrated in Figure 3.12.
This model can be used for causal reasoning directly without modeling specific
operational modes.
As already explained, to obtain function states from real simulation cases, a
process model view has been developed in the MFM software, MFM Suite.
The current version of the MFM Suite includes four type of measurements in
the process model view, namely: temperature, pressure, volume, and flow rate.
Temperature, pressure and volume measurements can be indicators for the state
of a storage function in the MFM model depending on the specific modeling
case, while the temperature and flow rate measurements can indicate the state
of transport function. This will be elaborated further with the PWR exam-
ple. Note that the current software implementation is specially programmed
to interface with the RIPS simulator provided by IFE Halden Reactor Project
through an on-line dynamic display system as data buffer. Therefore, the data
that is gathered in the process model are not measurements but indicators. The
simulator simulate multiple sensor values for the same component. The display
system will process the sensor values and visualize the measurements in various
graphical representation, including absolute value and the relative value to the
alarm boundaries. This offers a short cut for using the indicators provided by
the display system and those indicators can be translated in qualitative function
state directly by applying the alarm limits set by the display system.
The process model is developed in MFM Suite as shown in Figure 5.4. Various
sensor-shapes in MFM Suite are attached to different components based on the
simulator displays. The sensor values are directly imported from the simulator.
The key indicators are listed in Table 5.1. Figure 5.4 also shows a pop-up
window for one of the steam generator pressure sensors and the pressure level in
relative to the alarm setting. This sensor indicator is linked to a MFM function
shows in the bottom left corner in the figure. The indicators’ connection to
MFM functions in Figure 3.18 is also listed in Table 5.1.
Note that in the physical system, the low pressure safety injection pump works as
CVCS injection pump during normal operation, thus the indicator is associated
with two transport function states (tra16 and tra36 in Figure 3.18 in Section 3.2).
This shows the first hint of conflict by using a complete model for operational
analysis, because there are different structure-function operation modes involve.
Another point is that because the cooling loops are represented as one mass
circulation in the functional representation as an abstractive view, either of the
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Table 5.1: Indicators that are used for the PWR case study.
Components Measurements(MFM functions)
Steam Generator Volume(sto4), Pressure(sto17)
Reactor Temperature (Cold-Leg(tra18)/Hot-
Leg Temperature(tra20))
Pressurizer Volume(sto3), Pressure(sto20),
Temperature(sto22)
Pressurizer Relief Tank Volume(sto2), Pressure(sto21)
Reactor Coolant Loop Flow-Rate(tra11)
Cold-Leg Collector Volume(stowe)
High/Low Head Safety Injection Flow-Rate(tra37/tra36, tra16)
VCT Tank Volume(sto7)
Reactor Water Storage Tank Volume(sto14)
Figure 5.4: MFM Suite screen shot for the process view and sensor value dialog.
steam generator has abnormal states, the associated function state will be set
accordingly.
A LOCA situation is tested by using the complete model to perform diagnostic
and prognostic analysis. A loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) is a mode of failure
for a nuclear reactor; if not managed effectively, the results of a LOCA could re-
sult in reactor core damage. The nuclear plant’s emergency core cooling system
(ECCS) is installed specifically to deal with a LOCA.
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Nuclear reactors generate heat and the RCS is used to transport this heat to the
secondary system where it is converted it into electrical power during normal
power operation. If the coolant flow in the RCS is reduced, or lost altogether,
the nuclear reactor’s emergency shutdown system is designed to stop the fission
chain reaction. However, due to radioactive decay the nuclear fuel will continue
to generate a significant amount of heat. The decay heat resulting from a
reactor shutdown from full power is initially only of a very small proportion of
the thermal rating of the reactor. The emergency cooling system is designed to
step in to replace the RCS and cool down the reactor. If the emergency cooling
systems fails to operate, the heat produced in the reactor can increase the fuel
temperature to the point of damaging the reactor. There are several level of
defense to prevent the loss of emergency cooling capability. First of all, the cold
leg collector will response to the pressure drop in the RCS and inject additional
coolant into the primary RCS circuit to prevent a total loss of coolant. Then
the safety injection pump will use additional water resources from the RWST
for the continuation of cooling. If the volume of the RWST turns low level, the
coolant leaked to the containment building can be recirculated back into the
cooling circuit.
HWR-1118 
Table 2. Measurements that are used for the testing scenario. 
Components Measurements 
Steam Generator Volume, Pressure 
Reactor Temperature (Cold-Leg/Hot-Leg Temperature) 
Pressurizer  Volume, Pressure, Temperature 
Pressurizer Relief Tank Volume, Pressure 
Reactor Coolant Loop Flow-Rate 
Cold-Leg Collector Volume 
High/Low Head Safety Injection Flow-Rate 
Reactor Wate  Storage Tank Volume 
4. DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS BY USING MFM MODELS 
4.1 Diagnosis and prognosis 
Concurrently with the application development, MFM and process model designs have been made of the 
Ringhals PWR, and it was planned to carry out MFM analysis experiments using simulated sensor data 
from the RIPS real-time simulator. Unfortunately, timing constraints and unforeseen problems with the 
RIPS simulator hardware prevented the execution of the planned experiments. Only off-line reasoning 
can be performed at this stage. 
In a typical LOCA situation, a leakage will started in the main RCS, and the energy balance will be 
disturbed and the functions displayed using a red colour in the MFM model will be affected because of a 
drop in pressure and v lume in the main components (Figure 13). In the functional model, it indicates a 
loss of energy sink in the mass flow. This condition will be continued until the energy level passes the 
threshold to trigger the emergency energy transportation («tra5» in Figure 14). The causes identified 
through MFM reasoning in Figure 14 is there’s fault happens from «sou1» to «sin1». Another possible 
fault is a low value in «tra5». The consequence of the situation is that the source will be over-heated. 
 
Figure 13. Loss of coolant accident. 
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Figure 5.5: Fault propagation between flow structures in a LOCA situation.
(Functions with same color indicates the functions is connected through means-
end relation to the energy flow.)
There are several different types of LOCA events. In the testing scenario, the
LOCA in this test case is simulated to start with a leakage in the main RCS. The
consequence of the loss of coolant is that the energy balance will be disturbed
and the functions of: sto3, sto4, tra18, tra20, sto20, sto22, and sto17 in the
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MFM model in Figure 3.18 will be affected because of a drop in pressure and
volume in the main components. The secondary system will be shut down so
the sink function sin4 become disabled. Through consequence reasoning, the
result shows failure in objectives of power production (obj2 and obj5 in Figure
3.18). The abnormal functions are also shown in Figure 5.5 in red color. The
causes identified through MFM reasoning in Figure 3.18 is there’s fault happens
from sou2 to sin2. Since the tra18 is an end function whose state is influenced
by the mass flow structure, the root cause reasoning continues to the mass flow
level. Also because sou2 is connected to the boron injection flow structure and
the rod control structure, the root cause reasoning is continued in those two
flow levels which indicates that the amount of boron sto9 and the length of
control rods insertion sto10 are in low level. Another possible fault is a low flow
value in tra33 (represent the emergency cooling energy sink) and this function
is influenced by the emergency cooling functions in the mass flow.
To summarize the root cause reasoning result, the possible causes for the ab-
normal functions states along the energy flow through sou2 to sin2 in efs1 can
be due to 4 major root cause path: (the functions marked in color in Figure 5.6
shows the connection between functions between different flow structures.)
1. Due to the mass flow functions provided by the RCS (tra10 influence
tra18),
2. Due to the mass flow functions provided by the rods insertion (sto10 in-
fluence sou2),
3. Due to the mass flow functions provided by the boron injection (sto9
influence sou2),
4. Due to the mass flow functions provided by the emergency cooling (tra36
and tra37 influence tra33).
This reasoning result shows difficulty to represent the situation precisely because
when LOCA happens during the normal production, the emergency cooling and
reaction control methods should be activated when the fault is detected rather
than to be considered as a root causes before its activation. Although the
information gather from the physical system which indicates sto3 and sto4 in
low states conforms that the real root cause is the RCS system functions in the
mass flow level, however, the other functions should not be presented in the
system during the diagnosis process.
The consequence of the situation is that the source function sou2 will be over-
heated and obj2 and obj5 for maintain the cooling of the reactor and deliver
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Figure 5.6: Operational situation assessment procedure.
the energy to secondary will fail. It is also worth noticing that after the event
of LOCA, the objective for the energy flow structure changes from maintain
energy production to maintain the energy removal. This changes indicates a
objective-function mode change which indicate a change of situation.
5.3.2 Modeling different function-objective modes
According to this analysis using an MFM model of the PWR, it is clear that
models for each operational modes should be defines so that the situation assess-
ment then can be done properly. The energy and mass flow of energy production
mode should be modeled as in Figure 5.7, where compare to the previous com-
plete MFM model, the emergency cooling system is removed from the operation
model. The pumps’ energy flow structures are omitted for the purpose of sim-
plification, which means that efs2, efs3 and efs4 in Figure 3.18 will not be
presented in the operational mode models. And the pressurizer also lost the
ability to control the pressure, which means that efs5 in Figure 3.18 will not
be presented in the operational mode models.
For the energy flow functions, two additional operation modes can be identified.
First one is when the RCS system is not in a complete disabled status, however
the pressure drops will activate emergency cooling though cold-leg collector
tanks. In this mode, two energy sinks co-exists in the energy flow structure
as shown in Figure 5.8. However, the system objective change to maintain the
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Figure 5.7: Operation mode for LOCA initiative.
energy removal instead of energy production.
The shutdown procedure is automatically initiated and the control rods and
boron injection should perform so that the source function in efs1, changes
from the original energy source to the decay heat. After this action is finished,
the flow functions for control rods and boron injection process can be omitted
for the source function in efs1 changed. This will be shown in the second
emergency cooling mode in Figure 5.8.
The second emergency cooling mode is when the RCS function is totally dis-
abled because of the shutdown procedure and the emergency cooling pumps are
activated. In this mode, only one energy sink presented in the functional level.
The function-objective mode changes because that additional mass flow func-
tion join forces to serve as functional means to mediate the removal of energy.
This operation mode is shown in Figure 5.9
The third function-objective mode is when the cold-leg collector is empty out,
and the valves should be close due to operation procedure. So that only the
emergency injection from the RWST is still present in the functional model as
means to realize the energy removal in the energy level. The model of this mode
is shown in Figure 5.10
The last function-objective mode is when the RWST is in a low level, the leakage
in the mass flow become a transport function so that the injected water leaked
to the containment building can be recirculated and used again. This mode is
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Figure 5.8: Operation mode for the first emergency cooling mode with cold-leg
collector activated
Figure 5.9: Operation mode for the second emergency cooling mode with emer-
gency cooling injection started
shown in Figure5.11.
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Figure 5.10: Operation mode for the third emergency cooling mode with cold-leg
collector valve shutdown.
Figure 5.11: Operation mode for the fourth emergency cooling mode with water
recirculation from the containment building.
5.3.3 Applying the situation assessment procedure
When the five function-objective modes are developed for the same set of ob-
jectives of heat removal in the energy flow, the set of operational modes are all
included in one operational situation and the mode changes due to searching
for functional alternatives to realize the same set of objective. The situation
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assessment still start with abnormal events where, according to the previous
cause and consequence analysis in the MFM model, the RCS malfunction is
identified. The operator’s task during this situation is to monitor the automatic
shutdown procedure ensuring that it is successfully deployed. In this situation,
the objectives and function structures changes because the loss of functionality
and unfulfillment of goals.
The MFM model in Figure 5.7 should be used to replace the previous used
PWR MFM model in Figure 3.18. The monitoring tasks for the operator is to
ensure that the new function model for the new situation starting mode is in
normal state. Note that the function states in the new mode will change because
the indicator level limits should be updated whenever the operational mode
changes. After the safe shutdown of the reactor, the operator’s task changes
into monitoring the status of the decay heat removal. The functional model
for the system changes whenever there’s changes in the functional status. For
example, when the sto16 in the operational mode shown in Figure 5.9 become
low state, the operator need to be warned so that the procedure of shutdown
the cold-leg collector valve should be done. When the action is performed, the
function disappear from the functional model so that a new operational mode is
reached. The failure in performing the action will result in other mode change
rather than the operational mode illustrated in Figure 5.10.
The consequence of not performing the close valve action will result in the gas
generated in the RCS system entering the collector tank which is an undesirable
situation. This mode can be modeled in MFM as in Figure 5.12. There will be
a reverse transport function in the mass flow level (tra37 in Figure 5.12).
Operational knowledge can also be modeled together with the process oper-
ational mode as introduced in Chapter 4. The action performed by the au-
tomation system serves as links between different operational modes models. If
Figure 5.7 to Figure 5.11 are numbered as LOCA mode 1 to 5, while Figure 5.12
is numbered LOCA mode 4.1. The mode shifts in relation to the operation can
be demonstrated as shown in Figure 5.13.
As defined in Chapter 4, once the plant reached the stable situation, the heat
removal will be kept for longer period and no mode shift is required in the near
future. This is when the situation is secured.
118 Operational Situation Assessment
Figure 5.12: Operation mode for the fourth emergency cooling mode with water
recirculation from the containment building.
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 
Mode 4 Mode 4.1 
Open water 
re-circulation 
CL collector 
injection 
Shutdown 
SI start 
Mode 5 
Operator 
Close valve 
Success? 
Figure 5.13: The Mode transition through a LOCA shutdown situation.
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5.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter, the situation assessment procedure based on MFM models is
introduced. The procedure includes three primary steps. The first is to detect an
abnormal event and to perform cause and consequence analysis to detect the root
causes and possible consequences of objective failure. Once an objective failure
is detected and no alternative functions can realize the same set of objectives.
The system enters a new situation thus new objectives has to be identified. New
function-objective mode need to be established by using existing functionalities.
the setting up of new stable function-objective mode may go through a series of
function-objective mode shift follows control actions and operations. Once the
system enters a new stable state of functional-objective mode, the new situation
is secured. The PWR primary models is used to demonstrate the assessment
procedure and cause and consequence analysis is performed by using MFM
models and 5 different LOCA modes is modeled along with the possible mode
changes.
The MFM models provide process knowledge about system goal and functions
and by using MFM, the concepts of operational modes and operational situation
can be formalized so that the model for a specific operational mode can precisely
identify the current functional elements. Since MFM models can also be used to
reasoning about causes and consequences, it is also support the comprehension
and projection of an operational situation.
Software tools need to be developed further to support the full functionality for
using MFM to represent operational situation and perform situation assessment.
The suggested implementation is listed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and
Perspectives
This thesis has reviewed different perspectives on situation awareness in the hu-
man factor studies and uses the knowledge reflectively for system representation
and analysis. The human cognitive activities during complex plant operation
and how they perceive a situation and what kind of knowledge has to be es-
tablished in the human mental model for the operators to be aware of the
situations has motivated the utilization of functional representation in system
level of situation assessment. The thesis has summarized the MFM syntax and
provides detail instructions of how to model by using the modeling technique.
A PWR primary system is used as a comprehensive modeling case to demon-
strate the MFM modeling procedure. Then the thesis investigates the usability
of functional modeling approaches to define and model a plant operational sit-
uation. MFM modeling is proposed because it is a formalization combining the
means-end and part-whole dimensions of a system, so that the MFM models
can therefore represent a complex system at several abstraction levels. MFM
models also model cause-effect dependencies of functionalities and objectives of
the system in different abstraction levels, so the model can be used for causal
reasoning. This thesis extends the causal reasoning methods for MFM models
and exploits the ability for MFM models to represent operational knowledge
and operational modes. Both concepts are of great importance for situation
assessment. By applying the extended MFM theory, situation assessment pro-
cedure is developed to assess the plant operational situation. The assessment
procedure is demonstrated on the PWR model case. Some key contributions
and perspective of this thesis is summarized in this Chapter.
122 Conclusions and Perspectives
6.1 Contributions
1. Contribution to definition of the intersubjective aspects of an operational
situation:
Various studies suggest that although situation awareness is a subjec-
tive concept, support for operator’s situation awareness can be improved
through system design or external tools in combination with training and
education. This indicates the intersubjective aspect of the situation assess-
ment tasks which relies on a formalization of the plant operational situa-
tion. This thesis argues that the intersujectivity of a situation, should be
defined through system analysis rather than the operators’ task analysis,
which is the traditional approach in human factor. This is supported by
the ecological display design and functional design methodologies. How-
ever, the thesis further argues that the system analysis should be done by
using proper functional modeling approach rather than using Rasmussen’s
abstraction hierarchy [7]. There are several motivations:
(a) the dynamic information (operability, actions) of the system’s func-
tionality should be included in the system analysis.
(b) The dependency relations should be properly represented so that the
cause-effect relations becomes explicit knowledge to support causal
reasoning process.
(c) The means-end and part-whole decompositions should be combined
to deal with the system complexity while not losing the cause-effect
dependencies between different elements on the same means-end level.
Following these motivations, the functional modeling approach MFM is
proposed to be used for situation assessment.
2. Extension of MFM Modeling methodology for using MFM models in sit-
uation assessment tasks:
The existing MFM theory supports means-end and part-whole decompo-
sition in the representation of a complex engineering system. The MFM
flow functions and control functions are defined based on the concept of
actions. MFM also represents cause-effect relations explicitly so that the
MFM models can be used for causal reasoning. A previous prototype
of root-cause analysis expert system software were implemented by Pe-
tersen [2] with an early version of MFM concepts without causal roles
representation. This thesis provides a detail methodology for how to im-
plement the cause effect reasoning in MFM by using the new version of
MFM models. Firstly, the MFM function states are further formalized
based on the assessment requirement for means-end structure. Secondly,
the thesis provides a detailed explanation of how to implement reasoning
rules for both part-whole and means-end dimensions.
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This thesis also extends MFM to represent operational knowledge so that
it suggests a differentiation between causal reasoning within an opera-
tional mode and between operational modes within an operational situa-
tion. This differentiation provides basis for the development of situation
assessment procedure based on MFM methodologies.
3. The definition of an operational situation in relation to operational modes:
This thesis provides a definition of operational situation based on how
MFM models can represent operational modes. The MFM models’ ability
to represent operational modes based on the means-end structure is critical
for using MFM to represent operational situations. The intersubjective
aspect of an operational situation is about the operability of the plant
during a particular chain of events’ happening. How operational modes
should be initiated to fulfill the system objective is the crucial knowledge
for the human operator to be aware of during abnormal situations.
4. The development of assessing procedure for operational situation:
Finally, this thesis provides procedures for assessing operational situations
based on MFM models. The procedure starts with the identification of
abnormal events and loss of functions in the system. Then root cause rea-
soning should be performed searching for alternative structure-function
modes or function-objective modes. When there are no alternative op-
eration modes for the current set of objectives, it is required to define
new objective-function mode based on new system objectives which can
be realized by using available functions. A series of function-objective
mode change might be necessary to reach a new secure situation. The
diagnostic and prognostic components of the situation assessment have
been implemented by using rule-based system. The other components of
the assessment procedure are not implemented yet. It has been concluded
that model different operational modes is critical for situation assessment.
This thesis also provides some minor contributions to the functional modeling
methodology and tool implementation. They are summarized as follow:
1. In contribution of MFM modeling procedures:
Previous literature provides insights of how to build MFM models and
demonstrate MFM models for a various industrial plants. However, there’s
no comprehensive instructions for how to model the system by using all
MFM facilities e.g. means-end relations and causal roles. Chapter 3 pro-
vides a comprehensive modeling guide to readers who is interested to use
MFM for modeling process knowledge.
2. In implementing rule-based system for model-based reasoning application:
The thesis also provides a general framework to implement a rule-based
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reasoning system for model-based reasoning application. This is intro-
duced in Chapter 4.
6.2 Perspectives
The presented research offers theoretical justifications and foundations for ap-
plying MFM, a functional modeling approach, for situation assessment. And
this provides a theoretical foundation and provides several perspectives for ap-
proaching real system implementation of MFM-based operator support tools.
From the off-line reasoning results, the problem with representing safety func-
tions together with plant process functions can cause the reasoning system to
produce incoherent results. Therefore, the addition of different operation mode
models is proposed for future study.
The author proposes to use MFM control function to model the transitions be-
tween different function configurations between different models. For example,
in the model representing the RCS system during normal operation, power pro-
duction is the only energy sink at the energy level. IF the RCS system fails
to realize the heat removal functions, the MFM causal reasoning provide a pre-
diction of objective failure. The control function actuate on flow functions in
response to the change of state in MFM objectives. Thus the new function needs
to be enabled through control actuation (change of function-objective mode).
Under this assumption, the control functions can be used for representing mode
shift. However, this requires more study on the means-end decomposition of the
control system.
Currently, the MFM Suite’s reasoning package cannot handle model transitions.
Further study and development is required to support reasoning using multi-
ple models. This problem probably requires control function reasoning to be
implemented as an additional reasoning package.
1. The interface for MFM software, the MFM Suite, and the process simula-
tor display system has been programmed so that the information can be
generated from the simulated data. The next step of the research should
focus on testing of the usability of MFM models for online reasoning. This
has not been done in this thesis. The online cause and consequence reason-
ing requires the handling of temporal information which is an important
further research subject.
2. In the MFM Suite, Multiple MFM models can be developed within the
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same MFM project. This functionality of the software should be further
extended to support MFM operational modes models. The organization of
the data structure is not straight forward and requires proper organization.
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